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1 Introduction 
 
Economic benefits are often received at different points in time. There are 
numerous examples of economic applications where the outcomes occur at 
multiple points in time. Among these are the savings decisions of households, the 
environmental policies of countries, investment decisions of firms, health-related 
decisions of individuals, and educational activities of students. 
 In the majority of these cases, future outcomes are valued lower than similar 
present outcomes, i.e. there is positive time preference. There are several reasons 
for this behavior. One reason is that the future is almost always surrounded by 
uncertainty, whilst outcomes received immediately or in the nearer future are 
more certain. This translates into the discounting of future outcomes. 
 Second, utility is often concave in outcomes (diminishing marginal utility). 
This means that more units of a particular outcome give less additional utility the 
more one already possesses of that outcome or the more one has already 
consumed of it. A second cup of coffee, for example, often gives less utility than 
the first one. Because wealth is increasing over time due to economic growth, 
people have more possibilities to consume in the future than in the present. The 
utility of this extra consumption does, however, not increase proportionally with 
the increase of consumption, so that future outcomes give less utility than similar 
present outcomes. 
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 Third, people tend to be myopic and do not always consider all available 
information about the future. This kind of behavior has the same effect as giving 
less weight (or no weight at all) to future outcomes. 
 Fourth, lifetime of individuals is finite (Bommier, 2006), whereas society has 
an infinite lifetime, and, hence, individuals may not care about so much about 
society after their lives have ended. 
 
1.1 Measuring time preference 
 
Time preference has profound implications for many economic choices. 
Therefore, it is necessary to obtain good measurements of time preference. In 
several scientific disciplines, including economics, psychology, and medicine, an 
interesting debate is going on about the proper way to discount future benefits 
(Frederick et al., 2002). A major part of the literature assumes time-separability, 
which means that total discounted utility can be obtained by multiplying utility in 
each period by a time weight and then adding up these discounted utilities. This 
implies that marginal utility of an outcome at some point in time is independent of 
the amount of that outcome at some other point in time. The most widely used 
discounted utility model is constant discounting in which the discount function is 
determined by a constant rate of discount. However, the practice of discounting 
future utility streams with a constant rate has been disputed, due to empirical 
violations of some axioms of the constant discounting model (e.g. Ainslie, 1975; 
Thaler, 1981; Benzion et al., 1989). Hyperbolic discounting models (e.g. Harvey, 
1986; Loewenstein and Prelec, 1992) are popular alternatives. The discount rate is 
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not constant but decreases with the time delay in hyperbolic discounting models, 
i.e. hyperbolic discounters act as if they become more patient when payoffs are 
more remote. Several other violations have been observed as well, including 
differential discounting of gains and losses (Thaler, 1981; Loewenstein, 1988). 
 A drawback of most of the previous empirical studies on time preference is 
that they assumed linear utility of money, or assumed that the utility function had 
a particular parametric shape. Their time preference estimates are therefore biased 
if this assumption does not hold. An important purpose of this thesis is to solve 
this problem by proposing and testing new methods for measuring time 
preference that do not need these assumptions. First, an intertemporal utility 
elicitation method is introduced that can measure utility without having to assume 
a particular parametric shape and subsequently can be used to correct measured 
time preference for utility curvature. I am able to compare different discounting 
models with these corrected estimates, and to indicate which model gives the best 
fit, which was done hardly before. I also test whether the gain-loss asymmetry can 
be explained by differential utility functions for gains and losses. 
 Another method is introduced in this thesis that allows for directly testing 
whether individuals deviate from the constant discounting model and to quantify 
their deviation from this model without having to elicit the utility function over 
money. The method can test whether alternative time preference models 
correspond better to the data. This method has a lot of potential use. It, for 
example, makes it possible, by means of a few simple questions, to test whether 
individuals are prone to intertemporal arbitrage (see Attema, 2006, for an 
example).  
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 Finally, a new method is proposed to measure time preference for future life 
years, also known as utility for life duration. It is important to have knowledge 
about this utility function, as it is crucial in making treatment recommendations 
that best reflect the interests of the patient. The usual way to obtain information 
about this function is through the certainty equivalence method, which elicits 
utility under risk. This method requires expected utility, the normative theory for 
decision making under risk, to hold. Unfortunately, expected utility lacks 
descriptive validity (Starmer, 2000), so that the elicited utilities may be biased. In 
addition, these methods need the outcome death as stimulus, which tends to 
produce strong risk aversion and, hence, strong concavity of utility (e.g. Tversky 
and Kahneman, 1986; Stiggelbout and de Haes, 2001; Bleichrodt et al., 2003). It 
therefore seems worthwhile to find new techniques to obtain estimates of utility 
curvature for life duration that use a risk-free context and avoid the inclusion of 
the outcome death. In this thesis I propose such a technique, i.e. the risk-free 
method. 
 
1.2 Applications of proposed measurement methods 
 
Another purpose of this thesis is to consider a number of applications of the 
introduced measurement methods. First, I will investigate the universality of the 
utility concept. Some economists have argued that utility is only valid within the 
domain in which it was measured, whereas others consider utility to be a 
universal concept that is applicable in different contexts. I test these conjectures 
by comparing the results of the proposed intertemporal utility of money elicitation 
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method to existing results generated by methods that used risky utility. In the 
same vein, I compare risk-free utility of life duration to risky utility of life 
duration. 
 A second application concerns the use of the risk-free method for correcting 
the time tradeoff (TTO) method, an important and frequently used method to 
measure health state utilities, for utility of life duration. I discuss each of these 
investigations in more detail hereafter. 
 
1.3 Universality of utility 
 
This thesis considers whether one unifying concept of utility exists that holds 
under different situations or that utility is context-dependent and varies across 
domains. Economists have traditionally argued that utility differs across domains 
and, hence, that the utility function that is relevant for decision making under risk 
cannot be applied in other contexts, such as decision making under certainty or 
intertemporal decision making (see Wakker, 1994, for an overview). In contrast, 
in the health economics field there is a tendency to assume transferability of 
utility. For example, the TTO method measures utility in an intertemporal 
context, but the resulting TTO utilities are often used in economic evaluations of 
health care, i.e. in welfare judgments. The same holds true for utilities elicited by 
the standard gamble method, which considers a risky situation. 
 This thesis experimentally measures utility functions for money and health in 
several decision contexts. A novelty in this thesis is that utility for money is 
elicited in an intertemporal setting. The results are compared to previous utility 
Studies on intertemporal preferences with applications to health economics 
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elicitations in a risky setting (Chapter 3). The risk-free method to measure the 
utility for life duration in a risk-free situation is proposed in Chapter 5. It is 
compared to the results obtained with two familiar elicitation methods that use a 
risky setting for the same respondents. 
 
1.4 The time tradeoff method 
 
The final part of this thesis applies the measurement of utility over life years to 
correct the TTO method for utility curvature. In a TTO, individuals need to make 
a tradeoff between quality of life and duration of life. A problem of the TTO 
method is, however, that it assumes linear utility of life duration, whereas this is 
often found to be concave, because many people discount future lifetime. This 
results in a downward bias of health state utilities (Bleichrodt, 2002). It is 
desirable to quantify this bias and to correct for it. 
 There have been done some previous attempts to correct TTO scores for the 
utility of life duration (e.g. Stiggelbout et al., 1994; Stalmeier et al., 1996; van 
Osch et al., 2004; van der Pol and Roux, 2005), but most of these studies used the 
CE method and therefore required expected utility to hold. When expected utility 
does not hold, the correction of TTO scores will be biased. In this thesis the risk-
free method is employed to correct TTO scores for utility of life duration 
curvature, so that one is not dependent on the validity of expected utility and the 
influence of the outcome death. The differences with uncorrected TTO scores are 
investigated and the role of utility correction in several violations of the TTO 
method is explored. 
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1.5 Outline 
 
The structure of the thesis is as follows. It begins with an overview of the 
available evidence on time preference in Chapter 2, with special attention to the 
health economics field. The most important findings are presented and their 
implications for medical decision making are discussed. Chapters 3 and 4 
continue with experiments concerning the measurement of time preference. These 
chapters are of a general nature and therefore not specific to health outcomes. 
Chapter 3 develops a new method to measure time preference that corrects for 
utility curvature in a nonparametric way. This method is subsequently employed 
in an experiment to estimate utility and time preference for both gains and losses. 
Chapter 4 introduces another method that enables us to quantify the deviation 
from constant discounting without having to elicit the utility function over money. 
An experiment is presented to test this method and its results are discussed.  
 In the remainder of this thesis, I focus on the health domain. Chapter 5 
proposes and tests the risk-free method to measure the utility function for life 
duration. In addition, it compares this method with two risky methods and 
presents the results of a questionnaire about the feasibility of these methods. 
Chapter 6, 7, and 8 use the new method of Chapter 5 in TTO measurements. In 
Chapter 6 it is explained how the risk-free method can be used to correct TTO 
scores for utility of life duration curvature. I measure the magnitude of this 
correction by means of an experiment. Chapter 7 investigates whether the 
elicitation procedure used in the TTO method influences its results and whether 
this influence is diminished when correcting for utility of life duration. Chapter 8 
tests an important assumption of the TTO method, known as the assumption of 
Studies on intertemporal preferences with applications to health economics 
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constant proportional tradeoffs (CPTOs). This means that individuals are willing 
to give up the same proportion of lifetime irrespective of its duration. The 
empirical evidence about this assumption so far available is reviewed and I test 
whether individuals also (or instead) constantly proportionally trade off utilities. 
Finally, Chapter 9 discusses the main findings of this thesis and concludes. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 Developments in time preference and their 
implications for medical decision making 
 
 
Summary 
 
The field of time preference is developing rapidly. It concerns important concepts 
for many economic issues. One important domain of application is health 
economics. This chapter reviews several empirical and theoretical developments 
for time preference with special attention to applications in health economics. 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
Costs and benefits often occur at different points in time. This concerns concepts 
of time preference, because costs and benefits in the future are often valued less 
than when they occur immediately (see Olson and Bailey (1981) for arguments in 
favor of positive discounting). 
 The last decades have shown some interesting developments in the area of 
time preference. We review the literature to date and in particular we consider the 
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impact on the health economics field. Time preference is an important factor in 
health economics for at least three reasons. First, it plays a role in several methods 
that measure individual preferences for health states. For example, the time 
tradeoff (TTO) method, one of the most popular health valuation methods, is 
heavily dependent upon time preference. Individuals may incorporate their time 
preferences in the assessment process, which may cause double discounting of 
QALYs when the elicited TTO scores are discounted by a standard discount rate 
(e.g. MacKeigan et al., 2003; Gravelle et al., 2007). In addition, individuals may 
have different discount structures, so that these need to be measured first in order 
to obtain a robust estimate of a health state (e.g. Bleichrodt, 2002; Attema and 
Brouwer, 2007a). 
 Second, time preference has an impact on health-affecting behavior. This is 
because this kind of behavior often has short-term costs and long-term benefits or 
vice versa. For example, smoking involves immediate benefits (e.g. relief from 
craving, physical reactions, and so on) whereas most of the costs are not visible 
immediately (e.g. lung cancer or a heart attack in the future). Likewise, time 
preference can influence many health-related activities, like exercising, dieting, 
several addictive habits, and performing dangerous jobs. The relation between 
time preference and health behavior is not very clear though. Contrary to 
expectations, the link between discounting and preventive health behavior appears 
to be very weak (e.g. Fuchs, 1982; Chapman and Coups, 1999; Chapman et al., 
2001) or not to exist at all (e.g. Chapman, 1998). Only for addictive behavior 
there seems to be a substantial relation with time preference (e.g. Vuchinich and 
Simpson, 1998; Bickel et al., 1999; Bretteville-Jensen, 1999; Kirby et al., 1999; 
Madden et al., 1999; Baker et al., 2003). Chapman (2005) presents a meta-
Chapter 2: Developments in time preference 
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analysis and finds no significant correlation between time preference and health 
behavior, but she does find a significant correlation between time preference and 
addictive behavior. However, in the case of addiction, it is difficult to speculate 
on the direction of causation, as it may well be that being addicted causes 
discounting to increase instead of the reverse. Another question is whether the 
methods that elicited time preferences in these studies really capture the degree of 
impatience that is relevant for health purposes. More research in time preference 
is therefore necessary in order to get a better understanding of the relation 
between time preference and health-affecting behavior. 
 Third, public policy makers frequently make decisions about future health 
outcomes. These decisions require economic evaluations of health care programs, 
in which time preference is a necessary input. 
 This chapter is organized in the following way. Section 2.2 presents the most 
important theories that have been proposed to model intertemporal choice. 
Section 2.3 describes the empirical evidence, in particular the violations of the 
classical theory that were found. Finally, Section 2.4 discusses the implications of 
these findings for medical decision making. 
 
2.2 Review of theoretical developments 
 
Time preference was first formally described by Ramsey (1928), and Fisher 
(1930) was the first to use an indifference framework for analyzing the discount 
rate. However, the paper by Samuelson (1937) has become the classical study on 
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time preference. He proposed a formal way to model time preference, which is 
known as constant or exponential discounting: 
 
( ) ( )∑
=
=
T
t
t
t
T xuxxV
0
0 ,..., δ , (1) 
 
with V representing utility over a stream of outcomes x over time t, T the final 
period of the considered horizon, δ the discount factor, and u a real-valued 
instantaneous utility function that represents preferences over outcomes. 
Koopmans (1960) axiomatized this model, which has become the standard 
discounted utility model in economics. 
 A lot of studies have cast doubts on the descriptive validity of the constant 
discounting model, however, as will be shown in the next section. To 
accommodate the observed violations, alternative discounting models have been 
proposed. Loewenstein and Prelec (1992) introduced the generalized hyperbolic 
discounting function: 
 
( ) ( )t
ghT
t
T xugt
xxV
/
0
0 1
1
,..., ∑
=






+
= , (2) 
 
with g,h > 0 and g determining the departure from constant discounting, while h 
indicates the magnitude of discounting. Constant discounting is the limiting case 
of this function for g→0. A positive value of g implies that discount rates decline 
over time instead of staying constant. We will call this phenomenon decreasing 
impatience throughout the paper. Similarly, increasing discount rates will be 
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described by increasing impatience. The generalized hyperbolic discounting 
function was applied by Green et al. (1994), Cairs and van der Pol (1997a, 2000), 
Antonides and Wunderink (2001), and van der Pol and Cairns (2002), among 
others. 
 Herrnstein (1981) proposed a special case of the generalized hyperbolic 
discounting model where h = g, which was axiomatized by Harvey (1994). This 
model is very popular among psychologists (e.g. Mazur, 1987; Rachlin et al., 
1991; Kirby and Marakovic, 1995; Myerson and Green, 1995; Kirby et al. 1999; 
Green et al., 2005). Harvey (1986) gave an axiomatic foundation for another 
special case of the model of Loewenstein and Prelec (1992), with h = 1. Cropper 
et al. (1994) used this model when analyzing the discounting of future lives saved 
and van der Pol and Cairns (2002) applied it to non-fatal changes in health. 
 The most popular hyperbolic discounting model among economists is the 
quasi-hyperbolic discounting model (Phelps and Pollak, 1968). This model can be 
represented as follows: 
 
( ) ( ) ( )tt
T
t
T xuxuxxV δβ∑
=
+=
1
00 ,..., , (3) 
 
with 0 < β ≤ 1. The only difference with constant discounting is the parameter β. 
Constant discounting is the special case of quasi-hyperbolic discounting with β = 
1. If β < 1 then the outcome in the first period is discounted at a higher rate than 
the discount rate that is used to compare the outcomes in any two other 
contiguous future periods. In other words, β < 1 models an immediacy effect. 
Quasi-hyperbolic discounting was popularized in economic applications by 
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Laibson (1997). Its advantage is that it needs only one parameter, it is analytically 
tractable, and it still captures the essential characteristic of hyperbolic 
discounting, i.e. decreasing impatience. 
 Quasi-hyperbolic discounting has been used to explain several economic 
anomalies, including health-affecting behavior (e.g. Brocas and Carrillo, 2001; 
Gruber and Köszegi, 2001; Harris and Laibson, 2001; Bénabou and Tirole, 2002; 
Diamond and Köszegi, 2003; Krusell and Smith, 2003; DellaVigna and 
Malmendier, 2006). 
 
Discounting of health outcomes 
 Health is a unique commodity, which, in contrast to money and most other 
commodities, cannot be transferred across time or individuals and is irreversible 
in nature. In addition, market forces are not very prominent in health care, so that 
it is difficult to measure time preferences for health from field studies. Another 
problem in the measurement of time preferences for health outcomes is that health 
states have a duration inextricably bound to it, whereas monetary amounts can be 
delivered at a single point in time (Dolan and Gudex, 1995; Gafni, 1995; 
Bleichrodt and Johannesson, 2001; Chapman, 2003). 
 It is questionable whether the constant discounting model should be viewed 
as the normatively desirable model in the health domain. Bleichrodt and Gafni 
(1996) gave arguments against the use of the constant discounting model for 
prescriptive purposes in medical decision making. Further, as will be shown in the 
next section, the descriptive validity of the constant discounting model in health 
economics is even more doubtful. 
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2.3 Review of empirical developments 
 
Decreasing impatience 
 Probably the most robust violation of the traditional constant discounting 
model entails the observation that individuals often tend to discount at a 
decreasing instead of constant rate over time (e.g. Thaler, 1981; Benzion et al., 
1989; Rachlin et al., 1991; Kirby and Herrnstein, 1995; Kirby and Marakovic, 
1995; Myerson and Green, 1995; Kirby, 1997; Green et al., 2005). Kirby and 
Santiesteban (2003) found this pattern even when taking into account the presence 
of concave utility, transaction costs and risk. Abdellaoui et al. (2006) found it 
when correcting for utility curvature and without possible bias due to transaction 
costs and risk. The same pattern was observed for health outcomes (e.g. 
Loewenstein and Thaler, 1989; Cropper et al., 1992, 1994; Redelmeier and Heller, 
1993; Cairns, 1994; Chapman, 1996a; Cairns and van der Pol, 1997b; Bleichrodt 
and Johannesson, 2001; Lazaro et al., 2001; van der Pol and Cairns, 2002). 
 On the other hand, there are also studies arguing against hyperbolic 
discounting. For example, Read (2001) suggests that the observed decreasing 
discount rates are caused by subadditive instead of hyperbolic discounting. That 
is, people tend to discount a time interval more heavily when it is divided into 
several parts than when considered completely. Harrison et al. (2002) find no 
evidence against constant discounting in an experimental study with a 
representative sample of the population of Denmark using real incentives. 
Rubinstein (2003) presents experimental results rejecting hyperbolic discounting 
and proposes similarity relations to account for observed intertemporal choices. 
Coller et al. (2005) find that subjects are divided roughly equally between those 
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following the constant discounting model and those following the quasi-
hyperbolic discounting model. The results of Sopher and Sheth (2006) can only 
for a small proportion be explained by hyperbolic discounting. Benhabib et al. 
(2006) find evidence of a small present bias in the form of a fixed cost and no 
rejection of constant discounting when taking this into account.  
 
Increasing impatience 
 In spite of the growing interest in hyperbolic discounting models, there are 
also studies that find increasing instead of decreasing impatience. Examples for 
monetary outcomes include Gigliotti and Sopher (2003), Read et al. (2005a), 
Attema et al. (2006) and Sayman and Onculer (2006). 
 In the health economics literature there is also some, albeit indirect, evidence 
of increasing impatience. Martin et al. (2000) and Attema et al. (2007) estimated 
the utility function for life duration and found increasing absolute risk aversion 
over time. When we keep in mind that the utility of life duration in effect captures 
the rate of time preference for life years, this finding is equivalent to an increasing 
discount rate over time. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     
Sign effect 
 Another stylized fact in intertemporal choice is the finding of lower 
discounting of losses than gains of a similar magnitude. Several studies found 
individuals to make decisions from some reference point and to treat gains and 
losses seen from this reference point differently (e.g. Thaler, 1981; Loewenstein, 
1988; Benzion et al., 1989; Hesketh, 2000; Antonides and Wunderink, 2001; 
Donkers et al., 2004). Ahlbrecht and Weber (1997), on the other hand, find no 
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significant differences between discount rates for losses and those for gains. In the 
health domain, a gain-loss asymmetry was observed by MacKeigan et al. (1993) 
and Chapman (1996a). Several explanations for this behavior have been put 
forward. Loewenstein and Prelec (1992) proposed different utility functions for 
gains and losses. Shelley (1993) argued that losses were discounted differently 
merely because of a framing effect in previous studies. Both of these arguments 
were rejected, however, by the results of Abdellaoui et al. (2006), who found a 
significant sign effect even when correcting for differential utility functions for 
gains and losses and using a neutral frame. 
 
Sequence effect 
 An anomaly of the constant discounting model that was found both for 
monetary and health outcomes, concerns the preference of individuals for 
increasing sequences over time (e.g. Hsee et al., 1991; Loewenstein and Prelec, 
1991; Loewenstein and Sicherman, 1991; Varey and Kahneman, 1992; 
Loewenstein and Prelec, 1993). An explanation for this finding may be that 
individuals compare an outcome in a sequence to the outcome in the period before 
it, and therefore interpret a declining sequence as a series of losses. Due to loss 
aversion (Tversky and Kahneman, 1991), these are penalized and declining 
sequences get less overall utility than improving sequences, even when the former 
have higher net present values for any positive discount rate than the latter. In 
other words, it is equivalent to a negative time preference rate, even though most 
of these people discount future amounts positively in other situations. Chapman 
(1996b) suggests that decision makers compare a sequence to a reference 
sequence, i.e. to their expectations about how outcomes usually change over time. 
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Chapman (2000) finds that although sequences generally elicit a preference for 
improvement, this pattern is moderated by expectations about how outcomes are 
generally experienced over time. When the expectation of decline is strong 
enough, as in many aspects of health, a preference for a worsening sequence 
appears. 
 
Magnitude effect 
 Another empirical regularity concerns the finding of lower discount rates for 
higher amounts than for lower amounts. This has been found both for studies with 
hypothetical monetary incentives (e.g. Thaler, 1981; Benzion et al., 1989; Read, 
2001) and for studies with real monetary incentives (e.g. Holcomb and Nelson, 
1992; Green et al., 1994; Kirby et al., 1999; Antonides and Wunderink, 2001). In 
addition, a similar effect was found for health outcomes (e.g. Chapman and 
Elstein, 1995; Chapman, 1996a; Bickel and Johnson, 2003). An exception 
includes the study of Gigliotti and Sopher (2003). 
 Most of these studies may have found a spurious magnitude effect, however, 
as they did not correct for utility curvature. Loewenstein and Prelec (1992) 
proposed a possible explanation for the magnitude effect. They attribute it to the 
elasticity of the utility function. Chapman (2003) concludes that the magnitude 
effect is solely caused by utility curvature, but this conclusion seems premature, 
as the empirical evidence concerning the amount of utility curvature suggests that 
incorrectly assuming linear utility cannot fully account for the magnitude effect. 
For example, economists often assume a power utility function over money 
(Wakker, 2007), which has the property of constant relative risk aversion, but this 
cannot account for a magnitude effect. Suppose a decision maker has a power 
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utility function over money of the form xu =  and is indifferent between 100 
Euro now and 225 Euro in one year. This means that his utility discount factor is 
9
6
225
100
=  whereas not correcting for utility curvature gives a discount factor of 
9
4
225
100
= . If we then multiply the monetary amount that can be received 
immediately by a factor 2, the decision maker can get a utility of 14.14200 ≈  
right now, which is equivalent to a utility of 21.21
96
14.14
≈  in one year. 
Therefore, the monetary amount that makes him indifferent to 200 Euro 
immediately is 45021.21 2 =  in one year. Not correcting for utility curvature 
again gives a discount factor of 
9
4
, so that there is no magnitude effect even when 
incorrectly assuming linear utility. Consequently, one has to assume a utility 
function that does not belong to the family of constant relative risk aversion. An 
alternative is the exponential utility function, which belongs to the constant 
absolute risk aversion family and which does predict a magnitude effect when 
incorrectly assuming linear utility. However, the amount of the magnitude effect 
that is found mostly is so high (e.g. Thaler, 1981) that it would require absurdly 
high utility curvature to have discount functions that are independent of the 
magnitude of the outcomes. 
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Framing 
 The existing empirical literature on time preference demonstrates the 
considerable role the experimental design can play. Potentially influential factors 
include the response mode (money or time, see for example Attema et al., 2006), 
the framing of questions (e.g. Shelley, 1993), the time unit used (e.g. days, weeks, 
months or years), and the elicitation procedure (choices versus matching, e.g. 
Ahlbrecht and Weber, 1997). 
 Another framing effect is the dependence of discounting rates on the framing 
of a question as the delay or speeding up of some receipt or payment 
(Loewenstein, 1988; Shelley, 1993; Shelley and Omer, 1996). This phenomenon 
seems to be related to the WTP-WTA gap and can to a large extent be explained 
by loss aversion (e.g. Kahneman et al., 1990). There are also several studies that 
found higher discounting when the same amount of delay was expressed in terms 
of duration than when it was expressed in terms of dates (e.g. Read et al., 2005b; 
LeBoeuf, 2006). 
 
Domain independence 
 A further question concerns the existence of a unifying concept of 
discounting for several domains. Some studies have compared the discounting of 
monetary and health outcomes, with mixed results. Moore and Viscusi (1990) and 
Cropper et al. (1994) found discount rates for money and health to be similar. 
Chapman and Elstein (1995) reported low correlation in discount rates between 
money and health. Cairns (1992) found higher discount rates for money than for 
health. Chapman (1996a) observed domain independence even when expressing 
money and health on a common utility scale. Chapman et al. (1999) investigated 
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whether preferences could be explained by familiarity with the health state and its 
expected development during lifetime. It appeared to play no role, however, and 
therefore familiarity also seems not able to explain the independence between the 
monetary and the health domain. In addition, dissimilarities in the descriptions of 
health and money could not explain the differences. 
 
2.4 Discussion and implications for medical decision making 
 
The evidence presented above lends support to a tendency to discount future 
outcomes in a hyperbolic way, both for money and for health. This has important 
implications for the understanding and prediction of health-affecting behavior, for 
the measurement of health-related preferences, and for economic evaluations. For 
example, when people, having a hyperbolic discount structure, give relatively 
more weight to the far future than under constant discounting, this implies more 
attention will be given to preventive programs, which generally have benefits 
occurring long after implementation of the program (e.g. vaccination programs). 
On the other hand, hyperbolic discounting may cause self-control problems 
(O’Donoghue and Rabin, 1999), leading individuals to repeatedly postpone 
investments in health, like exercising or quitting smoking. 
 The findings of decreasing discount rates over time, lower discounting of 
losses than of gains, a lower discounting of high outcomes, and a general 
preference for improving sequences, seem to be robust across different domains. 
This suggests there is some underlying mechanism that is valid for both monetary 
and health outcomes. On the other hand, the correlation between time preference 
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rates for money and health is rather low, indicating that several other contextual 
factors are also influential in determining the observed intertemporal behavior. 
 
Implications for health-affecting behavior 
 Hyperbolic discounting can be used to explain a variety of observed health 
actions. For example, Gruber and Köszegi (2001) have incorporated the quasi-
hyperbolic discounting model into the rational addiction model of Becker and 
Murphy (1988). Their analysis shows that the presence of hyperbolic discounting 
can be a reason to introduce a tax to improve long-term welfare even when there 
are no externalities or market power present. As a test of this hypothesis, Gruber 
and Mullainathan (2005) analyzed by means of the results of a questionnaire 
whether higher cigarette taxes make consumers happier because it encourages 
them to stop smoking, which they wanted to anyway but were not able to due to 
self-control problems. They find that this is indeed the case, which suggests that 
increasing taxation on smoking may be welfare-improving. 
 O’Donoghue and Rabin (2006) show that taxing sin goods can increase 
consumer surplus when only a fraction of the population behaves time-
inconsistently. These consumers have self-control problems and consume more of 
some unhealthy product than they actually want. Redistributing the obtained tax 
proceeds to consumers may even yield a Pareto-improving outcome where 
nobody is worse off. Moreover, the resulting decrease in consumption will 
improve society’s health. 
 DellaVigna and Malmendier (2006) mention hyperbolic discounting as a 
potential explanation for their finding that consumers buy monthly contracts at 
gyms that turn out to be more expensive per visit than it would be if they bought a 
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separate ticket for each visit. They probably had too high expectations about their 
expected frequency of visits to the gym and according to those expectations the 
long-term package turned out to be the most favorable. However, because of self-
control problems, these expectations could not be made true and they ended up 
visiting the gym much less than expected. Therefore the ex post costs per visit 
were higher than the costs of a one visit ticket. 
 Contrary to hyperbolic discounting, the applications of the other anomalies to 
the health context are scarce. Since the evidence of a sign effect, a magnitude 
effect and framing is exhaustive, and relevant for medical decision making, there 
is need for future research to fill this gap. The gain-loss asymmetry implies that 
people will discount health outcomes that are framed as losses as seen from a 
certain reference point less than when these are framed as gains. This can be used 
by policy makers in order to achieve goals regarding better long-term health. For 
example, when governments want to reduce smoking in a country, it may help to 
focus on the future losses that will be incurred when one continues to smoke, 
instead of focusing on the future gains in terms of better health when one stops 
smoking. An implication of the magnitude effect is that emphasizing outcomes of 
large magnitudes can encourage future-oriented behavior, as these will be 
discounted at a lower rate.  
 
Implications for the measurement of health preferences 
 The evidence on time preference also has implications for health valuation 
methods. The findings against constant relative risk aversion in the context of life 
duration are negative evidence for the QALY model as proposed by Pliskin et al. 
(1980). If their assumptions hold, it necessarily follows that the utility function 
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for life years can be represented by a power function, which implies constant 
relative risk aversion. In addition, its implied condition of constant proportional 
tradeoffs has often been violated (e.g. Stiggelbout et al., 1995; Bleichrodt et al., 
2003; Attema and Brouwer, 2007c).  
 The evidence against constant discounting has implications for the QALY 
model as well, since future QALYs are often discounted at a constant rate. 
Economic evaluations may still incorporate constantly discounted QALYs for 
normative purposes, however, as long as the elicited quality weights are not 
distorted by time preference of respondents incorporated into their answers. For 
instance, raw TTO scores may already reflect time preference so that discounting 
them would underestimate utility. 
3 Intertemporal tradeoffs for gains and losses: 
An experimental measurement of discounted 
utility1 
 
 
Summary 
 
This chapter is the first to measure utility in intertemporal choice and presents 
new and more robust evidence on the discounting of money outcomes. Our 
measurement method is parameter-free in the sense that it requires no 
assumptions about utility or discounting. We found that intertemporal utility was 
concave for gains and convex for losses, consistent with a hypothesis put forward 
by Loewenstein and Prelec (1992). Utility in intertemporal choice was close to 
utility in decision under risk and uncertainty, suggesting that there may be one 
unifying concept of utility that applies to all of economics. The existence of one 
concept of utility is important for applied economics, because it largely reduces 
data requirements. Discount rates declined over time, but less so than has been 
observed in previous studies that assumed linear utility. Of the main discounted 
utility models, Loewenstein and Prelec’s (1992) generalized hyperbolic 
                                                 
1
 This chapter is based on Abdellaoui, Attema, and Bleichrodt (2006). 
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discounting model best fitted our data. The widely used quasi-hyperbolic model 
fitted the data only slightly better than constant discounting. Finally, we obtained 
evidence of an asymmetry in discounting between gains and losses, which, in 
contrast with earlier findings, cannot be explained by a framing effect.  
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
Many economic decisions involve outcomes that occur at different points in time. 
To model such decisions, discounted utility models are typically used. These 
models combine a utility function that reflects attitudes towards outcomes and a 
discount function that captures the effect of the passage of time. The most widely 
used discounted utility model in economics is constant discounting in which the 
discount function is determined by a constant rate of discount. Empirical studies 
on time preference have observed that discount rates are not constant but decrease 
over time, a phenomenon referred to as decreasing impatience (Frederick et al., 
2002; Read, 2004). These findings have led to the development of alternative 
discounted utility models, commonly referred to as hyperbolic discounting. The 
hyperbolic discounting models are consistent with decreasing impatience and 
have become quickly popular in economics. Today many applications are based 
on hyperbolic discounting, in particular on quasi-hyperbolic discounting, a model 
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that was first proposed by Phelps and Polak (1968) and made popular by Laibson 
(1997).2  
 Empirical measurement of discounted utility models is complex, because it 
requires the simultaneous elicitation of the utility function and the discount 
function. Previous studies have side-stepped this problem and have assumed 
specific functional forms for the utility function and the discount function. In 
particular, most studies have assumed linear utility. A drawback of making 
parametric assumptions is that the quality of the estimation comes to depend on 
the choice of functional forms. For example, if utility is concave instead of linear 
then falsely assuming linear utility will lead to an overestimation of discount 
rates. It should be noted that most empirical studies have indeed found high 
discount rates. Another limitation of assuming functional forms for utility is that 
no or only limited information is obtained on the intertemporal utility function. 
Consequently, in spite of the importance of intertemporal preferences and 
discounted utility models in economics, there exists to date no study that has 
actually measured the utility function in intertemporal choice. 
 In light of the above problems, this chapter presents a new method to 
measure both intertemporal utility and the discount function without making any 
assumptions about functional forms. It is in this sense that we refer to our method 
as parameter-free. An additional advantage of our method is that it allows 
                                                 
2
 Examples of applications based on quasi-hyperbolic discounting include Laibson 
(1997), Bernheim et al. (2001), Harris and Laibson (2001), Krusell and Smith (2003), and 
Salanié and Treich (2006) for saving, O'Donoghue and Rabin (1999) and Brocas and 
Carrillo (2001) for procrastination, Brocas and Carrillo (2000) for the value of 
information, Gruber and Köszegi (2001) for addiction, Bénabou and Tirole (2002) for 
self-confidence, Diamond and Köszegi (2003) for retirement, and Karp (2005) for global 
warming. 
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measuring utility and discounting at the individual level and, therefore, takes 
account of heterogeneity in individual preferences. We applied our method in an 
experimental study and, hence, this paper is the first to measure intertemporal 
utility and to obtain robust estimates of the discount function at the individual 
level.  
 Our data allowed us to address several empirical questions. First, we 
obtained evidence on the shape of the utility function in intertemporal choice. 
Classical economics assumes that this utility function is everywhere concave. 
Loewenstein and Prelec (1992), by contrast, posit that people treat gains and 
losses differently and have concave utility for gains and convex utility for losses. 
We performed our experiment both for gains and for losses, which made it 
possible to compare the predictions of classical economics with Loewenstein and 
Prelec’s (1992) hypotheses.  
 Second, our findings on intertemporal utility allowed us to shed some 
empirical light on a long-standing issue in economics, whether there exists one 
unifying concept of utility that applies to all of economics or whether different 
concepts of utility apply in different decision contexts (for a history see Wakker, 
1994). No empirical guidance exists on this debate, because few measurements of 
utility were available in decision contexts other than decision under risk. The 
existence of one unifying concept of utility would be highly desirable for applied 
economics because it implies that utility measurements can be transferred across 
decision contexts thereby greatly reducing data requirements. By comparing our 
utility measurements with those from the literature on decision under risk, we 
were able to provide insights regarding the existence of one unifying concept of 
utility.  
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 Third, we could test whether the commonly observed pattern of declining 
discount rates persisted when the assumption of linear utility was relaxed. As 
argued above, there are grounds to suspect that previous observations of 
decreasing impatience may, at least partly, have been caused by falsely assuming 
linear utility. Our data also made it possible to compare the fit of constant 
discounting with that of its main hyperbolic alternative, quasi-hyperbolic 
discounting, and three other popular hyperbolic discounting models. Many studies 
have provided support for hyperbolic discounting (e.g. Ainslie, 1975; Thaler, 
1981; Benzion et al., 1989; Kirby and Marakovic, 1995),3 but little insight exists 
into which hyperbolic model most accurately describes intertemporal preferences. 
The popularity of quasi-hyperbolic discounting relative to other hyperbolic 
discounting models in economics is based on its theoretical tractability and not on 
its displayed descriptive superiority. 
 Finally, we could perform a robust test for an asymmetry between the 
discounting of gains and losses that has been observed in some earlier studies 
(Thaler, 1981; Benzion et al., 1989). One explanation for the gain-loss asymmetry 
may be that it is an artifact of the assumption of linear utility. When utility is 
concave for gains, leading to an overestimation of discount rates for gains, and 
closer to linear for losses, leading to less distortion of discount rates for losses, 
then the gain-loss asymmetry will follow from the assumption of linear utility 
even when people have the same discount function for gains and for losses. The 
pattern “concave utility for gains and more linear utility for losses” has been 
observed in several empirical studies on decision under risk (Fishburn and 
Kochenberger, 1979; Abdellaoui, 2000; Pennings and Smidts, 2003).  
                                                 
3
 For findings challenging hyperbolic discounting see Read (2001) and Read et al. (2005b). 
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 In what follows, Section 3.2 reviews previous theoretical and empirical 
research on intertemporal choice. Section 3.3 presents our method for measuring 
discounted utility. The design and results of our experiment are specified in 
Sections 3.4 and 3.5 and are discussed in Section 3.6. We conclude in Section 3.7. 
 
3.2 Theory and existing empirical evidence 
 
We consider temporal profiles (x0,….,xT), where xt denotes outcome x at time 
point t and time point 0 is the present. Outcomes can be money amounts but also 
binary prospects (p:M; m) denoting money amount M with probability p and 
money amount m with probability 1−p. Throughout we assume that 0, i.e. 
receiving nothing, belongs to the set of outcomes. 
 We examine preferences í over temporal profiles. The relations Ç, Ä, ê, and 
~ are as usual. Preferences over outcomes are derived from preferences over 
constant temporal profiles, where x1 = ….= xT = x. We say that α í β if and only 
if (α,….,α) í (β,…,β), i.e. receiving α at all points in time is preferred to 
receiving β at all points in time. 
 We assume that the decision maker perceives outcomes relative to 0. Gains 
are outcomes preferred to 0 and losses are outcomes less preferred than 0. We will 
only consider temporal prospects where all outcomes have the same sign, i.e. 
either all outcomes are gains or all outcomes are losses. A function V represents 
í when for all x,y, x í y if and only if V(x) ≥ V(y). Throughout, we will assume 
that preferences over temporal profiles can be represented by the general 
discounting model 
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V(x0,….,xT) = ∑ Tt=0 λ
i
t u(xt), i = +,− (1) 
 
with the time weights λit positive and λ
i
0 = 1 and u a real-valued utility function 
that represents preferences over outcomes. We allow that the time weights differ 
for gains and for losses. To keep the notation tractable, we will suppress the sign-
dependence of the λit and simply write λt in what follows. Whether the time 
weights for gains or the time weights for losses apply will be apparent from the 
decision context.  
 The time weights λt are unique and the utility function is unique up to unit. 
Equation (1) is general in the sense that it presumes nothing about the ordering or 
the relative magnitude of the λt. The main models of discounting are all special 
cases of (1). A preference foundation for general discounting has been given by 
Krantz et al. (1971, Theorem 6.15). 
 The best-known special case of (1) is constant discounting, which was 
introduced by Samuelson (1937) and which is still the most widely used 
discounted utility model in economics. Constant discounting entails that the time 
weights λt in (1) are equal to ( )tρ+1
1
, where ρ is the constant discount rate. As 
mentioned before, experimental evidence has cast doubts on the descriptive 
validity of the constant discounting. In this chapter we focus on two violations of 
constant discounting: decreasing impatience, the finding that discount rates are 
Studies on intertemporal preferences with applications to health economics 
 32
not constant but decrease over time, and the gain-loss asymmetry, the finding that 
people discount gains and losses differently.4  
 Many studies have observed decreasing impatience. See for example Thaler 
(1981), Benzion et al. (1989), Shelley (1993), and Kirby and Marakovic (1995) 
for money amounts and Chapman (1996a), Lazaro et al. (2001), and van der Pol 
and Cairns (2002) for health. An exception is Ahlbrecht and Weber (1997), who 
only observed decreasing impatience in a matching task, but not in a choice task. 
The common assumption in these studies was linear intertemporal utility. 
Chapman (1996a) also considered power utility. She elicited utility in an 
atemporal setting using introspective strength of preference judgments and then 
assumed that this function could also be applied to intertemporal choice.5 Whether 
utility is transferable across decision domains is highly controversial in 
economics. Arrow (1951), Savage (1954), Luce and Raiffa (1957), and Fishburn 
(1989) amongst others have argued against such transferability.  
 There is some controversy in the literature as to whether decreasing 
impatience holds in general or whether violations of constant discounting occur 
only in the first time interval. The latter hypothesis is referred to as the immediacy 
effect and underlies quasi-hyperbolic discounting, which will be discussed below. 
Some studies found support for the immediacy effect (Bleichrodt and 
Johannesson, 2001; Frederick et al., 2002); others rejected it and also found 
                                                 
4
 The gain-loss asymmetry can be accommodated within the general discounting model 
because we allow that the λt differ between gains and losses. 
5
 In a recent working paper Andersen et al. (2006) used a comparable strategy: they 
estimated power utility from decision under risk and then applied this function to 
intertemporal choice.  
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violations of constant discounting for later time intervals (Kirby and Herrnstein, 
1995; Kirby, 1997; Lazaro et al., 2001). 
 The gain-loss asymmetry is empirically less well-established than decreasing 
impatience. Thaler (1981) and Benzion et al. (1989) found evidence of the gain-
loss asymmetry, but Shelley (1993) showed that their findings could be explained 
by a framing effect. In a neutral frame, she found no evidence of a gain-loss 
asymmetry, a finding that was later confirmed by Ahlbrecht and Weber (1997).  
 
3.2.1 Alternative discounting models 
 Several alternative discounting models have been proposed in response to the 
observed violations of constant discounting. These models were primarily 
designed to explain decreasing impatience. Except for the model of Loewenstein 
and Prelec (1992), they make no distinction between gains and losses and, hence, 
cannot explain the gain-loss asymmetry. 
 Loewenstein and Prelec (1992) suggested to use a generalized hyperbolic 
discounting model, in which ( ) γαγλ /1
1
t
t
+
= , with α,γ > 0. The parameter γ 
determines the departure from constant discounting. The limiting case of γ 
tending to zero yields constant discounting. Because α is positive, the discount 
rates implied by generalized hyperbolic discounting decrease over time, 
corresponding to decreasing impatience. Loewenstein and Prelec assumed that the 
time weights were the same for gains and for losses. To explain the gain-loss 
asymmetry, they suggested that the intertemporal utility function u in (1) is 
concave for gains and convex for losses and is more elastic for losses than for 
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gains. The special case of generalized hyperbolic discounting in which α = γ was 
initially proposed by Herrnstein (1981) and is referred to as proportional or 
hyperbolic discounting. Power discounting (Harvey, 1986), is the special case of 
generalized hyperbolic discounting in which γ = 1.  
 Quasi-hyperbolic discounting (Phelps and Pollak, 1968; Laibson, 1997), is 
the special case of (1) where ( )tt ρ
βλ
+
=
1
 for t > 0 with 0 < β ≤ 1. The only 
difference with constant discounting is the parameter β. Constant discounting is 
the special case of quasi-hyperbolic discounting with β = 1. If β < 1 then the 
outcome in the first period is discounted at a higher rate than the discount rate that 
is used to compare the outcomes in any two other contiguous future periods. In 
other words, β < 1 models the immediacy effect.  
 
3.3 Measurement method 
 
Our method to measure the general discounting model (1) consisted of two stages. 
In the first stage, choices between temporal profiles were constructed in such a 
manner that the time weights λt canceled, allowing us to measure utility without 
the need to know the time weights. This way of measuring utilities resembles the 
utility measurement method of Wakker and Deneffe (1996) for decision under 
uncertainty. The difficulty in translating their method to intertemporal choice is 
that the utility function in intertemporal choice has different uniqueness properties 
than the utility function in decision under uncertainty. In the second stage, we 
used the elicited utilities to measure the time weights. Hence, we could measure 
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the time weights from the elicited utilities and no assumptions about the shape of 
utility had to be made. 
 Our method involves choosing the utility of two outcomes and, as is shown 
in Appendix 3A, this is only allowed when all temporal profiles involve the same 
unit of time and have common final periods. That is, for all profiles (x1,…,xT) and 
(y1,…,yS), the difference in timing between xt−1 and xt is equal to the difference in 
timing between yt−1 and yt and T = S. Hence, we will assume such profiles in the 
remainder of this section and we only used such profiles in our experimental 
study described in Section 3.4. 
 
First stage: measurement of utility 
 Let x0yt denote the temporal profile that gives x now, y at time point t and 
nothing in all other periods. The first step in the measurement of utility was to 
select two gauge outcomes G and g and a starting outcome x0. Superscripts serve 
to distinguish outcomes and do not denote powers. We then elicited the outcome 
x
1
 such that a participant was indifferent between g0x
1
t
 and G0 x
0
t
. In terms of the 
general discounting model (1) this indifference implies that 
 
u(g) + λtu(x1) + ∑s≠0,t λsu(0) = u(G) + λtu(x
0) + ∑
s≠0,t λsu(0) (2) 
 
and, hence, 
 
 u(x1) − u(x0) = u(G)−u(g)λt  . (3) 
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 The outcome x1 was used as an input in the next question where we elicited 
x
2
 such that indifference held between g0x
2
t
 and G0x
1
t
. By (1) and a similar 
argument as above, this indifference implied that  
 
u(x2) − u(x1) = u(G)−u(g)λt  . (4) 
 
 Thus, u(x2) − u(x1) = u(x1) − u(x0). We proceeded to elicit indifferences g0xjt 
~ G0xj−1t , j = 3,…,k, and obtained a standard sequence of outcomes x0, x1,…., xk 
such that successive elements of the sequence were equally spaced in terms of 
utility: u(xj+1) − u(xj) = u(x1) − u(x0) for j = 2,…,k−1. It is easily verified that if G 
ê g then the standard sequence is increasing, i.e. xj ê xj−1 for j = 1,….,k. If G Ä g 
then the standard sequence is decreasing, i.e. xj Ä xj−1 for j = 1,….,k.  
 Appendix 3A shows that if all temporal profiles involve the same unit of 
time and have common final periods then we can freely choose the utility of two 
outcomes. Since we only considered such temporal profiles, we set u(xk) = 1 and 
u(x0) = 0 for increasing standard sequences, yielding u(xj) = j/k for j = 0,…,k. For 
decreasing standard sequences, we set u(xk) = −1 and u(x0) = 0, yielding u(xj) = 
−j/k for j = 0,…,k. 
 
Second stage: measurement of the time weights 
 Once the utility function is known, the measurement of the time weights is 
straightforward. We elicited the outcome z such that a participant was indifferent 
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between z0x
0
t
, i.e. z now and x0 at time point t, and x00 x
k
t
, i.e. x0 now and xk at time 
point t. By (1) we obtain that  
 
u(z) + λtu(x0) + ∑s≠0,t λsu(0) = u(x
0) + λtu(xk) + ∑s≠0,t λsu(0) (5) 
 
and, hence, by the adopted scaling, )(zu = λt. By varying t, we could elicit 
different time weights. The elicited outcomes z typically did not belong to the 
standard sequence elicited in the first stage and their utility was unknown. If 
participants have positive time preference, however, then z will lie between two 
elements of the elicited standard sequence and we could approximate the utility of 
z through the known utility of these elements of the standard sequence. This 
approximation will be good if successive elements of the standard sequence are 
not too far apart. We return to the issue of approximation below.
  
 
3.4 Experiment 
 
The aim of the experiment was to elicit the intertemporal utility function and the 
time weights both for gains and for losses through the procedure outlined above. 
 
Participants and incentives 
 Seventy participants were recruited and were paid a fixed amount of €12.50 
to join the experiment. The participants were students from different faculties of 
the Erasmus University Rotterdam. Before the actual experiment, we tested the 
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design in several pilot sessions using other students and university staff as 
participants. 
 Throughout the experiment we used hypothetical choices. There were several 
reasons for using hypothetical instead of real incentives. A first reason was the 
problem in organizing payments in the future, some of which occurred in four 
years time. Second, because utility tends to be close to linear for small amounts 
(Wakker and Deneffe, 1996), we used large money amounts to capture the effect 
of utility curvature. Paying these amounts for real would have been prohibitively 
expensive. Third, there were ethical constraints to use real incentives for the 
losses part of the experiment. Finally, in hypothetical questions one can ask 
participants to assume that there is no risk associated with future payments. With 
real stakes, participants may consider the receipt of future money amounts 
uncertain, which could inflate the discounting of these amounts.  
 Some studies have investigated the differences between real and hypothetical 
money amounts in intertemporal decision making, but no clear evidence exists 
that hypothetical amounts are discounted differently than real amounts (Frederick 
et al., 2002). In decision under uncertainty, real and hypothetical incentives do not 
seem to give qualitatively different results, although real incentives tend to reduce 
data variability (Camerer and Hogarth, 1999; Hertwig and Ortmann, 2001). 
 
Procedure  
 The experiment was administered with each participant individually using a 
computer program. Answers were entered into the computer by the interviewer, 
so that participants could concentrate on the questions and mistakes could be 
reduced. Each individual session lasted between 30 and 45 minutes. Throughout 
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the experiment, participants were encouraged to think aloud to obtain insight into 
the reasoning underlying their answers. 
 All indifferences were elicited through a sequence of choices. We used 
choices because empirical evidence suggests that choice-indifferences lead to 
fewer inconsistencies than indifferences determined by matching, where 
participants are directly asked to state their indifference value (Bostic et al., 
1990). Because we used choices, our study employs what Shelley (1993) refers to 
as a neutral frame and, hence, we could test whether the gain-loss asymmetry was 
due to a framing effect. 
 The interviewer used a scroll bar to vary the value of the outcome that we 
sought to elicit, starting with values for which preferences were clear and then 
“zooming in” on the indifference value. Examples of the computer screens that 
participants faced in the first and the second stage of the experiment are in 
Appendix 3B and 3C. 
 We elicited the general discounted utility model first for gains and then for 
losses. We always started with the gains part because we learnt from the pilot 
sessions that this made it easier for participants to understand the choice task. 
Both parts were preceded by a practice question. Recall from Section 3.3 that our 
method involved the selection of two gauge outcomes denoted G and g. For gains 
(losses), G was a prospect giving a 50% chance of winning (losing) €2000 (and 
nothing otherwise) and g was a prospect giving a 50% chance of winning (losing) 
€500. Hence, we elicited increasing standard sequences for gains and decreasing 
standard sequences for losses. We used risky prospects instead of riskless money 
amounts to discourage heuristics like simply computing the difference in absolute 
values, which we observed in pilot studies where riskless money amounts were 
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used. It is important to emphasize that our results are robust to participants’ 
evaluation of prospects (e.g. according to expected utility or prospect theory) 
provided that the same theory is used throughout the experiment. As mentioned 
before, we chose substantial amounts of money to be able to detect utility 
curvature. A few participants mentioned budgetary constraints in the losses 
questions. They were told to assume that an interest-free loan was available to pay 
off the losses. 
 The starting outcome x0 was €0 both for gains and for losses. The delay t was 
set equal to 1 year in the elicitation of utility. Hence, in the first question we 
elicited the money amount x1 that made participants indifferent between prospect 
G at time point 0 and nothing in 1 year and prospect g at time point 0 and x1 in 1 
year. Both for gains and for losses we elicited 6 elements of the standard 
sequence.  
 In the second part of the experiment, we elicited the time weights for t = 3 
months, 6 months, 1 year, 2 years, 3 years, and 4 years, both for gains and for 
losses. The order in which the time weights were elicited was random. Both for 
gains and for losses, we tested for consistency by repeating the first elicitation at 
the end of each experimental task. That is, in the elicitation of utility, we repeated 
the elicitation of x1 after x1,…,x6 had been elicited and in the elicitation of the 
time weights we repeated the elicitation of the time weight that had been elicited 
first6 after the time weights for 3 months,…, 4 years had been elicited. 
 
 
                                                 
6
 Recall that the order in which the time weights were elicited was random. 
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Analyses 
 The results for means and medians were similar and, hence, we will only 
report the medians in the analysis of the aggregate data. Due to the presence of 
outliers, we focused on nonparametric tests to test for statistical significance.  
 To investigate the curvature of utility at the individual level, we computed  
 
∂j = (xj+1 − xj) − (xj − xj−1), j = 1,…,5, (6) 
 
i.e. how much successive outcome intervals increase or decrease. We observed 
ten values of ∂j for each participant, five for gains and five for losses. For gains, a 
positive value of ∂j corresponds to a concave part of the utility function. A 
positive ∂j means that an individual needs a larger increase in money to obtain a 
given increase in utility (1/6) at higher amounts than he needs at lower amounts. 
Likewise, a negative value of ∂j corresponds to a convex part of the utility 
function and a value of zero to linear utility. For losses, a positive value of ∂j 
corresponds to a convex part of the utility function and a negative value of ∂j to a 
concave part.  
 Both for gains and for losses, we determined for all five ∂j’s of each 
participant whether it corresponded to a concave, convex or linear part of the 
utility function. We classified a participant as having linear (concave, convex) 
utility if he had at least three linear (concave, convex) parts. Again, we did this 
both for gains and for losses. We used a criterion of three instead of five similar 
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parts, to account for response error.7 If none of the three parts (linear, concave or 
convex) occurred more than twice, the participant was left unclassified. 
 To smoothen out irregularities in the data, we also analyzed the data under 
specific parametric assumptions about utility. We examined two parametric 
families: the power family and the exponential family. Both are widely used in 
economics and decision analysis. Because the two functions yielded similar 
results we will only report the results for the power family. Let z = x/x6, x∈[0,x6]. 
The power family is defined by rz  if r > 0, by ln(z) if r = 0, and by − rz  if r < 0. 
For gains (losses), r < 1 corresponds to concave (convex) utility and r > 1 to 
convex (concave) utility; the case r = 1 corresponds to linear utility both for gains 
and for losses. We estimated the parametric families both for the median data and 
for each individual separately. The estimation was by nonlinear least squares.  
 We used the estimates of the power coefficients to obtain another, 
parametric, classification of individual participants. For gains (losses) we 
classified a participant as concave (convex) if his power coefficient was below 
0.95, as linear if his power coefficient was between 0.95 and 1.05, and as convex 
(concave) if his power coefficient exceeded 1.05.  
 To compute the time weights we had to approximate the utility of the elicited 
outcome z in (5). We did this by linear approximation. We also used 
approximation by the estimated power and exponential utility. This affected the 
results only marginally and we do not report these results separately. 
                                                 
7
 Similar criteria were used by Fennema and van Assen (1999), Abdellaoui (2000), 
Etchart-Vincent (2004), and Abdellaoui et al. (2005). 
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 From the elicited time weights we could estimate implied annual discount 
rates ρs as follows: 
 
λs = 
1
(1+ρs)s , (7) 
 
where s is time in years. We could then test whether the implied annual discount 
rates were constant. We computed the difference between the implied annual 
discount rates for adjacent time periods8 and, hence, obtained five observations 
for each participant both for gains and for losses. If at least three of these 
observations were positive then the participant was classified as decreasingly 
impatient, i.e. as having decreasing discount rates over time, if at least three 
observations were negative then he was classified as increasingly impatient, and if 
at least three observations were zero then he was classified as a constant 
discounter. Again, we used a criterion of three out of five to account for response 
error. 
 We also used the elicited time weights to estimate the parameter(s) in 
constant discounting, generalized hyperbolic discounting, proportional 
discounting, power discounting, and quasi-hyperbolic discounting. Each model 
was estimated separately, so we did not assume that ρ in constant discounting and 
ρ in quasi-hyperbolic discounting were equal, that γ in generalized hyperbolic 
discounting and γ in proportional discounting were equal or that α in generalized 
hyperbolic discounting and α in power discounting were equal. The models were 
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estimated by nonlinear least squares both for the median data and for each 
participant separately. To test whether the results were sensitive to the 
specification of the unit of time, we performed the estimations for different 
specifications of the unit of time (years, months, and weeks).  
 Goodness of fit was assessed by Akaike’s information criterion. An 
important advantage of this criterion is that it takes into account that the 
discounting models differ in the number of parameters employed. The fit of 
nested models was also compared through likelihood ratio tests. Because the 
coefficients for the median data were very close to the medians of the estimated 
coefficients for the individual data, we will focus on the individual data.  
 
3.5 Results 
 
The data of two participants were excluded from the analysis, because these 
participants gave answers that did not correspond to their reasoning. The data of 
another participant were lost due to a computer crash. As a result, the data of 67 
individuals (31 females) were included in the analysis. The consistency of the 
data was good: none of the tests that we performed revealed significant 
inconsistencies in participants’ responses (p > 0.05 in all tests). The individual 
parametric estimates are given in Appendix 3D. 
 
                                                                                                                          
8
 That is, we computed ρ3months− ρ6months, ρ6months− ρ1year, ρ1year− ρ2years, ρ2years− ρ3years, and 
ρ3years− ρ4years. 
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3.5.1 Gains 
Utility 
 Concavity of utility was most common at the individual level. Twenty-two 
participants were classified as concave, 16 as linear, and 7 as convex. The 
proportion of concave participants was significantly higher than the proportion of 
convex participants (p < 0.01). The classification based on the individual 
estimates of the power function also showed predominant concavity: thirty-eight 
individuals were classified as concave, 12 as linear and 17 as convex. The 
difference between the proportion of concave and the proportion of convex 
participants was significant (p < 0.01). The median of the individual estimates of 
the coefficient in the power utility function was 0.91 (interquartile range (IQR) = 
0.76−1.05), which indicated slight concavity. This median was, however, not 
significantly different from 1 (p = 0.075). 
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FIGURE 3.1. THE UTILITY FUNCTION FOR GAINS BASED ON THE MEDIAN DATA. 
 
 
  
 Our findings on utility were comparable to those observed for decision under 
risk and uncertainty. The proportions of concave and convex participants were 
slightly lower and the proportion of linear subjects was slightly higher 
(Abdellaoui, 2000; Abdellaoui et al., 2005). The median power coefficient that we 
observed was similar to studies that estimated the utility for gains in decision 
under risk and uncertainty. Abdellaoui et al. (2005) and Schunk and Betsch 
(2006), for example, also found a median estimate of 0.91 for decision under 
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uncertainty, whereas for decision under risk this estimate was 0.88 in Tversky and 
Kahneman (1992) and 0.89 in Abdellaoui (2000).  
 The aggregate data also showed concavity for gains. Figure 3.1 displays the 
utility function for gains based on the median data. The x-axis shows the medians 
of the elicited elements of the standard sequences for gains, the y-axis their utility. 
The difference between successive elements of the standard sequence generally 
increased, consistent with concave utility. The hypothesis that the difference 
between successive elements of the standard sequence was constant, the case 
corresponding to linear utility, could be rejected (p < 0.01). The estimated power 
coefficient for the median data was 0.84 (White’s corrected standard error = 
0.027), which differed significantly from 1 (p < 0.01), the case corresponding to 
linear utility. Figure 3.1 also shows the estimated power function. As the figure 
shows, the fit of the estimation was very good. 
 
Time weights 
 The individual level data showed clear evidence of decreasing impatience: 55 
participants were classified as decreasingly impatient and only 12 as increasingly 
impatient. The difference between the proportion of decreasingly impatient 
participants and the proportion of increasingly impatient participants was 
significant (p < 0.01). 
 Table 3.1 shows the median time weights for each delay, as well as the 
median annual discount rates that were implied by these weights. The median 
implied discount rates were low in comparison with the rates estimated in most 
previous studies. The median discount rates declined over time, which is 
consistent with decreasing impatience. The pattern of decreasing impatience was 
Studies on intertemporal preferences with applications to health economics 
 48
significant: the hypothesis that the implied annual discount rates were constant 
could be rejected (p < 0.01). 
 
TABLE 3.1. TIME WEIGHTS AND IMPLIED ANNUAL DISCOUNT RATES FOR GAINS. 
INTERQUARTILE RANGES IN PARENTHESES. 
Delay 3 months 6 months 1 year 2 years 3 years 4 years 
Median 
time 
weight 
0.970 
(0.942-
0.990) 
0.944 
(0.897-
0.978) 
0.923 
(0.787-
0.953) 
0.831 
(0.672-
0.915) 
0.735 
(0.487-
0.891) 
0.735 
(0.352-
0.870) 
Annual 
discount 
rate 
12.8% 
(4.0%-
26.9%) 
12.3% 
(4.6%-
24.3%) 
8.3% 
(4.9%-
27.1%) 
9.7% 
(4.5%-
22.0%) 
10.8% 
(3.9%-
27.1%) 
8.0% 
(3.6%-
29.9%) 
 
 Table 3.2 shows the medians of the estimated individual parameters for each 
of the five discounting models. Generalized hyperbolic discounting fitted the data 
best. The difference in goodness of fit between generalized hyperbolic 
discounting and the other models was always significant. The fit of the other four 
models was similar and no significant differences were observed. The results were 
not sensitive to the specification of the unit of time. 
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TABLE 3.2. MEDIANS OF THE INDIVIDUAL PARAMETER ESTIMATES FOR THE 
DISCOUNTING MODELS (GAINS). 
 
The median value of γ+ in generalized hyperbolic discounting shows limited 
deviation from constant discounting. The individual estimates of γ+ varied 
substantially, however. The wide variation of γ+ was caused by poor convergence 
of the estimation algorithm for some participants. We could reject the hypotheses 
that γ+ was equal to 0, the case of constant discounting, or equal to 1, the case of 
power discounting, (p < 0.01 in both cases) and also the hypothesis that α+ = γ+, 
the case of proportional discounting (p < 0.01). The parameter β+ in quasi-
hyperbolic discounting was close to 1, but significantly lower than 1 (p < 0.01), 
suggesting a small but significant immediacy effect. There were only 17 subjects 
for whom β+ was less than 0.95, which illustrates that for most subjects the 
immediacy effect was small. Both δ+ in constant discounting and δ+ in quasi-
hyperbolic discounting (p = 0.02) and α+ in power discounting and α+ in 
generalized hyperbolic discounting (p = 0.03) differed significantly.  
Model Con-
stant 
Propor-
tional 
Power 
Generalized 
Hyperbolic 
Quasi-hyperbolic 
Para-
meter 
δ + γ + α+ γ + α+ β+ δ + 
Median 
(IQR) 
0.102 
(0.038
-
0.263) 
0.117 
(0.039-
0.309) 
0.213 
(0.080-
0.460) 
0.291 
(−0.087-
1.952) 
0.130 
(0.070-
0.316) 
0.988 
(0.958-
1.009) 
0.078 
(0.033-
0.208) 
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FIGURE 3.2. MEDIAN TIME WEIGHTS FOR GAINS AND FIT OF PARAMETRIC MODELS. 
 
3 months 1 year 2 years 3 years 4 years
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 The estimation results based on the median data were largely similar. The 
main exception was that the immediacy effect was no longer significant. Figure 
3.2 shows the fit of generalized hyperbolic discounting, quasi-hyperbolic 
discounting and constant discounting to the median data. The results of power 
discounting and proportional discounting were similar but are not displayed to 
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keep the figure tractable. The figure shows that even though generalized 
hyperbolic discounting provided the best fit, the differences in fit between the 
models were limited. 
 
3.5.2 Losses 
Utility  
 The individual data showed no clear pattern in the direction of concave or 
convex utility. There were 122 concave parts in total, 98 linear parts, and 125 
convex parts. Twenty-two participants had convex utility for losses and 20 had 
concave utility (9 had linear utility; the others could not be classified). The 
proportion of participants with convex utility did not differ significantly from the 
proportion with concave utility (p > 0.10). The classification based on the 
estimates of the power coefficient showed more evidence of convex utility for 
losses: 30 participants had convex utility, 23 linear utility, and 14 concave utility. 
The proportion of participants with convex utility was now significantly higher 
than the proportion with concave utility for losses (p = 0.01). The median of the 
individual estimates of the coefficient in the power utility function was 0.96 
(interquartile range = 0.82-1.04), also indicating slight convexity for losses. This 
median was not significantly different from 1 (p = 0.085).  
 Our findings on utility for losses were also similar to those obtained for 
decision under risk and under uncertainty. The proportion of convex participants 
was similar, the proportion of concave participants was somewhat higher and the 
proportion of linear participants somewhat lower (Fennema and van Assen, 1999; 
Abdellaoui, 2000; Etchart-Vincent, 2004; Abdellaoui et al., 2005). Our median 
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estimate for the power coefficient of 0.96 was close to the estimates of 0.88 in 
Tversky and Kahneman (1992), 0.84 in Fennema and van Assen (1999), 0.92 in 
Abdellaoui (2000), and 0.96 for small losses and 0.98 for large losses in Etchart-
Vincent (2004). 
 
FIGURE 3.3. THE UTILITY FUNCTION FOR LOSSES BASED ON THE MEDIAN DATA. 
 
  
Figure 3.3 shows the utility for losses based on the median data. The x-axis shows 
the medians of the elements of the standard sequences. The differences between 
successive elements of the standard sequence were close and, hence, the utility for 
losses was close to linear at the aggregate level. We could reject, however, the 
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null hypothesis that the differences between successive elements of the standard 
sequence were all equal (p < 0.01) and, hence, the hypothesis of linear utility.  
 The estimate of the power coefficient was 0.97 (White’s corrected standard 
error: 0.016), which indicated slight convexity and which was just significantly 
different from 1 (p = 0.05). Figure 3.3 also shows the plot of the estimated power 
function. The fit of the estimation was very good. 
 
Time weights 
 As for gains, decreasing impatience was the most common pattern at the 
individual level: 47 participants were decreasingly impatient, 18 increasingly 
impatient, and 2 participants were constant discounters. The proportion of 
decreasingly impatient participants was significantly higher than the proportion of 
increasingly impatient participants (p < 0.01). 
 Table 3.3 shows the median time weights and the implied annual discount 
rates for each of the six delays. The discount rates declined over time, as predicted 
by decreasing impatience, but the decline was modest. The pattern of decreasing 
impatience was significant, however: the null hypothesis that the implied discount 
rates were all equal could be rejected (p < 0.01).  
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TABLE 3.3. TIME WEIGHTS AND IMPLIED ANNUAL DISCOUNT RATES FOR LOSSES. 
INTERQUARTILE RANGES IN PARENTHESES. 
Delay 3 months 6 months 1 year 2 years 3 years 4 years 
Median 
time 
weight 
0.984 
(0.967-
0.991) 
0.969 
(0.928-
0.989) 
0.947 
(0.893-
0.968) 
0.898 
(0.817-
0.941) 
0.871 
(0.752-
0.932) 
0.834 
(0.652-
0.909) 
Annual 
discount 
rate 
6.8% 
(3.8%-
14.6%) 
6.6% 
(2.3%-
16.1%) 
5.6% 
(3.3%-
12.0%) 
5.5% 
(3.1%-
10.7%) 
4.7% 
(2.4%-
10.0%) 
4.6% 
(2.4%-
11.3%) 
 
 Table 3.4 shows the estimation results for the five discounting models at the 
individual level.9 As for gains, generalized hyperbolic discounting provided the 
best fit. It fitted the data significantly better than the other models except that for 
power discounting the results are ambiguous. Based on Akaike’s information 
criterion generalized hyperbolic discounting did not fit significantly better than 
power discounting (p = 0.181). However, based on the likelihood ratio test we 
could reject the hypothesis that γ− was equal to 1 (p < 0.01). 
 Proportional discounting fitted significantly worse than all other theories (p < 
0.01 in all cases). No significant differences in goodness of fit were observed 
between constant discounting, power discounting, and quasi-hyperbolic 
discounting. The conclusions about the relative performance of the different 
theories were not sensitive to the specification of the unit of time. 
 
                                                 
9
 For three participants, it was not possible to estimate the models because they did not 
discount losses. 
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TABLE 3.4. INDIVIDUAL PARAMETER ESTIMATES FOR THE DISCOUNTING MODELS 
(LOSSES). 
Model Con-
stant 
Propor-
tional 
Power 
Generalized 
hyperbolic 
Quasi-hyperbolic 
Para-
meter 
ρ− γ− α− γ− α− β− ρ− 
Median 
(IQR) 
0.056 
(0.032-
0.101) 
0.090 
(0.053-
0.182) 
0.120 
(0.070
-
0.208) 
0.512 
(−0.074
-1.555) 
0.100 
(0.053-
0.242) 
0.989 
(0.969-
1.003) 
0.046 
(0.029-
0.090) 
 
 The estimate for γ− in generalized hyperbolic discounting indicated stronger 
deviations from constant discounting than we observed for gains. The estimates 
varied substantially across individuals, however. We could reject the hypotheses 
that γ− was equal to 0, 1 or to α−  (p < 0.01 in all cases). The estimate for β− 
suggested a small but significant immediacy effect (p < 0.01). Only 15 subjects 
had a value of β− smaller than 0.95, indicating that for most subjects the 
immediacy effect was modest. The parameters ρ− under constant discounting and 
ρ− under quasi-hyperbolic discounting differed significantly (p < 0.01); the 
parameters α− under power discounting and α− under generalized hyperbolic 
discounting did not differ significantly (p > 0.10). 
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FIGURE 3.4. MEDIAN TIME WEIGHTS FOR LOSSES AND FIT OF PARAMETRIC 
MODELS. 
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The estimation results based on the median data were largely similar. The main 
difference was that the immediacy effect was no longer significant and the 
estimate of γ− in generalized hyperbolic discounting indicated less deviation from 
constant discounting and was only 0.228. This estimate differed significantly 
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from 0, however (p = 0.027). Figure 3.4 shows the fit to the median data of 
generalized hyperbolic discounting, quasi-hyperbolic discounting, and constant 
discounting. Generalized hyperbolic fitted the data best, but the figure shows that 
the fit of quasi-hyperbolic discounting and, to a lesser degree, constant 
discounting was also good. All parametric models fitted the data better for losses 
than for gains. 
 
3.5.3 Comparison of gains and losses 
 In order to check whether there was a gain-loss asymmetry, we investigated 
the difference between the time weight for gains and the time weight for losses for 
each delay. As Tables 3.2 and 3.4 show, the time weights were higher for losses 
than for gains. The difference was significant for all delays (p = 0.02 for 3 
months, p < 0.01 for 6 months, p = 0.03 for 1 year, p < 0.01 for 2 years, 3 years, 
and 4 years). 
 Mixed results obtained when we compared the parameters in the five 
discounting models for gains and for losses. Remember that none of the 
discounting models allows for a difference in these parameters. The estimates in 
constant discounting and power discounting differed significantly for gains and 
for losses (p < 0.01). The parameters in generalized hyperbolic discounting and 
proportional discounting did not differ significantly for gains and for losses (p > 
0.10 in all tests). In the quasi-hyperbolic model, finally, the estimates of ρ+ and ρ− 
differed significantly (p < 0.01), whereas β+ and β− did not differ significantly (p 
> 0.10).  
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3.5.4 The effect on the time weights of assuming linear utility  
 As mentioned before, most previous studies that estimated discount rates 
assumed linear utility. To assess the bias resulting from assuming linear utility, 
we also computed the time weights under the assumption that utility was linear 
and compared these with the parameter-free time weights obtained without 
making assumptions about utility. The median time weights were lower under 
linear utility and, hence, the annual discount rates were higher. However, the time 
weights under linear utility did not differ significantly from the parameter-free 
time weights (p > 0.05) with the exception of the time weight for 2 years for gains 
(p = 0.05). The gain-loss asymmetry became more pronounced when linear utility 
was assumed (p = 0.01 for 3 months, p = 0.02 for 6 months, p < 0.01 for the other 
delays). 
 The fit of the discounting models was significantly better when we used the 
utility-adjusted time weights than when we used the time weights that were 
computed under the assumption that utility was linear. For gains, the exception 
was proportional discounting (p = 0.056), for losses the exceptions were power 
discounting (p = 0.063) and generalized hyperbolic discounting (p = 0.563). The 
conclusions about the relative fit of the discounting models were hardly affected 
by assuming linear utility. The only differences were that for losses generalized 
hyperbolic discounting now fitted significantly better than all other models and 
that proportional discounting no longer fitted significantly worse than constant 
discounting, quasi-hyperbolic discounting, and power discounting. 
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3.6 Discussion 
 
Loewenstein and Prelec (1992), extending Kahneman and Tversky (1979) to 
intertemporal choice, suggested that utility be concave for gains and convex for 
losses. We found some evidence for their proposition. Our data were consistent 
with concave utility for gains, but for losses the picture was less clear, although 
the predominant shape of utility was slightly convex. The power coefficients that 
we estimated were consistent with Loewenstein and Prelec’s (1992) assumption 
that utility is more elastic for losses than for gains.  
 Interestingly, our findings on the degree of utility curvature were close to 
those obtained in decision under uncertainty and in decision under risk. This held 
both for gains and for losses. While requiring further evidence, this finding may 
suggest that there exists one unifying concept of utility. Economists have 
traditionally argued that utility differs across domains and, hence, that the utility 
function that is relevant for decision under risk cannot be employed in other 
contexts, such as intertemporal decision making. In applied economics 
transferability of utility is, however, commonly assumed. For example, in health 
economics measurements of utility under risk are routinely used in welfare 
comparisons. Our findings provide some tentative support for the transferability 
of utility that is commonly assumed in applied economics. 
 The discount rates we observed were lower than the rates observed in most 
previous studies (Frederick et al., 2002). This could not be entirely explained by 
the fact that, contrary to previous studies, we made no assumptions about utility, 
because even when linear utility was imposed the observed discount rates were 
still relatively low. One explanation may be that our experiment was choice-
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based, whereas most previous studies used matching tasks. It is well-known that 
choice tasks tend to produce different results than matching tasks (Tversky et al., 
1988). Ahlbrecht and Weber (1997) also observed different discounting patterns 
in choice than in matching. That said, even though our experimental tasks 
involved choices, it was clear to participants that we were looking for 
indifferences and in that sense our task resembled matching (Fischer et al., 1999). 
Empirical evidence shows that eliciting indifferences through a series of choices, 
as we did, produces results in between choice and matching (Delquié, 1997). 
 Of the main discounting models that we considered, generalized hyperbolic 
discounting fitted the data best. The fit of constant discounting was rather good 
and we could not conclude that quasi-hyperbolic discounting, power discounting 
or proportional discounting fitted the data unambiguously better than constant 
discounting. One reason why quasi-hyperbolic discounting is used so much in 
applications is the alleged belief that it fits individual choice behavior better than 
constant discounting. Our data provide little support for this belief. If the aim of 
models is to accurately describe individual intertemporal choice behavior then the 
most appropriate model to use seems generalized hyperbolic discounting. 
Estimation of the generalized hyperbolic model is no more complicated than 
quasi-hyperbolic discounting and the fit was significantly better. It should be 
emphasized, however, that there exist other reasons to use quasi-hyperbolic 
discounting besides descriptive accuracy, one of which is the greater tractability 
of the model in theoretical analyses. A cause of concern in our study is the 
instability of the estimates for the parameter γ in generalized hyperbolic 
discounting.  
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 Our experiment used a neutral frame as did Shelley (1993) and Ahlbrecht 
and Weber (1997). Contrary to those studies, we observed evidence for a gain-
loss asymmetry and, hence, our data do not corroborate the conclusion that the 
gain-loss asymmetry is caused by a framing effect. The difference between our 
findings and those of Shelley (1993) and Ahlbrecht and Weber (1997) cannot be 
explained by the assumption of linear utility made in these studies, because 
assuming linear utility actually increased the gain-loss asymmetry.  
 The finding that assuming linear utility seemed not to cause serious biases is 
important for empirical research into intertemporal preferences. As mentioned 
before, most studies have hitherto assumed linear utility but it was not known to 
what extent this assumption distorted their findings. Our results suggest that this 
distortion was modest. This finding was not caused by our method for measuring 
utility. An easy heuristic to adopt in responding to the utility elicitation questions 
might be by keeping the difference between successive elements of the standard 
sequence constant, which would lead to linear utility. However, both for losses 
and for gains there were only six participants for whom the difference between 
successive elements of the standard sequence was always constant; there were 
only three participants for whom the difference between successive elements of 
the standard sequence was constant both for gains and for losses. These limited 
numbers suggest that the heuristic may not have caused serious biases. 
 Our method used chained measurements, i.e. answers from previous 
questions were used as inputs in later stages. A possible danger of using chained 
measurements is error propagation: errors in earlier responses get transferred to 
later responses. Bleichrodt and Pinto (2000) and Abdellaoui et al. (2005) 
examined the effect of error propagation in their studies and concluded that it had 
Studies on intertemporal preferences with applications to health economics 
 62
little impact. Since our method was based on a similar chaining process as theirs, 
their findings suggest that the effect of error propagation was limited in our study 
as well. 
 A crucial assumption in our method was that participants behaved according 
to the general discounting model (1). This model underlies all of the main 
discounting models used in the literature. A central property of (1) is 
intertemporal additivity. There is some evidence of violations of intertemporal 
additivity (Loewenstein and Sicherman, 1991; Frank and Hutchens, 1993). It is 
not clear how important these violations of (1) are. As mentioned by Loewenstein 
and Prelec (1992), they seem particularly relevant when evaluating complete 
alternative sequences of outcomes like savings plans or multiyear salary contracts. 
In our experiment, we considered, however, elementary types of intertemporal 
choices. We tried to mitigate the possible effect of violations of intertemporal 
additivity by using prospects in the elicitation of utility. We learned from pilot 
tests that using prospects made it more likely that people viewed things that 
happened at different points as separate and, hence, behaved more in line with 
intertemporal additivity. 
 The order of the tasks was fixed throughout the experiment. We always 
started with the gains part, because, as we observed in the pilot sessions, 
participants found this easier. It may be, although we do not consider this likely, 
that participants became more aware of their true preferences during the 
experiment and that this has caused the gain-loss asymmetry in our study. By the 
construction of our elicitation method, we always had to elicit utility prior to the 
elicitation of the time weights. We cannot think of any systematic bias that may 
have arisen because of this. 
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3.7 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has presented a parameter-free method to measure the discounted 
utility model in its entirety. Hence, we are the first to measure the utility function 
in intertemporal choice and we provide more robust evidence on the discounting 
of monetary outcomes. We found concave utility for gains and slightly convex 
utility for losses, which supports a hypothesis put forward by Loewenstein and 
Prelec (1992). Utility in intertemporal choice was close to previously found 
results on utility in decision under risk and uncertainty suggesting the existence of 
one unifying concept of utility. Our data confirmed decreasing impatience. The 
decrease was, however, modest and the fit of constant discounting was rather 
good. Of the hyperbolic discounting models that we examined, generalized 
hyperbolic discounting fitted the data best. Our data were less supportive of the 
widely-used quasi hyperbolic discounting model: it did not fit significantly better 
than constant discounting and the immediacy effect that we observed was small. 
We found some evidence for a gain-loss asymmetry in the time weights, which 
contradicts earlier conclusions that the gain-loss asymmetry was due to a framing 
effect (Shelley, 1993; Ahlbrecht and Weber, 1997) and also contradicts 
Loewenstein and Prelec (1992) who suggested that the gain-loss asymmetry was a 
consequence of the shape of the utility function only. Finally, the assumption of 
linear utility seemed not to bias the estimated time weights and discount rates in a 
significant manner. Hence, our study suggests that assuming linear utility in 
future empirical studies and in practical applications may not be very harmful at 
least for qualitative purposes. 
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Appendix 3A. Proof that we can freely choose the utility of 
two outcomes when the unit of time and the final period are 
the same across temporal profiles 
 
Because the unit of time and the final period are the same across temporal 
profiles, we restrict comparison to profiles x and y where the difference in timing 
between xt-1 and xt is equal to the difference in timing between yt-1 and yt and also 
the final periods are the same. Suppose that ∑ T
t=1λt u(xt) ≥ ∑
T
t=1λt u(yt) and that ∑
T
t=1
λt u(.) represents í over temporal profiles. If we replace u by v = αu + β with α > 
0 and β real, we obtain ∑ T
t=1λt v(xt) = α∑
T
t=1λt u(xt) + β∑
T
t=1λt ≥ α∑
T
t=1λt u(yt) + β∑
T
t=1
λt = ∑
T
t=1λt v(yt). Hence, v also represents í. Note that the assumption that the unit 
of time and the final period are the same across the profiles was crucial in the 
proof. 
¸ 
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Appendix 3B. Example of the display participants faced in 
the elicitation of utility 
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Appendix 3C. Example of the display participants faced in 
the elicitation of the time weights 
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Appendix 3D. Individual parameter estimates 
 
TABLE 3A.1. INDIVIDUAL PARAMETER ESTIMATES FOR GAINS. 
 
 
Partic
ipant 
ρ
+
 (CD) γ+ 
(PD) 
α+ 
(PowD
) 
γ+ 
(GHD) 
α+ 
 
(GHD) 
ρ
+
  
(QHD) 
β
+
 
(QHD) 
r+ 
(PowU
) 
1 0.055 0.058 0.111 -0.101 0.044 0.060 1.012 0.838 
2 0.062 0.067 0.129 0.298 0.086 0.063 1.002 0.626 
3 0.036 0.038 0.081 2.554 0.130 0.025 0.971 0.914 
4 0.051 0.054 0.106 -0.065 0.044 0.047 0.989 0.920 
5 0.013 0.013 0.028 -0.106 0.011 0.013 0.999 1.000 
6 0.003 0.003 0.007 25.629 0.057 0.001 0.995 0.488 
7 0.092 0.101 0.186 0.387 0.132 0.077 0.966 0.826 
8 0.084 0.092 0.172 0.427 0.126 0.076 0.982 0.669 
9 0.159 0.193 0.319 5.793 0.818 0.091 0.864 0.967 
10 0.667 0.816 0.889 0.440 0.698 0.789 1.077 3.299 
11 0.021 0.022 0.046 2.464 0.073 0.015 0.984 0.704 
12 0.147 0.167 0.282 -0.083 0.118 0.138 0.983 1.267 
13 0.196 0.227 0.357 -0.091 0.153 0.216 1.039 1.041 
14 0.037 0.038 0.078 1.279 0.087 0.028 0.977 0.779 
15 0.276 0.329 0.477 -0.131 0.193 0.322 1.076 1.143 
16 0.308 0.407 0.547 3.184 0.960 0.187 0.817 2.388 
17 0.010 0.011 0.023 3.627 0.046 0.007 0.991 0.799 
18 0.037 0.039 0.079 0.207 0.048 0.035 0.995 0.948 
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Partic
ipant 
ρ
+
 (CD) γ+ 
(PD) 
α+ 
(PowD
) 
γ+ 
(GHD) 
α+ 
( 
GHD) 
ρ
+
  
(QHD) 
β
+
 
(QHD) 
r+ 
(PowU
) 
19 0.008 0.008 0.017 -0.248 0.002 0.008 0.998 0.939 
20 0.033 0.034 0.072 4.306 0.158 0.020 0.967 1.000 
21 0.079 0.085 0.159 -0.070 0.067 0.078 0.997 0.688 
22 0.025 0.025 0.054 1.479 0.064 0.019 0.986 0.808 
23 0.174 0.203 0.329 0.017 0.165 0.173 0.998 1.000 
24 0.443 0.584 0.704 0.662 0.607 0.323 0.858 0.943 
25 0.138 0.159 0.272 0.450 0.203 0.110 0.941 0.759 
26 0.038 0.040 0.079 0.106 0.043 0.036 0.995 0.689 
27 0.040 0.042 0.085 1.541 0.104 0.031 0.977 1.592 
28 0.726 1.148 1.003 61.840 12.300 0.197 0.577 1.011 
29 0.223 0.267 0.410 -0.234 0.099 0.205 0.967 1.507 
30 0.433 0.555 0.692 0.007 0.363 0.357 0.905 0.976 
31 0.110 0.123 0.218 0.107 0.120 0.105 0.989 0.731 
32 0.083 0.091 0.167 0.114 0.094 0.091 1.018 1.067 
33 1.139 1.304 1.249 -0.024 0.746 1.296 1.064 2.525 
34 0.027 0.027 0.058 2.959 0.100 0.018 0.978 0.883 
35 0.250 0.292 0.437 -0.181 0.153 0.291 1.072 1.000 
36 1295.3 20.525 7.697 50.388 36.460 2.077 0.201 3.277 
37 0.324 0.368 0.530 -0.233 0.164 0.434 1.180 1.112 
38 1.472 1.503 1.324 1.074 1.354 1.225 0.939 5.905 
39 0.203 0.230 0.368 -0.247 0.075 0.197 0.988 0.820 
40 0.376 0.440 0.595 -0.114 0.270 0.515 1.181 0.885 
41 0.028 0.029 0.066 
95160.
1 602.89 0.001 0.931 0.786 
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Partic
ipant 
ρ
+
 (CD) γ+ 
(PD) 
α+ 
(PowD
) 
γ+ 
(GHD) 
α+ 
 
(GHD) 
ρ
+
  
(QHD) 
β
+
 
(QHD) 
r+ 
(PowU
) 
42 0.112 0.129 0.229 1.243 0.252 0.088 0.946 1.075 
43 0.578 0.761 0.843 0.583 0.703 0.458 0.890 0.730 
44 0.151 0.174 0.289 0.057 0.152 0.162 1.022 1.451 
45 0.102 0.117 0.213 3.515 0.407 0.066 0.918 1.018 
46 0.125 0.138 0.238 -0.178 0.079 0.143 1.040 0.772 
47 0.010 0.010 0.022 0.119 0.012 0.009 0.996 0.755 
48 0.029 0.029 0.059 -0.031 0.027 0.032 1.008 0.694 
49 0.040 0.042 0.085 0.561 0.068 0.034 0.984 0.824 
50 0.167 0.194 0.315 0.044 0.165 0.172 1.010 0.780 
51 0.357 0.418 0.578 -0.215 0.194 0.456 1.144 1.054 
52 0.027 0.028 0.059 3.778 0.118 0.018 0.975 0.668 
53 0.193 0.252 0.388 17.477 2.097 0.074 0.784 1.045 
54 0.586 0.729 0.839 0.038 0.481 0.604 1.016 2.065 
55 0.033 0.034 0.067 -0.140 0.024 0.035 1.005 1.000 
56 0.049 0.052 0.104 0.551 0.083 0.040 0.976 0.594 
57 0.041 0.042 0.081 -0.222 0.020 0.048 1.019 0.755 
58 0.054 0.057 0.112 0.070 0.058 0.051 0.993 1.000 
59 0.069 0.076 0.151 27.768 1.200 0.027 0.900 0.641 
60 0.404 0.554 0.672 1.610 0.824 0.285 0.852 1.151 
61 0.327 0.377 0.541 -0.247 0.141 0.413 1.141 0.729 
62 0.165 0.192 0.315 -0.145 0.114 0.157 0.982 0.855 
63 0.194 0.226 0.358 -0.098 0.149 0.205 1.021 2.969 
64 0.076 0.083 0.156 0.292 0.103 0.070 0.986 0.732 
65 0.072 0.079 0.154 2.294 0.231 0.050 0.948 0.774 
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Partic
ipant 
ρ
+
 (CD) γ+ 
(PD) 
α+ 
(PowD
) 
γ+ 
(GHD) 
α+ 
( 
GHD) 
ρ
+
  
(QHD) 
β
+
 
(QHD) 
r+ 
(PowU
) 
66 0.030 0.031 0.064 0.548 0.051 0.026 0.991 0.845 
67 0.331 0.447 0.576 2.375 0.859 0.211 0.833 0.736 
 Note: CD = constant discounting, PowD = power discounting, GHD = generalized 
hyperbolic discounting, QHD = quasi-hyperbolic discounting, PD = proportional 
discounting, PowU = power utility 
 
 
TABLE 3A.2. INDIVIDUAL PARAMETER ESTIMATES FOR LOSSES. 
 
 
Particip
ant 
ρ
−
 
(CD) 
γ− 
(PD) 
α− 
(PowD
) 
γ− 
(GHD) 
α− 
(GHD) 
ρ
−
  
(QHD) 
β
−
 
(QHD) 
r− 
(PowU
) 
1 0.072 0.115 0.153 2.102 0.219 0.052 0.950 1.027 
2 0.026 0.038 0.059 3.331 0.110 0.018 0.976 0.732 
3 0.018 0.027 0.038 -0.042 0.017 0.018 1.001 0.896 
4 0.017 0.025 0.035 -0.230 0.008 0.017 0.999 0.799 
5 0.017 0.025 0.037 0.730 0.033 0.015 0.993 0.911 
6        0.792 
7 0.084 0.138 0.173 0.367 0.121 0.074 0.974 0.971 
8 0.009 0.014 0.021 2.329 0.032 0.007 0.993 0.810 
9 0.045 0.069 0.094 0.263 0.060 0.040 0.989 0.634 
10 0.061 0.093 0.135 3.694 0.267 0.037 0.943 1.157 
11 0.014 0.020 0.033 25.542 0.247 0.006 0.978 0.897 
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Particip
ant 
ρ
−
 
(CD) 
γ− 
(PD) 
α− 
(PowD
) 
γ− 
(GHD) 
α− 
(GHD) 
ρ
−
  
(QHD) 
β
−
 
(QHD) 
r− 
(PowU
) 
12 0.100 0.168 0.197 -0.191 0.059 0.101 1.002 1.088 
13 0.255 0.533 0.465 1.034 0.472 0.209 0.925 0.734 
14 0.032 0.048 0.070 2.200 0.103 0.024 0.978 0.782 
15        0.914 
16 0.541 1.158 0.803 1.547 0.960 0.332 0.799 5.151 
17 0.134 0.228 0.262 28.930 2.063 0.086 0.892 1.200 
18 0.046 0.071 0.095 0.115 0.053 0.047 1.003 1.010 
19 0.069 0.109 0.143 0.512 0.111 0.065 0.990 0.977 
20 0.132 0.234 0.257 -0.002 0.124 0.128 0.990 1.415 
21 0.089 0.145 0.184 1.208 0.200 0.067 0.949 1.023 
22 0.037 0.056 0.079 0.751 0.070 0.031 0.985 0.805 
23 0.132 0.231 0.252 -0.179 0.082 0.145 1.029 1.000 
24 0.341 0.785 0.589 1.080 0.608 0.269 0.900 0.901 
25 829.49 20.916 7.303 
1162.9
4 382.88 0.330 0.150 1.759 
26 0.037 0.057 0.076 -0.066 0.032 0.040 1.007 1.008 
27 0.042 0.064 0.086 -0.046 0.038 0.042 1.002 1.285 
28 0.371 0.794 0.610 -0.104 0.267 0.377 1.009 1.252 
29 0.055 0.084 0.120 8.358 0.401 0.030 0.939 1.027 
30 0.424 0.974 0.689 0.958 0.678 0.321 0.876 1.000 
31 0.018 0.026 0.040 1.051 0.040 0.015 0.992 0.964 
32 1.100 2.339 1.209 1.004 1.211 0.690 0.810 2.393 
33 0.072 0.117 0.145 -0.074 0.061 0.075 1.006 1.355 
34 0.085 0.139 0.173 0.306 0.116 0.085 0.999 1.047 
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Particip
ant 
ρ
−
 
(CD) 
γ− 
(PD) 
α− 
(PowD
) 
γ− 
(GHD) 
α− 
(GHD) 
ρ
−
  
(QHD) 
β
−
 
(QHD) 
r− 
(PowU
) 
35 0.061 0.098 0.126 0.070 0.066 0.064 1.005 1.000 
36 0.015 0.020 0.034 6.819 0.100 0.008 0.981 0.735 
37 0.068 0.106 0.139 0.256 0.089 0.070 1.005 0.586 
38 0.037 0.056 0.076 -0.158 0.025 0.038 1.003 0.543 
39 0.049 0.075 0.108 2.531 0.171 0.035 0.963 1.045 
40 0.165 0.299 0.297 -0.233 0.078 0.223 1.123 0.653 
41 0.013 0.019 0.028 -0.216 0.007 0.008 0.987 1.160 
42 0.036 0.056 0.073 -0.174 0.023 0.038 1.006 0.930 
43 0.038 0.059 0.077 -0.209 0.021 0.043 1.013 1.075 
44        0.987 
45 0.098 0.162 0.208 6.844 0.601 0.053 0.899 1.007 
46 0.041 0.061 0.087 0.690 0.075 0.034 0.984 0.765 
47 0.014 0.021 0.031 0.988 0.031 0.012 0.993 0.715 
48 0.022 0.031 0.047 1.526 0.057 0.016 0.984 0.901 
49 0.056 0.089 0.116 0.146 0.066 0.055 0.996 0.847 
50 0.168 0.311 0.317 0.063 0.169 0.173 1.010 1.047 
51 0.358 0.753 0.586 -0.132 0.246 0.411 1.074 0.952 
52 0.052 0.080 0.112 1.317 0.126 0.041 0.971 0.893 
53 0.101 0.170 0.208 1.483 0.249 0.077 0.945 0.780 
54 0.203 0.380 0.373 -0.235 0.089 0.204 1.002 1.000 
55 0.048 0.074 0.099 -0.022 0.045 0.044 0.991 1.000 
56 0.073 0.120 0.146 -0.241 0.029 0.077 1.008 0.962 
57 0.022 0.032 0.046 -0.102 0.017 0.018 0.990 0.961 
58 0.059 0.093 0.120 -0.048 0.052 0.060 1.003 1.000 
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Particip
ant 
ρ
−
 
(CD) 
γ− 
(PD) 
α− 
(PowD
) 
γ− 
(GHD) 
α− 
(GHD) 
ρ
−
  
(QHD) 
β
−
 
(QHD) 
r− 
(PowU
) 
59 0.211 0.403 0.391 -0.099 0.160 0.180 0.942 1.276 
60 0.083 0.134 0.168 0.142 0.096 0.073 0.978 1.633 
61 0.272 0.521 0.459 -0.245 0.118 0.364 1.165 0.669 
62 0.059 0.091 0.128 3.398 0.242 0.039 0.950 0.876 
63 0.027 0.039 0.060 4.674 0.139 0.016 0.972 0.654 
64 0.041 0.063 0.087 0.599 0.071 0.034 0.983 0.937 
65 0.014 0.020 0.032 54.506 0.431 0.006 0.977 0.822 
66 0.022 0.033 0.047 -0.090 0.019 0.022 1.000 0.986 
67 0.043 0.064 0.092 1.555 0.113 0.033 0.974 0.938 
Note: CD = constant discounting, PowD = power discounting, GHD = 
generalized hyperbolic discounting, QHD = quasi-hyperbolic discounting, PD = 
proportional discounting, PowU = power utility 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4  Time standard sequences for quantifying 
and visualizing the degree of time 
inconsistency, using only pencil and paper1 
                                                 
1
 This chapter is based on Attema, Bleichrodt, Rohde, and Wakker (2006). 
 
 
Summary 
 
This chapter introduces time standard sequences as a new tool for analyzing 
intertemporal preferences. Time standard sequences yield a new way to measure 
temporal discounting, while minimizing distortions due to violations of 
intertemporal separability. They make it particularly easy to observe and exactly 
quantify deviations from stationarity and the implied proneness to choice 
anomalies. Time standard sequences can easily be administered and analyzed, 
using only pencil and paper, and do not need any assumption about utility, or 
estimation thereof. They allow for the empirical discrimination between several 
hyperbolic discounting models that have been proposed in the literature as 
alternatives to constant discounting, such as quasi-hyperbolic, proportional, and 
generalized hyperbolic discounting. We tested the feasibility of time standard 
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sequences in an experiment. Our findings suggest some new directions for 
theories of intertemporal choice. 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
Many decisions involve tradeoffs over time. The most popular model for 
evaluating streams of outcomes over time, also assumed in this paper, is (general) 
discounted utility. In this model, streams of outcomes are evaluated by summing 
the discounted utilities of the outcomes received at various time points. In 
traditional approaches, the measurement of the discount function is difficult 
because both this function and the utility function are unknown parameters that 
have to be measured simultaneously (Coller et al., 2005). The difficulty is 
aggravated because separability of preferences over disjoint time periods, an 
assumption of the model, is extensively violated empirically, distorting 
assessments of discounting. We introduce time standard sequences as a new and 
simple tool for measuring discount functions. It turns out that we need no 
measurement of utility, or assumption about utility, to obtain the discount 
function. Distortions due to violations of time separability are minimized. 
 Samuelson (1937) introduced constant discounting, where a preference 
between two outcome streams does not change if all outcomes are delayed by an 
equal time period, reflecting constant impatience, a property also known as 
stationarity. Constant discounting has long been the standard for intertemporal 
choice in economics. An attractive feature is that, under some extra assumptions, 
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constant discounting implies dynamically consistent behavior: plans for future 
decisions will be adhered to, and no arbitrage is possible. 
 Empirical evidence has revealed many violations of stationarity. Mostly, 
impatience is decreasing rather than constant (Frederick et al., 2002). People, who 
at present are not willing to wait for an improved but delayed outcome due to 
impatience, become willing to wait if all outcomes are delayed by the same 
amount of time. These people, thus, become less impatient as time proceeds. 
Under common assumptions, decreasing impatience implies dynamic 
inconsistency, which is usually considered irrational. All kinds of choice 
anomalies result, such as proneness to arbitrage. 
 Hyperbolic discounting models have been developed so as to model 
decreasing impatience. For example, quasi-hyperbolic discounting (Phelps and 
Pollak, 1968) assumes constant impatience for all future time points, but 
decreasing impatience at present. Then time inconsistency arises only if 
immediate consumption is involved. Generalized hyperbolic discounting 
(Loewenstein and Prelec, 1992) allows decreasing impatience at all time points. 
Analyses of traditional economic models change because of these new ways of 
discounting, and many previously unexplained phenomena can now be 
accommodated (Laibson, 1997). Hence, hyperbolic discounting is popular today. 
 Prelec (2004) introduced a theoretical measure of decreasing impatience, 
being the convexity index −ln(ϕ)´´ln(ϕ)´   of the logarithm of the discount function ϕ.
1
 
He demonstrated that this measure identifies different degrees of proneness to 
                                                 
1
 The index measures concavity for increasing functions, and convexity for decreasing 
functions such as ϕ. 
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inconsistencies and arbitrage when impatience is decreasing. He wrote: 
"Decreasing impatience provides a natural criterion for assessing whether a set of 
time preferences represents a more or less severe departure from the stationarity 
axiom. The criterion is associated with a simple normative diagnostic—the 
selection of inefficient (dominated) outcomes in two-stage decision problems" (p. 
526). 
 At this stage, it may seem to be difficult to elicit or implement Prelec’s 
measure in practice. It, apparently, first requires the measurement of the discount 
function and, next, taking the logarithm and determining its second derivative 
over its first. To measure the discount function, we, apparently, have to measure 
utility, or at least make assumptions about utility, because the discount function 
determines behavior only in combination with utility. Some analyses in the 
literature parametrically estimated utility and, subsequently, used these estimates 
to measure the discount function (e.g. Chapman, 1996a). Most analyses simply 
equated outcomes with utility, which amounts to the assumption of linear utility. 
Such assumptions can confound findings about discounting. 
 Time standard sequences provide a new way of directly measuring the 
degree of deviation from stationarity and the degree of time-inconsistent behavior. 
Surprisingly, we can immediately estimate Prelec’s index −ln(ϕ)´´ln(ϕ)´  of time 
inconsistency and graphically depict it, using only pencil and paper, without need 
to carry out the measurements and calculations mentioned above. In particular, we 
need not determine the utility function. Through time standard sequences we can 
immediately tell who of two persons satisfies more decreasing impatience, and we 
can identify groups of people who are especially prone to losses and arbitrage 
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because of time inconsistency, as we show in a representation theorem. Time 
standard sequences are easy to comprehend for participants, leading to reliable 
data. 
 Time standard sequences, together with one simple choice between outcome 
streams with two nonzero outcomes, completely identify the time discount 
function. Again, for this measurement no assumption about utility is needed. Our 
method is therefore, obviously, robust against distortions and nonlinearities in 
utility, and can be applied to general outcome sets, such as finite sets of 
qualitative health states. 
 We show how time standard sequences can test which of several hyperbolic 
models considered in the literature can be applied, and of those that can be, which 
best fit the choices of individuals. Until now, most studies only rejected constant 
discounting, but did not test which alternative was better. Exceptions are 
Abdellaoui et al. (2006), Keller and Strazzera (2002), and van der Pol and Cairns 
(2002). In an experiment, we demonstrate the feasibility of our method by 
measuring time standard sequences of 55 subjects. 
 Our experimental findings lead to a number of suggestions for new models of 
intertemporal choice. Several recent studies, discussed in Section 4.9, have found 
increasing impatience, which casts doubt on the universal decreasing impatience 
commonly assumed in time preference theories. Our study also finds a majority of 
increasing, rather than decreasing, impatience for the present and near future. 
After the present and near future, impatience becomes constant. 
 Most analyses of intertemporal discounting considered in the literature so far 
have focused entirely on decreasing impatience. The data of our study and some 
other recent studies suggest that the development of new tools for analyzing 
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increasing impatience will be worthwhile. This point can be compared to the risk 
field, where tools for analyzing risk seeking are needed also if the majority of 
participants exhibit risk aversion. Without such flexibility of modeling, data 
fitting is not possible at the individual level. 
 We also find some fundamental violations of the general discounted utility 
model. This suggests that generalizations, primarily relaxing temporal 
separability, are desirable. 
 The outline of this chapter is as follows. Section 4.2 describes discounted 
utility and the various families of discount functions considered in this chapter. 
Time standard sequences and curves are presented in Section 4.3. Section 4.4 
demonstrates theoretically that time standard sequences capture the degree of 
deviation from stationarity, and the proneness to choice anomalies. Section 4.5 
illustrates some applications, and Section 4.6 shows how discount functions can 
be measured using time standard sequences. Experimental details are in Section 
4.7, and results in Section 4.8. Section 4.9 contains a discussion. 
 
4.2 Discounted utility 
 
We consider preferences between outcome streams. An outcome stream 
(t1:x1,…,tm:xm) yields outcome xi at time point ti for i = 1, …,m and nothing at 
other time points. For simplicity of presentation we assume that outcomes are 
monetary and nonnegative, with "nothing" equated with the 0 outcome. Our 
measurement method can equally well be applied to other outcomes, with the 
outcome set for instance a finite set of qualitative health states, but we will not 
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pursue this point. Time point t = 0 corresponds with the present. Under discounted 
utility (which in this paper refers to general, possibly nonconstant, discounting), 
outcome streams are evaluated through 
 
DU(t1:x1,…,tm:xm) = ∑i=1
m  
 ϕ(ti)U(xi), (1) 
 
where ϕ is the discount function and U the (instant) utility function, with ϕ(t) > 0 
for all t, ϕ strictly decreasing (impatience) and continuous, U(0) = 0, and U 
continuous and strictly increasing. ϕ and U are ratio scales, meaning that each is 
unique up to a positive scale factor. Throughout this paper we assume that 
discounted utility holds. In the literature, a normalization ϕ(0) = 1 is sometimes 
assumed, but it is more convenient for us not to commit to a scaling. 
 Constant discounting holds if ϕ(t) = δt for a discount factor δ with 0 < δ ≤ 1. 
Constant discounting has been the traditional assumption. Then a preference 
between two outcome streams does not change if all outcomes are delayed by an 
equal amount of time ε, a preference condition known as stationarity or constant 
impatience. Under such a delay, the discounted utility of both sequences is 
multiplied by the same constant δε, so that their ordering is not affected. It is well-
known that the reversed implication also holds under common assumptions, that 
is, constant impatience implies constant discounting (Koopmans, 1960). 
 In psychological studies it has often been found that people have decreasing 
impatience, i.e. their willingness to wait increases as outcomes are delayed. A 
popular model that captures decreasing impatience is the quasi-hyperbolic 
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discounting model (Phelps and Pollak, 1968), where the discount function is 
given by 
 
ϕ(t) = 1 if t = 0 and 
ϕ(t) = βδt if t > 0, (2) 
 
for a constant β ≤ 1 with, again, 0 < δ ≤ 1. Under quasi-hyperbolic discounting we 
have decreasing impatience only at time point 0, and constant impatience 
thereafter. 
 A model that captures decreasing impatience not only for the present, but 
also for future time points, is generalized hyperbolic discounting (Loewenstein 
and Prelec, 1992), defined by 
 
ϕ(t) = (1+gt)−h/g, (3) 
 
with g > 0 and h > 0. Harvey (1986, Eq. 7) considered the special case g = 1. 
Herrnstein (1981) and Harvey (1995, "proportional discounting") considered the 
case g = h. 
 In general, violations of stationarity need not imply time inconsistency, 
contrary to claims sometimes made in the literature, but in agreement with some 
careful discussions (Dasgupta and Maskin, 2005, section I; Harvey, 1995 p. 389; 
Thaler, 1981). For example, you may have a special preference for apples on 
Tuesday, and prefer two apples on Tuesday to one apple on Monday, but not 
prefer two apples on Wednesday to one apple on Tuesday. This entails a violation 
of stationarity, but no inconsistency. All the time you consistently have and 
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predict your preferences, and you never change plans. Such discrepancies 
between stationarity and time inconsistency are caused by nonhomogeneity of 
time. As is common in the literature, we assume homogeneous time henceforth, 
so that at every time point your decisions can be based on stopwatch time, and 
nonconstant impatience can be equated with time inconsistency. Then 
nonconstant impatience entails a vulnerability to arbitrage, where a person first 
pays to obtain an exchange one way and later pays again to reverse the exchange, 
ending up in the original position less some money. We will come back to this 
point in Section 4.4. 
 
4.3 Deriving the degree of time inconsistency from time 
standard sequences 
 
A time standard sequence is a sequence t0,…,tn of time points such that there exist 
two outcomes β < γ with 
 
(t0: β) ~ (t1: γ) 
(t1: β) ~ (t2: γ) 
    . 
    . 
    . 
(tn−1: β)  ~  (tn: γ) (4) 
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That is, each delay between two consecutive time points exactly offsets the same 
improvement of outcome. This delay between two consecutive time points, di = ti 
– ti−1, is called the willingness to wait (WTW). Stationarity means that the WTW is 
constant. Under decreasing impatience the WTW increases as time proceeds, and 
under increasing impatience it decreases. Thus, a time standard sequence readily 
identifies constant, increasing, or decreasing impatience. 
 Time standard sequences are equally spaced in terms of the logarithm of the 
discount function. Because the derivation of this result may be clarifying, we give 
it in the main text. 
 
OBSERVATION 1. For a time standard sequence t0,…,tn: 
ln(ϕ(t0)) − ln(ϕ(t1)) =  ln(ϕ(t1)) − ln(ϕ(t2)) = ... = ln(ϕ(tn−1)) − ln(ϕ(tn)). 
 
PROOF. For a time standard sequence we have 
ϕ(t0)U(β) = ϕ(t1)U(γ) and 
ϕ(t1)U(β) = ϕ(t2)U(γ), 
implying 
ϕ(t0)
ϕ(t1)  = 
U(γ)
U(β)  = 
ϕ(t1)
ϕ(t2)  = 
...
 = 
ϕ(tn−1)
ϕ(tn)  . (5) 
 
Here the third and following equalities result from analogous algebraic 
manipulations. Taking logarithms gives the observation. 
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 The points t0,…,tn are, obviously, also equally spaced in terms of 
normalizations of ln(ϕ(t)), such as at t0 and tn. The latter normalization is denoted 
τ, and is called the time standard sequence curve. It is given by 
 
τ(t) = ln(ϕ(t)) − ln(ϕ(tn))ln(ϕ(t0)) − ln(ϕ(tn))   (6) 
 
Because it is 1 at t0 and 0 at tn, with n equally big steps of size 1/n in between, we 
get 
 
τ(tj) = 1 − jn  for all j. (7) 
 
 From time standard sequences we can, thus, immediately obtain the graph of 
the normalized logarithmic discount function. See Figure 4.1, with points (tj,1 − 
j
n
) depicted, and linear interpolation. The figure concerns the experiment reported 
later, and is derived from participant 7’s indifferences 
 
(05 months: €700) ~ (07 months: €900) 
(07 months: €700) ~ (09 months: €900) 
(09 months: €700) ~ (12 months: €900) 
(12 months: €700) ~ (18 months: €900) 
(18 months: €700) ~ (24 months: €900) 
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so that n = 5, t0 = 5, t1 = 7, t2 = 9, t3 = 12, t4 = 18, and t5 = 24. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
The degree of convexity of a function is not affected by normalizations and, 
hence, the convexity of τ equals the convexity of ln(ϕ). As we saw, stationarity, 
decreasing impatience, and increasing impatience correspond with constant, 
increasing, and decreasing WTW. Hence, we obtain the following result. 
FIGURE 4.1. THE TIME STANDARD SEQUENCE CURVE OF PARTICIPANT 7. 
t0= 
 5 
t1= 
 7 
t2= 
 9 
t3= 
 12 
t4= 
 18 
t5= 
 24 
1.0 
0.8 
0.6 
0.4 
0.2 
0.0 
τ 
time in months 
Chapter 4: Time standard sequences 
 
 
87
OBSERVATION 2. Stationarity corresponds with linearity of the time standard 
sequence curve and of ln(ϕ). Decreasing impatience corresponds with convexity 
of the time standard sequence curve and of ln(ϕ). Increasing impatience 
corresponds with concavity of the time standard sequence curve and of ln(ϕ). The 
time standard sequence curve τ and the logarithm of discounting ln(ϕ) have the 
same degree of convexity, i.e., −τ´´
τ´
   = −
ln(ϕ)´´
ln(ϕ)´  . 
 
4.4 Time standard sequences to measure proneness to 
arbitrage 
 
In this section, we restrict our attention to simple outcome streams. The following 
analysis will, contrary to the rest of this paper, essentially use continuity of utility. 
A simple outcome stream has at most one nonzero outcome, and can be written as 
(s:α). Consider the following two indifferences, similar to expression (4): 
 
(s:β) ~ (t:γ) and (s+σ:β) ~ (t+σ+ρ:γ) 
for s < t (s for “short”), β < γ, and σ > 0. (8) 
 
We have ρ > 0 under decreasing impatience, ρ = 0 under constant impatience, and 
ρ < 0 under increasing impatience. ρ can be taken as an index of deviation from 
stationarity. Indeed, for ρ > 0, we have the typical nonstationarity 
 
Studies on intertemporal preferences with applications to health economics 
 88
(s:β) í (t´:γ) and (s+σ:β) Ç (t´+σ:γ) with one preference strict (9) 
 
for all t ≤ t´ ≤ t+ρ and for no other t´. The interval [t, t+ρ], thus, indicates a space 
for arbitrage. 
 Preference reversals as in (9) are prone to arbitrage. At time 0 the person, 
when endowed with (s+σ:β), is willing to exchange it for (t´+σ:γ). When asked to 
reconsider at time point σ, the person now perceives of the options as (s:β) and 
(t´:γ), and is willing to go back to the β-option.2 The person is willing to pay a 
small amount for at least one of the two exchanges (take it small enough not to 
affect preference otherwise). Then the person has ended up at the original 
endowment less some money, which entails arbitrage. Bénabou and Tirole (2002), 
Gruber and Köszegi (2001), Laibson (1997), O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999), 
Prelec (2004), Strotz (1956), Thaler and Benartzi (2004), and numerous others 
derived various choice anomalies from (9), and gave formalizations for these 
phenomena. For example, a sophisticated person who is informed about the above 
procedure beforehand may avoid it but then becomes vulnerable to commitments 
to dominated options, due to lack of future self-control. Other anomalies that can 
result entail time inconsistency, addiction, and procrastination. 
 
For ρ < 0 in (8), as typical of increasing impatience, we have 
(s:β) Ç (t´:γ) and (s+σ:β) í (t´+σ:γ) with one preference strict (10) 
                                                 
2
 In the latter step we use homogeneity of time, i.e. the possibility to use stopwatch time, as 
assumed throughout this chapter. 
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for all t+ρ ≤ t´ ≤ t and for no other t´, and [t+ρ, t] indicates a space for arbitrage. 
 Consider now another preference relation í*, satisfying the assumptions of 
preceding sections as does í, with corresponding ϕ*, U*, τ*. 
 
DEFINITION 1. í* exhibits more decreasing impatience than í if the equivalences 
in (8) plus (s:β*) ~* (t:γ*) imply (s+σ:β*) Ç* (t+σ+ρ:γ*). 
 
Prelec (2004) gave an equivalent definition. Under decreasing impatience for í 
and í*, the above condition implies, for 
 
(s:β*) ~* (t:γ*) and (s+σ:β*) ~* (t+σ+ρ*:γ*), (11) 
 
that either this ρ* exceeds ρ, or that such a ρ* does not exist. In the first case the 
space [t, t+ρ*] for arbitrage for í* exceeds the corresponding space [t, t+ρ] for í. 
In the second case the space for arbitrage for í* is in fact [t, t+∞), as is readily 
verified. 
 There is also interest in increasing impatience, because of which we extend 
the above definition. 
 
DEFINITION 2. í* exhibits more increasing impatience than í if the equivalences 
in (8) plus (s:β*) ~* (t:γ*) imply (s+σ:β*) í (t+σ+ρ:γ*). 
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For preference relations with increasing impatience, the arbitrage space [t+ρ, t] is 
bigger as increasing impatience is bigger. 
 The following theorem shows that time standard sequence curves identify 
proneness to arbitrage in the above sense. As usual, τ* is more concave than τ if 
there exists a concave transformation f such that τ*(t) = f(τ(t)) for all t, which 
holds if and only if τ*´´
τ*´
  ≥ 
τ´´
τ´
  everywhere on their domain. Note here that τ and 
τ* are decreasing functions, for which the Pratt-Arrow index of concavity drops 
the minus sign relative to increasing functions. Similarly, τ* is more convex than 
τ if there exists a convex transformation f such that τ*(t) = f(τ(t)) for all t, which 
holds if and only if −τ*´´
τ*´
  ≥ −
τ´´
τ´
  everywhere on their domain. The following 
theorem adapts Prelec’s (2004) Proposition 1 to time standard sequence curves 
instead of ln(ϕ), and extends the result to increasing impatience. 
 
THEOREM 1. Assume that í and í* satisfy the assumptions of discounted utility 
of this chapter, with í’s time standard sequence curve τ(t) a normalization 
lnϕ(t) − lnϕ(S)
lnϕ(T) − lnϕ(S)  of ln(ϕ(t)) and í*’s time standard sequence curve τ*(t) a 
normalization 
lnϕ*(t) − lnϕ*(S*)
lnϕ*(T*) − lnϕ*(S*)  of ln(ϕ*(t)), for some arbitrary S > T and S* 
> T*. 
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(i) í* exhibits more decreasing impatience than í if and only if í*’s time 
standard sequence curve τ* is more convex than í’s time standard 
sequence curve τ. 
(ii) í* exhibits more increasing impatience than í* if and only if í*’s time 
standard sequence curve τ* is more concave than í’s time standard 
sequence curve τ. 
 
 The above theorem holds irrespective of the normalization parameters S, T, 
S*, T* chosen. The theorem demonstrates formally that the degree of convexity 
of a time standard sequence curve determines the degree of decreasing impatience 
and, thus, the space for arbitrage and the proneness to anomalies as discussed by 
Prelec (2004) and others. From a mathematical perspective, our reformulation in 
terms of time standard sequence curves, i.e. normalized ln(ϕ) curves, may seem to 
be only more complex than Prelec’s formulations directly in terms of ln(ϕ) itself. 
This reformulation is, however, the essential step for obtaining the empirical 
status of the result. The normalized curve is directly observable whereas the 
nonnormalized curve is not.3 
 
 
                                                 
3
 In terms of Eq. (17) hereafter, Theorem 1 shows that we need not measure h, a value 
needed to obtain ln(ϕ
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4.5 Illustrations of time standard sequences 
 
We can immediately infer proneness to time inconsistency from simply 
eyeballing time standard sequence curves, curves that were obtained using only 
pencil and paper. Figure 4.2 displays seven time standard sequence curves, 
obtained from seven participants in the experiment described later, on normalized 
time intervals (t~0=0, t~n=1). The curves immediately reveal that the curve of 
participant 7 is more convex, implying more decreasing impatience, than the 
curve of participant 38. Because both participants exhibit decreasing impatience 
by Theorem 1i, participant 7 is more prone to time inconsistency and arbitrage 
than participant 38. Participant 24's curve is also always below that of participant 
38, suggesting more decreasing impatience. Locally around 0.45, participant 38 
exhibits more convexity though, so that this ordering of convexity does not hold 
on the whole interval [t0,t5]. The curves of participants 7 and 24 intersect and 
there is no uniform ordering regarding their degree of nonstationarity over the 
whole interval [t0,t5]. 
 There are several concave curves suggesting increasing rather than 
decreasing impatience. Theorem 1ii shows that participant 10 is more prone to 
time inconsistency than participant 5; etc. 
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FIGURE 4.2.  THE TIME STANDARD SEQUENCE CURVES OF SEVERAL 
PARTICIPANTS. 
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 For sophisticated analyses, we can estimate ratios of second derivatives by 
first derivatives, or find best-fitting parametric curves, and compare the 
corresponding degrees of convexity. We can also develop global heuristic 
measures of convexity that can be calculated using only pencil and paper. For 
example, the area below the diagonal is a plausible index of convexity and of 
decreasing impatience. This area is a monotonic transform of the decreasing-
impatience index (DI-index), defined by 
DI-index = ∑ i=1
n-1  
 ( i
n
  − t
~
i ) , with t~i the normalization of ti. (12) 
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These values are 0.63 (participant 7), 0.52 (participant 24), and 0.36 (participant 
38). They suggest that, overall, participant 7 exhibits more decreasing impatience 
than participant 24, and participant 24 more than participant 38. Notice that the 
DI-index bears some resemblance with the Gini-index in inequality measurement. 
 Participants 5, 10, and 49 exhibit increasing impatience. Accordingly, their 
DI-indices will be negative, and they are −0.26 (participant 5), −0.60 (participant 
10), and −0.45 (participant 49). Overall, participant 10 exhibits more increasing 
impatience than participant 49, and participant 49 does so more than participant 5. 
 The DI-index of participant 13 is 0.08, and this participant virtually exhibits 
no decreasing or increasing impatience in an overall sense. Yet, this participant 
does deviate considerably from stationarity. For deviations from stationarity, 
absolute values of deviations from linearity are more relevant, with any area 
between the τ curve and the diagonal taken positively. We define the non-
stationarity index (NS-index) as 
 
NS-index = ∑ i=1
n-1  
 | i
n
 −t
~
i | . (13) 
 
It provides an overall index of deviation from stationarity and proneness to 
inconsistencies without concern of the direction of deviation. For participant 13, 
the NS-index = 0.15. To the extent that stationarity is rational, the NS-index could 
be interpreted as an index of rationality. 
 The DI-index and NS-index depend on the size of the interval [t0,t5] 
considered in the sense that they will tend to zero if the interval [t0,t5] becomes 
small. The desirability of such dependence depends on the application considered. 
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Distortions due to this effect can be avoided by comparing participants only on 
same time intervals, or taking subparts of the τ curve related to the same interval. 
In Figure 4.2, the curves of participants 13 and 49 concerned similar time 
intervals indeed (being [5,17] and [5,16]). 
 Other measures of decreasing impatience or absolute deviation from 
stationarity can be devised, depending on the application and the time discounting 
assumed. Let us consider generalized hyperbolic discounting, ϕ(t) = (1+gt)−h/g 
(Loewenstein and Prelec 1992), with 0 ≤ g < ∞ an index of decreasing impatience, 
and with stationarity and constant discounting e−ht the limiting case of g→0. This 
family incorporates most of the popular hyperbolic families other than quasi-
hyperbolic discounting, such as those of Herrnstein (1981) and Harvey (1986, 
1995). Rohde (2005) derived the most appropriate index of convexity for this 
family, called the hyperbolic factor. For a time standard sequence t0,…,tn, 
hyperbolic factors can be calculated as 
hyperbolic factor(i,j) = (tj−ti) − (tj−1−ti−1)ti(tj−1−ti−1) − ti−1(tj−ti)   (14) 
for j > i. Hence, for one time standard sequence with n = 5, 10 (= 4+3+2+1) 
hyperbolic factors can be calculated. As Rohde (2005) demonstrated, for 
generalized hyperbolic discounting, ϕ(t) = (1+gt)−h/g, the hyperbolic factor is 
constant, independent of i and j or the time standard sequence considered, and is 
always equal to g. For constant discounting (stationarity), the hyperbolic factor 
will always be zero, and for quasi-hyperbolic discounting the hyperbolic factor is 
positive at time point 0 and zero for all future time points. Thus, this statistic can 
readily serve to test these models. 
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 The relation between Prelec’s convexity index and the hyperbolic factor can 
be compared with indices of risk aversion of utility functions U in expected 
utility. The absolute Pratt-Arrow index −U´´/U´ is most appropriate for so-called 
CARA utility, but the relative index x(−U´´/U´) is most appropriate for so-called 
CRRA utility. Thus, what is the most useful index depends on the application 
mentioned. Theorem 1 described cases where Prelec’s measure is most suited. If 
we restrict our attention to generalized hyperbolic discounting, the hyperbolic 
factor is useful. 
 The hyperbolic factor can be directly calculated from time standard 
sequences, and can be used to test whether generalized hyperbolic discounting 
holds and, if it does, to distinguish between its various subfamilies. One necessary 
condition for generalized hyperbolic discounting to hold, and for g to be well 
behaved, is that the denominator in Eq. (14) be positive, i.e. 
 
ti(tj−1−ti−1) − ti−1(tj−ti) > 0 for j > i.  (15) 
 
This inequality provides a test of generalized hyperbolic discounting, as does 
constantness of the hyperbolic factor when defined. 
 
4.6 Deriving the discount function from time standard 
sequences 
 
We saw in preceding sections that time standard sequences give the normalized 
logarithm of the discount function, and they give the degree of change of 
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impatience and discounting through the degree of convexity of the function 
obtained. We did not derive the complete discount function in the preceding 
section, because we did not establish the rate of time preference in any absolute 
sense. Deriving the complete discount function from time standard sequences is 
the purpose of this section. One way to identify the discount function is to derive 
the utility function from some extra information or from some extra assumption, 
such as linearity as is often done in the literature. Then we can use (5) and we 
readily get ϕ. 
 An alternative route that does not need any assumption about utility is as 
follows. We can take any indifference between outcome streams with two 
nonzero outcomes: 
 
(b:γ, c:γ) ~ (a:γ, d:γ) for γ > 0 and a < b < c < d. (16) 
 
 We give the proof of the following observation in the main text because it 
demonstrates how the discount function can be calculated from (16) together with 
time standard sequences. 
 
OBSERVATION 3. Given the function τ, the discount function ϕ is uniquely 
determined through one observed indifference (16). 
 
PROOF. Let tn > t0, and assume that 
τ(t) =  ln(ϕ(t)) − ln(ϕ(tn))ln(ϕ(t0))  − ln(ϕ(tn)) . 
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That is, τ is a normalization of ln(ϕ(t)). There exist, as yet unknown, parameters λ 
and r such that ln(ϕ(t)) = λ + hτ(t), i.e.4 
 
ϕ(t) = eλ × (eτ(t))h.   (17) 
 
The parameter eλ is an arbitrary scaling constant without empirical implications. 
We may as well assume that it is e−h. The power h determines the rate of time 
preference and is empirically relevant. For example, if we let the irrelevant factor 
eλ be e−h and rewrite ϕ(t) as e−h × (eh)τ(t), then for the special case of constant 
discounting and linear τ(t) = 1−t, e−h is the discount factor. 
 Time standard sequences in isolation cannot identify the power h and, hence, 
cannot identify the absolute rate of time preference. To see this point, note that 
time standard sequences concern simple outcome streams. If ϕ(t)U(x) represents 
preferences over simple outcome streams (t:x), then so does ϕ(t)hU(x)h for every h 
> 0, because ϕ(t)U(x) ≥ ϕ(s)U(y) if and only if ϕ(t)hU(x)h ≥ ϕ(s)hU(y)h. Hence, 
without any assumption about utility, simple outcome streams and time standard 
sequences cannot identify the power of time discounting and the absolute degree 
of discounting, indeed. 
 The indifference in (16) implies that ϕ(b)U(γ) + ϕ(c)U(γ) = ϕ(a)U(γ) + 
ϕ(d)U(γ), or ϕ(b) + ϕ(c) = ϕ(a) + ϕ(d). Substituting (17) and dropping eλ gives 
 
(eτ(b))h + (eτ(c))h = (eτ(a))h + (eτ(d))h. (18) 
                                                 
4
 We have λ = ln(ϕ(tn)) and h = ln(ϕ(t0)) − ln(ϕ(tn)) , with ϕ(t0) and ϕ(tn) unknown. 
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It is well-known that for all quadruples a´ (eτ(a) above), b´ (eτ(b) above), c´ (eτ(c) 
above), and d´ (eτ(d) above) with a´ > b´ > c´ > d´ (recall that τ is decreasing) there 
exists a unique real number h such that exactly one of the following equations 
holds: 
 
b´h + c´h = a´h + d´h  with h > 0 (19) 
ln(b´) + ln(c´) = ln(a´) + ln(d´), corresponding to h = 0 (20) 
b´h + c´h = a´h + d´h  with h < 0 (21) 
 
Such equations have, for instance, been studied in decision under risk with 
expected utility where (b´,c´) and (a´,d´) designate fifty-fifty lotteries for money, 
and constant relative risk averse utility U(x) = xh/h (U(x) = ln(x) for h = 0) is used 
to fit data. Unfortunately, there is no analytic expression for the solution h to the 
best of our knowledge, but h can readily be determined numerically. 
 In our above analysis for time preference, only positive powers h (= 
ln(ϕ(t0)) − ln(ϕ(tn))) are possible. In the experiment we measured (16) 
empirically, and then solved for h. If negative h resulted, it followed that the 
discounted utility model was falsified. To clarify how such a violation can arise, 
assume a time standard sequence t0,…,t5 (n = 5). Assume that we take a = t1, b = 
t2, and c = t3, in (16), and the participant chooses d < t4. Then ϕ(t2) + ϕ(t3) = ϕ(t1) 
+ ϕ(d) > ϕ(t1) + ϕ(t4), so that ϕ(t1) − ϕ(t2) < ϕ(t3) − ϕ(t4). This contradicts the 
equality ϕ(t3) − ϕ(t4) = µ2(ϕ(t1) − ϕ(t2)) for 0 < µ = ϕ(t2)/ϕ(t0) < 1, and the general 
discounted utility model has been falsified. 
 Figure 4.3 depicts a discount function that we obtained for participant 5. We 
used his indifferences (0:700) ~ (6:900), (6:700) ~ (12:900), (12:700) ~ (16:900), 
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(16:700) ~ (20:900), (20:700) ~ (24:900), which yields the time standard 
sequence t0 = 0, t1 = 6, t2 =12, t3 = 16, t4 = 20, and t5 = 24. Further we used his 
indifference (12:700, 16:700) ~ (6:700, 24:700) as a version of (16) to estimate h 
in 
 
(eτ(12))h + (eτ(16))h = (eτ(6))h + (eτ(24))h. (22) 
 
Eq. (22) is equivalent to 
 
(e3/5)h + (e2/5)h = (e4/5)h + (e0)h. (23) 
 
We obtained an estimated power h = 1.41. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 4.3.  THE DISCOUNT FUNCTION ϕ(T) OF P5 
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4.7 Method of experiment 
 
Participants 
 N = 55 participants took part. There were 31 students from Erasmus 
University, of whom 21 were from finance or economics and the others were 
from various other disciplines, and there were 24 students from Maastricht 
University, with 2 students from economics or finance and the rest from various 
disciplines. 
 
Motivating participants  
 Every participant received €10 for participating. All payoffs in the stimuli 
were hypothetical. This point is discussed in Section 4.8. 
 
Procedure 
 The experiment was run by computer, and participants were interviewed 
individually. On average, the task took 15 minutes per participant. We ran 
extensive pilots with 53 participants in order to determine the appropriate setup of 
the experiment. 
 We took one month as unit of time. Participants first went through a training 
phase, where preferences (0:700) Ä (1:900) and (0:700) ê (600: 900) were mostly 
observed (with sometimes one or both reversed). Then, in a training matching 
task, we asked for the value t to give the indifference (0:700) ~ (t:900), and then 
for the value t to give the indifference (0:2800) ~ (t:3300). 
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Stimuli 
 We elicited four time standard sequences for each participant (Table 4.1). 
Every sequence consisted of 5 steps, i.e. n = 5. All tasks were matching tasks, 
similar to the last task of the training phase. 
 
TABLE 4.1. PARAMETERS FOR THE 4 TIME STANDARD SEQUENCES. 
Sequences t0 β γ 
I 0 months €700 €900 
II 0 months €2800 €3300 
III 5 months €700 €900 
IV 0 months €1600 €1900 
The outcomes β, γ, and the initial time point t0 are as in (4). 
 
 The computer screen was as given in Appendix 4B. The pilots suggested that 
a direct successive elicitation of the time points t1,…,t5 of one time standard 
sequence could generate order effects. Hence, in the main experiment we first 
elicited t1 for every time standard sequence, next t2 for every time standard 
sequence, etc. 
 We elicited two versions of (16). In both we took γ = €700. In the first we 
measured an indifference 
 
(5:700, 11:700) ~ (1:700, T:700). (24) 
 
where participants were asked to provide their indifference value T through a 
matching question. In the second we measured an indifference 
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(t2:700, t3:700) ~ (t1:700, T:700), (25) 
 
where t1, t2, and t3 were from the elicited time standard sequence I. 
 
Demographic variables 
 At the end of the experiment, participants were asked to report their gender, 
age, length, weight, field of study, nationality, and also whether or not they 
smoked. We also asked seven behavioral questions on a scale from 1 to 7, where 
1 means totally disagree and 7 means totally agree. The questions concerned 
behavioral aspects that we thought could have an influence on discounting and are 
given in Appendix 4B. 
 
Analysis 
 We did all tests both parametrically and nonparametrically. These always 
gave similar results, and we only report the nonparametric tests. 
 
Analysis of group averages 
 Changes in WTW indicate whether participants satisfy constant, decreasing 
or increasing impatience. We tested for constant WTW for each time standard 
sequence separately using a Friedman test. 
 Next, for every two subsequent measurements of WTW (di and di−1) we 
tested equality using Wilcoxon tests. We also tested equality of WTW between 
the first questions of sequence I ((0:700) ~ (t:900)) and of sequence III ((5:700) ~ 
(t:900)). Because these concern the same outcomes, stationarity predicts the same 
WTW here. 
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 We also checked whether the temporal attitude suggested by this comparison 
is consistent with the temporal attitude suggested by comparisons within sequence 
I. That is, we checked whether the change in WTW from the first question of 
sequence I to the first question of sequence III has the same sign as the first 
change in WTW within sequence I. 
 
Analyses of individual data 
 A participant was classified as exhibiting increasing (constant, decreasing) 
impatience if at least 50% of her changes in WTW suggested so, where we 
considered all sequences together. A double classification as constant or 
increasing (decreasing) was reclassified as increasing (decreasing), and a double 
classification as increasing and decreasing was taken as unclassified, as were all 
other cases. We used these conservative criteria to reduce the effects of response 
error. Such a threshold of 50% has been used before in the literature (e.g. 
Abdellaoui, 2000). We tested whether significantly more participants are 
classified as increasingly or decreasingly impatient using Wilcoxon. 
 Next, we tested whether quasi-hyperbolic discounting holds. For every 
participant we split all changes in WTW of all time standard sequences into two 
groups: the group containing all changes in WTW where the first time point was 
0, and the group containing the rest. For both groups, we chose the same 50% 
classification as before. Under quasi-hyperbolic discounting, the WTW should 
increase in the former group and be constant in the latter. We performed similar 
Wilcoxon tests as before. 
 For every participant we calculated indices of decreasing impatience and of 
non-stationarity, and also the hyperbolic factors as explained in Section 4.5. We 
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compared the indices of all participants between sequences by means of Wilcoxon 
signed rank tests. To test for a possible special effect of first questions, we also 
considered sequences with the first step left out. We computed the DI-index for 
these reduced sequences as follows: DI-index = ∑i=1
3  
 ( i4  − t
~
i+1 ), with t~i the 
normalization of ti such that t
~
1 = 0 and t
~
5 = 1. 
 We thereafter regressed the indices of decreasing impatience and non-
stationarity on the body-mass index. We estimated the correlation between each 
of the seven behavioral questions and each DI-index and each NS-index. We also 
regressed the mean of the DI-indices per participant and that of the NS-indices on 
gender, smoker, age, length, weight, and all behavioral questions together. 
Finally, we estimated the power of discounting h in Eq. (17) from the questions in 
(24) and (25). 
 
4.8 Results 
 
Group averages 
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FIGURE 4.4. THE TIME STANDARD SEQUENCE CURVES FOR MEDIAN ANSWERS 
OF THE 4 TIME STANDARD SEQUENCES. 
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Figure 4.4 gives the time standard sequence curves constructed from the medians 
of the answers of all participants. The curves suggest that participants are 
increasingly impatient in the beginning and near future and constantly impatient 
thereafter. Statistical analyses confirm this pattern. The Friedman tests rejected 
constantness of the WTW (p < 0.01) for all sequences. We repeated the test with 
the first WTW excluded. As expected, then the null hypothesis of constant WTW 
is not rejected (p > 0.20 for all tests). Thus, our findings suggest that people 
satisfy stationarity for time points beyond a certain threshold. From the third 
sequence we can see that this threshold exceeds 5 months. 
 
FIGURE 4.5. MEDIAN WILLINGNESS TO WAIT FOR EACH SEQUENCE. 
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Figure 4.5 shows median WTWs. The vertical axes give the WTW. We can 
clearly see that the WTW drops in the beginning and remains more or less 
constant later on for every sequence. This is confirmed by Wilcoxon tests. The 
results of the Wilcoxon test are summarized in Table 4.2. The WTW changed 
significantly in the first steps (d2 − d1) (α = 0.01). The WTW decreases there, 
suggesting increasing impatience. The WTW increases in the second step (d3 - d2) 
for sequence III (α = 0.05). No other changes are significant at α = 0.05. 
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TABLE 4.2. WILCOXON SIGNED RANK TESTS: Z (P-VALUE, 2-TAILED). 
WTW  
Sequence d2 – d1 d3 − d2 d4 – d3 d5 – d4 
I -4.40 (0.000) -0.51 (0.612) -0.63 (0.531) -0.34 (0.732) 
II -4.50 (0.000) 1.35 (0.176) -0.93 (0.352) -0.98 (0.329) 
III -3.39 (0.001) 2.00 (0.046) -0.29 (0.769) -0.95 (0.341) 
IV -3.19 (0.001) 1.03 (0.302) -0.41 (0.681)  1.05 (0.293) 
 
 A Wilcoxon test shows that the first WTW of the third sequence is 
significantly lower (p < 0.01) than the first WTW of the first sequence. Thus, 
participants are consistent between sequences I and III. 
 
Individual data 
 The individual data confirm the preceding findings. Participants are 
increasingly impatient for time points close to 0 and constantly impatient for later 
time points, as follows. The classification of all participants based on all 
sequences together yields 18 participants exhibiting constant impatience, 3 
exhibiting decreasing, 10 exhibiting increasing impatience, and 24 not classified 
(Table 4.3). Thus, based on this classification we cannot say much about the 
behavior of individual participants. The Wilcoxon test shows that there is more 
tendency towards increasing than towards decreasing impatience (p = 0.052). In 
the group of all questions with a first time point zero, 8 participants exhibit 
constant impatience, 3 participants exhibit decreasing impatience, 36 participants 
exhibit increasing impatience, and 8 participants could not be classified. This 
suggests that most participants indeed are increasingly impatient for time point 
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zero, which is supported by the Wilcoxon test (p = 0.000). In the other group (first 
time point positive), 21 participants exhibit constant impatience, 5 participants 
exhibit decreasing, 6 participants exhibit increasing, and 23 participants could not 
be classified. Thus, it appears that most participants indeed exhibit constant 
impatience for time points not too close to 0. 
 
TABLE 4.3. CLASSIFICATION OF INDIVIDUALS. 
 Impatience 
Questions Constant Decreasing Increasing Unclassified 
All 18 3 10 24 
Time point 0 8 3 36 8 
Time point > 
0 
21 5 6 23 
 
 Calculations of the hyperbolic factors revealed that (15) was widely violated, 
for virtually all participants in many questions. This falsifies the generalized 
hyperbolic discounting model, and Rohde's hyperbolic factor cannot be calculated 
in many situations. 
 In view of the problems of calculating the hyperbolic factors, we only use the 
indices of decreasing impatience (DI-index) and of non-stationarity (NS-index) to 
compare participants. The medians of the indices of decreasing impatience over 
the whole sequences are significantly negative (p < 0.01) so that participants are 
increasingly impatient overall. The medians of the DI-index were respectively -
0.33, -0.28, -0.092, and -0.19. We observe that the third sequence had both a 
lower NS-index and a lower absolute value of the DI-index. This is probably 
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caused by the fact that the third sequence starts closer to the threshold from 
whereon participants satisfy constant impatience. The DI-indices of the reduced 
sequences, the sequences without the first steps, did not deviate significantly from 
zero, indicating that the increasing impatience found earlier is indeed due to the 
first step of every sequence. 
 We proceed by considering only the DI-index and NS-index of the complete 
sequences. Based on a Wilcoxon signed rank test, the DI-index and the NS-index 
are significantly different for every sequence (p < 0.01), where the NS-index is 
always larger than minus the DI-index. Since most indices of decreasing 
impatience are negative, this finding implies that for most participants the time 
standard sequence curve τ intersects the curve belonging to a linear time standard 
sequence curve at least once. Thus, most participants are not clearly either 
increasingly or decreasingly impatient, but are a mix of both. 
 There was no significant difference in DI-index and NS-index between 
sequences I and II and between sequences III and IV. For all other pairs of 
sequences, the sequence with the higher sequence number provided significantly 
higher DI-indices and significantly lower NS-indices than the ones before (p < 
0.01 for all but one, p < 0.05 for all). Thus, participants became less non-
stationary and more decreasingly impatient or, equivalently, less increasingly 
impatient in later sequences. 
 On average, men had higher DI-indices and lower NS-indices, except for the 
DI-index in sequence III, but the differences were usually not significant, with 
marginal significance (p < 0.10) for the DI-index of sequence I and for the NS-
indices of sequences I and II, and significance (p < 0.05) only for the NS-index of 
sequence IV. 
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 We found no significant relations between our indices and demographic 
variables otherwise. Also, the correlations between the behavioral questions and 
the indices were mostly insignificant, so this gives no clear indication that the 
behavioral questions predict behavior. In the two regressions of the mean of the 
DI-indices per participant and that of the NS-indices on gender, smoker, age, 
length, weight, and all behavioral questions together, only the coefficient on the 
second behavioral question with the mean of the NS-index as dependent variable, 
was significantly positive (p = 0.045) and all other coefficients were insignificant. 
 In calculations of the power h in Eq. (17) for (24) and (25), about 1/3 of these 
were negative. It shows that there are many violations of the basic model of 
general discounting.  
 
4.9 Discussion 
 
Our findings suggest that the participants satisfy increasing impatience in the 
beginning and constant impatience thereafter. Thus, we find a kind of "reversed 
quasi-hyperbolic" discounting, where impatience is constant after a certain 
threshold and increasing as opposed to decreasing in the beginning. Impatience, 
however, continues to increase up to 5 months and is not constant immediately 
after the present. Informal discussions with participants indicated that they 
understood the questions and knew what they wanted to answer. For the major 
finding of this study that deviates from common empirical findings in the 
literature, i.e. increasing instead of decreasing impatience, there was clear support 
from the informal discussions. Many students indicated that they did not mind a 
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delay at first, but after a long wait they extra disliked further delays. This finding 
is opposite to participants' becoming more insensitive to delays, as is commonly 
assumed in the literature. 
 Our finding of increasing impatience is consistent with several other studies 
(Airoldi et al., 2005; Frederick, 1999; Gigliotti and Sopher, 2004; Read et al., 
2005a; Read et al., 2005b; Rubinstein, 2003; Sayman and Onculer, 2005). Read et 
al. (2005b) found that hyperbolic discounting is only observed when time is 
described in delay terms as opposed to calendar time terms. Rubinstein (2003) 
reported three experiments that provide evidence against constant or decreasing 
impatience. Bommier (2005) and Dasgupta and Maskin (2005) gave theoretical 
reasons why increasing impatience can occur. 
 The setup of the experiment made it unlikely that participants noticed that the 
questions were chained, and that several of them together served to elicit 
sequences. Therefore, it is unlikely that order effects would cause the increasing 
impatience we found. 
 For the violations of general discounted utility that we found when 
estimating the powers in Eq. (17), it is likely that the time-separability assumption 
underlying general discounted utility is violated. It plays no role for the 
measurements of time standard sequences, and only becomes effective for two or 
more outcomes. This finding adds to the motivation for paying attention as much 
as possible to simple outcome streams, as done when measuring time standard 
sequence curves. Therefore the analysis of the time standard sequences minimizes 
the biases caused by this violation. 
 Participants were paid a flat fee for participating and all questions were 
hypothetical. There are several reasons why we did not use performance-based 
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real incentives. First, it is administratively complicated to transfer money on the 
time points specified, not only for the experimenters but also for the participants. 
Hence, such a procedure will generate many extra biases such as through doubts 
on the participants’ part about reliable implementations. Second, the outcomes we 
used were large so as to avoid participants thinking that the amount of money is 
trivial anyhow and not worth thinking about carefully. Then real payments make 
the experiment prohibitively expensive. Also, no clear evidence exists that 
hypothetical amounts are discounted differently than real amounts (Frederick et 
al., 2002). In other fields with stimuli that are not cognitively demanding similar 
to our study, hypothetical incentives do not seem to give qualitatively different 
results, although real incentives tend to reduce data variability (Camerer and 
Hogarth, 1999; Hertwig and Ortmann, 2001). Finally, there is no clear incentive 
for our participants to please the experimenter, as there can be in experiments 
about social behavior. 
 Many studies that provide evidence in favor of decreasing impatience elicit 
indifference values in the outcome domain. They fix two time points and one 
outcome and elicit a second outcome that makes the participant indifferent 
between the two simple outcome streams. We elicit indifference values in the 
time domain. Because we are interested in properties of the discount function, and 
not of the utility function, it is more natural to focus the participants’ attention on 
this dimension as our questions did. Because, by construction of a time standard 
sequence, utilities cancel out from the equations, our method does not require 
richness in the outcome dimension and can, for instance, be used with qualitative 
health outcomes. It naturally exploits the richness in the time dimension that is 
available anyhow. 
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 Scale compatibility entails that participants put more weight on the time 
dimension in our setup than in studies eliciting indifferences in the outcome 
domain. This could mean that participants discount outcomes more heavily in our 
setup but it need not affect the main topic of interest to us: nonconstant 
impatience. 
 Although eliciting indifferences has not been very common in the time 
domain, it has been used on a number of occasions, for instance by Mazur (1987). 
He conducted experiments with pigeons instead of humans. Green et al. (1994) 
did similar experiments with humans. These studies, as our study, exploited the 
richness of the time dimension to study temporal preference. They, however, still 
assumed linear utility of money. 
 Our findings suggest a number of new directions for intertemporal 
preference. Virtually all existing models, including quasi-hyperbolic discounting 
and generalized hyperbolic discounting, assume universal decreasing or constant 
impatience, and have no clear extension to allow for increasing impatience. 
However, even if group averages satisfy decreasing impatience, then there will 
still be individuals who exhibit increasing impatience, so that for any data fitting 
at the individual level such functions are required. For this reason we could not 
implement the planned test to discriminate which of the currently popular models 
fit the data better: none of them could at all fit data. In particular, Rohde's (2005) 
hyperbolic factor, in theory a good tool to empirically distinguish between various 
families, was not defined for many answers of virtually all participants. Also 
when we used time standard sequences to derive discount functions from two 
nonzero-outcome streams, our findings were mostly negative: we found the 
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general discounted utility model (1) extensively violated. Hence, the development 
of models relaxing this assumption is also desirable. 
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Appendix 4A. Proofs 
 
PROOF OF THEOREM 1. Because τ and τ* are strictly decreasing functions, τ*(t) = 
f(τ(t)) for a strictly increasing function f. Take any intervals [d,c] and [b,a] to the 
right of [d,c] (b > d and a > c) in the domain of f. Then a = τ(s), b = τ(t), c = 
τ(s+σ), and d = τ(t+σ+ρ) for some s < t, s+σ < t+σ+ρ, σ > 0, σ + ρ > 0. Because 
the ranges of U and U* contain nondegenerate intervals with 0 as lower bound, 
there exist outcomes β < γ with 
 
(s:β) ~ (t:γ)  (A.1) 
 
and outcomes β* < γ* with  
 
(s:β*) ~* (t:γ*). (A.2) 
 
(Here is where we crucially use continuity of utility.) Only the utility ratios 
U(β)/U(γ) and U*(β*)/U*(γ*) matter for all that follows and, hence, the particular 
choices of β, γ, β*, γ* are immaterial for all that follows. 
 We have equivalence of the following statements: 
 
a − b = c − d; 
τ(s) − τ(t) = τ(s+σ) − τ(t+σ+ρ); 
lnϕ(s) − lnϕ(t) = lnϕ(s+σ) − lnϕ(t+σ+ρ); 
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ϕ(s)/ϕ(t) = ϕ(s+σ)/ϕ(t+σ+ρ); 
(s+σ:β) ~ (t+σ+ρ:γ). (A.3) 
 
We also have logical equivalence of the following statements: 
 
f(a) − f(b) ≥ f(c) − f(d). 
τ*(s) − τ*(t) ≥ τ*(s+σ) − τ*(t+σ+ρ); 
lnϕ*(s) − lnϕ*(t) ≥ lnϕ*(s+σ) − lnϕ*(t+σ+ρ); 
ϕ*(s)/ϕ*(t) ≥ ϕ*(s+σ)/ϕ*(t+σ+ρ); 
(s+σ:β*) Ç (t+σ+ρ:γ*); (A.4) 
 
It is well-known that f is convex if and only if for all a, b, c, d as above we have 
f(a) − f(b) ≥ f(c) − f(d). As we have just demonstrated, this is, in view of (A.1) 
and (A.2) and the independence of the choices β,γ,β*,γ* above, the same as the 
requirement that (s+σ:β) ~ (t+σ+ρ:γ) imply (s+σ:β*) Ç (t+σ+ρ:γ*) for all s,t,σ,ρ 
as above. That is, convexity of f is equivalent to more decreasing impatience for 
í* than for í. Reversing inequalities and weak preferences above shows that 
concavity of f is equivalent to more increasing impatience for í* than for í. 
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Appendix 4B. Display screen and behavioral questions 
 
FIGURE 4A.1. LAYOUT OF THE COMPUTER SCREEN. 
 
 
 
 
The seven behavioral questions were as follows: 
 
1. I do not study regularly, but often postpone it for too long, so that the 
exams week is extra stressful.  
2. I wish I would drink less alcohol per week than I do currently.  
3. I wish I would eat less per day than I do currently.  
4. I tend to postpone things.  
5. I am impatient.  
6. I am often late.  
7. I tend to do impulsive purchases. 
5 A new method for measuring the utility of life 
duration1 
 
 
Summary 
 
This chapter proposes a new method to measure the utility of life duration. A 
major advantage of our method, as opposed to existing methods for the 
measurement of the utility of life duration, is that it avoids the use of probabilities 
and of the outcome death. People tend to have difficulties handling probabilities, 
leading to biases in the elicited utilities, and the possibility of death tends to 
produce extreme risk aversion. Our measurements are obtained by using a 
choice-based procedure in contrast to other studies on risk-free utility that 
measured utility based on direct strength of preference judgments. To compare 
the elicited utility of our risk-free method to utility under risk, we also measured 
the utility of life duration using two familiar risky elicitation methods, the 
certainty equivalence method and the tradeoff method. We found the certainty 
equivalence method to be more concave than the risk-free method, but when we 
adjusted the certainty equivalence method for the violations of expected utility 
                                                 
1
 This chapter is based on Attema, Bleichrodt, and Wakker (2007). 
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modeled by prospect theory the difference was no longer significant. In addition, 
the tradeoff method, which is not prone to bias caused by probability weighting, 
did not differ significantly from the risk-free method. Hence, our risk-free method 
provides a reliable measure of utility. In addition, people indicated that they 
found the risk-free method significantly easier than the other two methods, 
thereby increasing feasibility for practical purposes. 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
Knowledge of the utility for life duration is crucial in making treatment 
recommendations that best reflect the interests of the patient, see McNeil et al. 
(1978) for an illustration. The common way to measure the utility for life duration 
is through the certainty equivalence (CE) method. In the CE a risky treatment 
(p:M; m), denoting probability p of M additional life-years and probability 1 − p 
of m < M additional life-years, is given and the decision maker is asked to specify 
the number of life years x for sure that he considers equivalent to the risky 
treatment. Commonly, m is set equal to immediate death. Assuming expected 
utility and setting the utility of M equal to 1 and the utility of m to 0 it then 
follows that the utility of x years is equal to p. 
 There are two problems with the CE method. The first problem is the use of 
the outcome immediate death, which tends to result in extreme risk aversion, i.e. 
low values of x and, consequently, high utilities for life duration. The second 
problem is the assumption that the CE can be evaluated by expected utility. 
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Evidence abounds that people do not behave according to expected utility 
(Starmer, 2000). Violations of expected utility in medical decision making are 
reported, for example, by Llewellyn-Thomas et al. (1982), Rutten-van Mölken et 
al. (1995), Bleichrodt (2001), and Oliver (2003). The violations of expected utility 
lead to an upward bias in the measured utility for life duration, i.e. to utilities for 
life duration that are too high (Wakker and Stiggelbout, 1995; Bleichrodt et al., 
2001; Bleichrodt et al., 2007). 
 This chapter presents a new method to measure the utility for life duration 
that avoids the two problems affecting the CE. Our method does not involve the 
outcome death and is risk-free; hence, it is not affected by violations of expected 
utility. The method is entirely choice-based and does not introduce additional 
primitives such as strength of preference judgments.  
 The risk-free nature of our method raises the question whether we can expect 
it to yield the same utilities as measurements that are applied under risk. This 
question touches on a long-standing issue in economics and decision theory 
whether utility is context-specific or whether there exists one unifying concept of 
utility. The dominant viewpoint has been that there is no unifying concept of 
utility and that the utility that is elicited from decisions under risk can only be 
applied in risky decisions (e.g. Arrow, 1951; Savage, 1954; Luce and Raiffa, 
1957; Fishburn, 1989). In the medical domain the assumption of one unifying 
concept of utility is common, however. For example, time tradeoff measurements, 
which are made in an intertemporal context, are commonly applied in decisions 
involving risk. 
 Dyer and Sarin (1982) proposed a way to separate under expected utility 
riskless strength of preference from attitude towards risk. Several studies reported 
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evidence for this distinction in the form of a significant difference between utility 
obtained under risk and utility obtained under certainty (Tversky, 1967; McCord 
and de Neufville, 1984; Miyamoto and Eraker, 1988; Camerer, 1995; Pennings 
and Smidts, 2000).  
 All these studies assumed expected utility, however. Under expected utility, 
the utility function captures both a decision maker’s attitude towards outcomes 
and his attitude towards risk. Hence, if people are not risk neutral then it is 
plausible that riskless and risky utility will be different. Under non-expected 
utility, a decision maker’s risk attitude is not only determined by the shape of his 
utility function. For example, in prospect theory risk attitude is also determined 
by probability weighting and loss aversion. It has been argued that utility 
curvature plays a minor role in shaping a decision maker’s attitude towards risk 
and that loss aversion is the main driving force (Rabin, 2000). If utility is not 
influential in determining a decision maker’s attitudes towards risk then riskless 
and risky utility can be the same. Two studies observed evidence that the 
difference between riskless and risky utility disappears when corrections are made 
for deviations from expected utility. Stalmeier and Bezembinder (1999) found 
that risky and riskless utility of health states did not differ anymore when they 
corrected for probability weighting and framing. More recently, Abdellaoui et al. 
(2007) observed no significant difference between risky and risk-free utility when 
risky utility was corrected for probability weighting. These studies lend support to 
the existence of an intrinsic meaning of utility, which is relevant for risky as well 
as riskless applications. By comparing the results from our risk-free method with 
the results from two risky elicitation methods, the CE method and Wakker and 
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Deneffe's (1996) tradeoff (TO) method, our study will shed new light on the 
nature of utility. 
 In what follows, Section 5.2 introduces notation and background. Section 5.3 
describes our new risk-free (RF) method, Section 5.4 the CE method and Section 
5.5 the TO method. Section 5.6 describes an experiment in which we measured 
the utility for life duration by the RF method, the CE method, and the TO method. 
Section 5.7 presents the results of the experiment and Section 5.8 concludes. 
 
5.2 Background 
 
Let h = (h1,…,hT) denote a health profile, where ht denotes health in period t = 
1,…,T and T is the decision maker’s final period of life. Constant health profiles 
give the same health state at each point in time: h1 = …= hT = constant. In the RF 
method we will consider preferences í over health profiles. Preferences over 
health states are derived from preferences over constant health profiles. If h1 = 
…= hT = γ and h′1 = …= h′T = β then γ í β if and only if h í h′. We assume 
throughout that health profiles h = (h1,…,hT) are evaluated by  
 
∑
T
t=1 δtV(ht)                  (1) 
 
and preferences and choices correspond with this evaluation. In Eq. 1 V is a real-
valued utility function over health states and the δt are period-specific decision 
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weights. We will denote W(x) = ∑ x
t=1δt. W(x) can be interpreted as the utility of 
life duration x.  
 In the CE and the TO methods we consider preferences í over binary 
prospects. The prospect (p:h; g) gives health profile h with probability p and 
health profile g with probability 1 − p. A prospect is riskless if p = 1 or if h = g. 
We denote by í the decision maker’s preference relation over binary prospects. 
We will assume throughout that binary prospects (p:h; g) are rank-ordered, i.e. it 
is implicit in the notation that h í g.  
 Expected utility holds if prospects (p:h; g) are evaluated by pU(h) + 
(1−p)U(g), with U a real-valued function on the set of health profiles, and 
preferences and choices correspond with this evaluation. We will also assume that 
U is of the form described in Eq. 1. It is important to emphasize, however, that the 
decision weights δt and the function V may be different under the CE and the TO 
as the CE and the TO measure preferences under risk. Given common scaling, the 
CE and the TO should give the same results when expected utility holds. 
 We also consider deviations from expected utility described by prospect 
theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). In prospect theory, preferences depend on 
a reference point r. If a health profile h is better than the reference point then it is 
a gain. If it is worse than the reference point it is a loss. Decision makers are 
assumed to be loss averse, i.e. losses loom larger than gains. Loss aversion is 
captured by a loss aversion parameter λ. Finally, prospect theory assumes that 
people do not evaluate probabilities linearly but transform probabilities. Let w+ 
denote the probability weighting function for gains and w− the probability 
weighting function for losses. The probability weighting functions are strictly 
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increasing and satisfy w+(0) = w−(0) = 0 and w+(1) = w−(1) = 1. A mixed prospect 
(p:h; g), hêrêg, is evaluated as 
 
U(r) + w+(p)(U(h) − U(r)) − λw−(1− p)(U(r) − U(g)).         (2) 
 
A gain prospect (p:h; g), h í g í r is evaluated as  
 
U(r) + w+(p)(U(h) − U(r)) + (1 − w+(p))(U(g) − U(r)).         (3) 
 
Finally, a loss prospect (p:h; g), r í h í g is evaluated as 
 
U(r) − λ(1−w−(1− p))(U(r) − U(h)) − λw−(1− p))(U(r) − U(g)).         (4) 
 
Expected utility is the special case of prospect theory where w+(p) = w−(p) = p 
and λ = 1. In Eqs. 2-4 the function U is assumed to be of the form specified in Eq. 
1. Again, the δt and V can be different from the functions that apply in the RF 
method. If prospect theory holds and we evaluate the CE and the TO according to 
prospect theory then they should give the same result. 
 
5.3 The risk-free method 
 
The essence of the risk-free method is to ask a decision maker when he would like 
to have an improvement in his health. Specify two health states β (bad) and γ 
(good), with γ ê β. The decision maker always chooses between two profiles A, 
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which gives the health improvement from β to γ sooner and B, which gives the 
improvement from β to γ later. Let γx→yβ denote the health profile β that gives an 
improvement in health from β to γ from time point x until time point y. In the first 
assessment health profile A gives γ 0→x0.5 β, i.e. an immediate improvement in 
health from β to γ until time point x0.5 and B gives γ x0.5 →Τ β, i.e. an improvement 
from β to γ from time point x0.5 until time point T. The time point x0.5 is varied 
until the respondent is indifferent between A and B. This implies by Eq. 1 that 
  
W(x0.5)[V(β) +  (V(γ)−V(β))] + (W(T) − W(x0.5))V(β) = 
W(x0.5)V(β) + (W(T) − W(x0.5))[V(β) + (V(γ)−V(β))].              (5) 
 
Rearranging yields 
 
W(T)V(β) +  W(x0.5)(V(γ)−V(β))= W(T)V(β) + (W(T) − W(x0.5))(V(γ)−V(β)). (6) 
 
And thus 
 
W(x0.5) = ½ W(T).          (7) 
 
Setting W(T) = 1 gives W(x0.5) = 0.5. 
 Once x0.5 is known, we can now proceed to elicit the utility for life duration. 
For example, in a next step we determine the life duration x0.25 that makes the 
profiles A = γ 0→x0.25 β and B = γ x0.25→x0.5 β equivalent. Then   
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W(x0.25)[V(β) +  (V(γ)−V(β))] + (W(T) − W(x0.25))V(β) =  
W(x0.25)V(β) + (W(x0.5) − W(x0.25))[V(β) + (V(γ)−V(β))] + (W(T) − W(x0.5))V(β),    
    (8) 
 
and rearranging gives W(x0.25) = ½*W(x0.5) = 0.25. To determine the life duration 
that has utility 0.75, we elicit the life duration x0.75 that establishes indifference 
between the profiles A = γ 0→x0.75 β and B = γ x0.25→T β. This gives W(x0.75) = W(T) 
− W(x0.25) = 0.75. Continuing in this manner we can measure W without making 
particular assumptions about its functional form. 
 
5.4 The certainty equivalence method 
 
In the first step of the certainty equivalence method we elicited the sure outcome 
x
ce
0.5 that a decision maker considers equivalent to a risky prospect (½:T; 0). All 
years are spent in the same health state so for notational convenience we will 
suppress the health state. By expected utility x ce0.5 ~ (½:T; 0) implies WCE(x
ce
0.5) = 
0.5. We can then proceed to elicit x ce0.25 and x
ce
0.75 through the indifferences x
ce
0.25 ~ 
(½:x ce0.5; 0) and x
ce
0.75 ~ (½:T; x
ce
0.5). It is easily verified that under expected utility 
W(x ce0.25) = 0.25 and W(x
ce
0.75) = 0.75. These outcomes can be used in turn to elicit 
further points of the utility for life duration. 
 To determine the utility for life duration under prospect theory we must 
know the decision maker’s reference point. Bleichrodt et al. (2001) presented 
evidence that the reference point in the CE was equal to 0 and participants 
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generally perceive all life durations in the CE as gains. Then it follows from Eq. 3 
that  
 
WCE(x ce0.5) = w+(0.5) 
WCE(x ce0.25) = w+(0.25) 
WCE(x ce0.75) = w+(0.5) + (1 − w+(0.5))w+(0.5).           (9) 
 
5.5 The tradeoff method 
 
In the TO method (Wakker and Deneffe, 1996) a sequence of outcomes that are 
equally spaced in utility units is established. As in the CE, health status is held 
constant and we will therefore suppress the level of health in the ensuing notation. 
The first step in the TO method is to select two gauge durations G and g (G > g), 
a probability p, and a starting life duration x0. Then the life duration x1 is elicited 
such that the decision maker is indifferent between the prospects (p:G; x0) and 
(p:g; x1). We will analyze this equivalence by prospect theory. The evaluation 
under expected utility is the special case where w+(p) = p and all properties of the 
measurements derived below also hold under expected utility. To be able to apply 
prospect theory we must know the location of the reference point. Here we follow 
Bleichrodt et al. (2001) who showed that people perceive all outcomes in the TO 
method as gains. Provided that x1 < g, the indifference (p:G; x0) ~ (p:g; x1) 
implies that  
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w+(p)W(G) + (1 − w+(p))W(x0) = w+(p)W(g) + (1 − w+(p))W(x1).          (10) 
 
Thus 
 
W(x1) − W(x0) = w
+(p)
1 − w+(p) (W(G) − W(g)).        (11) 
 
 The life duration x1 is used as an input in the next question in which x2 is 
elicited such that the decision maker is indifferent between the prospects (p:G; x1) 
and (p:g; x2). By (1) and a similar argument as above this implies that 
 
W(x2) − W(x1) = w
+(p)
1 − w+(p) (W(G) − W(g)).        (12) 
 
And thus, W(x2) − W(x1) = W(x1) − W(x0). We proceed to elicit indifferences 
(p:G; xj−1) ~ (p:g; xj), j = 1,…,k. As long as xj ≤ g, these indifferences imply that 
W(xj) − W(xj−1) = W(x1) − W(x0), j = 1,…,k. Hence, the TO method elicits a 
standard sequence of life duration x0,x1,…,xk, which are equally spaced in terms 
of utility, i.e. the utility difference between successive elements of the standard 
sequence is constant. Normalizing the utility of life duration such that W(x0) = 0 
and W(xk) = 1 gives W(xj) = j/k, j = 0,…,k. If xj > g, the rank ordering of the 
prospects is affected, Eq. 1 can no longer be applied and the above derivations do 
not apply. 
 Equations 11 and 12 show that the elicitation of the standard sequence, and, 
hence, the measurement of the utility for life duration, is independent of the 
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probability weighting function. Consequently, the TO method is not prone to bias 
due to probability weighting. Bleichrodt et al. (2001) showed that the TO method 
is also robust to loss aversion in the most plausible cases. Therefore, if a 
significant difference is found between the results of the TO method and the 
results of the RF method, this is not caused by probability weighting or loss 
aversion. 
 
5.6 Experiment 
 
Participants 
 Seventy participants enrolled in the experiment and were paid a fixed amount 
of €12.50. The participants were students from different faculties of the Erasmus 
University Rotterdam. Before the actual experiment, we tested the design in 
several pilot sessions using other students and university staff as participants. 
  
Procedure 
 The experiment was computer-based and was administered in sessions of at 
most two persons. An experimenter was present during each session. All 
participants finished the experimental session within 45 minutes. To avoid order 
effects, the order of the RF, CE, and TO methods was randomized across 
sessions. We did not intersperse the questions of the different methods so the 
three methods were administered successively. All methods were preceded by 
practice questions. 
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 All indifferences were elicited through a sequence of choices between two 
options, which were neutrally labeled A and B. We used choices since there is 
empirical evidence suggesting that choice-based procedures cause fewer 
inconsistencies than matching procedures, in which participants are asked to state 
their indifference value directly (Bostic et al., 1990). The indifferences were 
obtained by an iterative process, which is explained in Appendix 5C. After each 
choice the participant was asked to confirm his choice. Indifference values were 
elicited in at most five iterations. At the end of the iteration process, the first 
choice of the process was repeated to try and minimize the impact of response 
error. If the respondent changed his choice the iteration process was started anew. 
To check for consistency, the elicitation of the first indifference value was 
repeated at the end of each part.  
 
Stimuli of the RF method 
 Health state β was specified as regular back pain. We selected this health 
state because it is a common illness and the participants were likely to know 
people suffering from it. We described the health state by the Euroqol 5D 
questionnaire. Health state γ was specified as full health. It was made clear to the 
participants that this health state meant they were able to function perfectly on all 
five dimensions, irrespective of their age. The descriptions were printed on cards 
and handed to the participants (see Appendix 5A). 
 The life duration T was set equal to 50 years. In the first question we 
determined x0.5 such that W(x0.5) = ½*W(50) = 0.5. As described in Section 5.3, 
we did this by finding the life duration for which a participant was indifferent 
between A = γ 0→x0.5 β and B = γ x0.5→Τ β. We told the participants that after this 
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period the two options gave the same health state without further specifying it. 
We also used the RF method to elicit x0.125, x0.25, x0.75 and x0.875. 
 
Stimuli of the CE method 
 In the CE part of the experiment, participants had to compare the risk-free 
option x years in full health with a risky option (½: z years in full health; y years 
in full health), with y < x < z. Full health (FH) was used as the prevailing health 
state throughout. In the first question we set z = T = 50 years and y = death within 
a week. This made it possible to elicit x ce0.5. As in the RF method, we then used x
ce
0.5 
as input to elicit x ce0.125, x
ce
0.25, x
ce
0.75, and x
ce
0.875. 
 
Stimuli of the TO method 
 The gauge outcomes G and g in the TO method were set equal to 55 and 45 
years and p was set equal to ½. The initial outcome x0 was death within a week. A 
standard sequence x1,…,x6 was determined by eliciting the value of xj that 
established indifference between (½:55; xj-1) and (½:45; xj), j = 1,…,6.   
 
Convenience of the methods 
 We included a question at the end of the experiment to explore whether 
participants preferred one of the methods to the others in terms of 
understandability and cognitive burden. The participants were asked to rate each 
method on a scale of 1 to 7, where 1 indicated that the questions of the method 
were very hard to answer and 7 indicated that they were very easy to answer. An 
example can be found in Appendix 5D. 
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Analyses 
 Because the RF and the CE were both measured on the same domain [0,50], 
they could be directly compared. The comparison of RF and CE with the TO is 
more involved because the highest outcome in the TO method, x6, is in general 
different from 50 years, the highest outcome in the RF and CE elicitations. As a 
result, the domains of the utility functions did not coincide and we could only 
compare utility curvature on common subdomains. In those cases utilities were 
rescaled (to W*) so that the maximum of the common subdomain was assigned 1. 
If x6 was less than 50, which was the most common case, we rescaled the RF and 
the CE, if it exceeded 45 we rescaled the TO. We then determined through linear 
interpolation the x-values under the RF and CE methods that had utilities W*(xj), j 
= 1,..,5, where the xj denote as before the elements of the standard sequence that 
was elicited by the TO method. These x-values were then compared with the 
elicited x-values under the TO.  
 For example, suppose an individual gave the following answers to the RF 
questions: x0.125 = 5, x0.25 = 10, x0.5 = 18, x0.75 = 30 and x0.875 = 40. Further, his 
value of x6 is 40, so that the common subdomain is [0,40]. The utilities in the RF 
method are then rescaled such that the outcome 40 gets a utility of 1, i.e. by 
dividing all utilities by W(40) = 0.875. As a result, W *RF(5) = 1/7, W *RF(10) = 2/7, 
W *RF(18) = 4/7, W *RF(30) = 6/7. The x-value corresponding to a utility of 1/6 is 
then estimated by linearly interpolating between the two surrounding utilities of 
which the x-values were elicited, i.e. 1/7 and 2/7: W* −1RF (1/6) = 5 + 1/6 −1/72/7 − 1/7  * 
(10−5) = 5.83. Outcomes above 45 in the TO method were not considered 
because then the rank-ordering G > g > xj > xj-1 was violated and the prospects 
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under comparison were no longer rank-ordered. This was the case for fourteen 
participants. Of course, we could still compare the RF and the CE for these 
participants. 
 A problem when comparing the x-values is that except for the first question, 
the questions of the participants depend on their answers in the preceding 
questions. We corrected for this dependence by first computing the proportional 
match (PM) of each answer of the RF and CE methods, which is defined as 
follows: 
 
PM = 
CE − Low
High − Low  (13) 
 
where Low
 
is the lower amount in the risky prospect for the CE method and the 
earliest time point in which an improvement in health occurred for the RF 
method. Similarly, High is the higher amount in the risky prospect for the CE 
method and the last time point in which an improvement in health occurred for the 
RF method. The outcomes Low and High vary per question. The idea of using 
proportional matches to correct for dependencies across questions was proposed 
by Miyamoto and Eraker (1988). Because we had five values for each participant, 
not all values were independent of each other and we had to compare them for 
each question separately. This resulted in the comparison of the answers to the 
five different answers by means of Wilcoxon signed ranks tests.  
 For each participant and each method we determined the shape of the utility 
function for life duration. Curvature of utility was investigated by computing the 
area under the normalized utility function. We classified a participant’s utility 
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function as concave (convex, linear) if this area was larger than (smaller than, 
equal to) 0.5. 
 To smoothen out response error, we also analyzed the data under the 
assumption that the utility for life duration was a power function: W(x) = xα. This 
family is widely used in medical decision making and generally gives a very good 
fit to experimental data. The power function is concave (convex, linear) if α < (>, 
=) 1. The power function was estimated by nonlinear least squares both for each 
participant separately and for the median data. All tests used below are 
nonparametric and two-sided. The individual power estimates provide another 
way to classify the participants. We classified a participant’s utility function as 
concave (convex, linear) if his estimated power coefficient was less than 0.95 
(was larger than 1.05, was between 0.95 and 1.05). 
 To investigate whether possible differences between the methods (e.g. more 
concavity under the CE method) were due to violations of expected utility, we 
reanalyzed the data of the CE method under prospect theory. Based on previous 
research, we assumed that death was the reference point of the participants 
(Bleichrodt et al., 2001), so that all outcomes were perceived as gains and loss 
aversion played no role. For probability weighting we adopted the parameter 
estimates of Tversky and Kahneman (1992). That is, we assumed that the 
probability weighting function was equal to p
γ
(pγ + (1−p)γ)1/γ  with γ = 0.61. This 
implies that w+(½) = 0.42. To compare the utilities under the RF and the CE we 
had to approximate the x-values of the RF method corresponding with the new 
CE utilities. This was accomplished in a similar way as in the comparison of the 
TO method with the other two methods, which was explained above.  
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5.7 Results 
 
We excluded the data of three participants since they did not understand the 
choice task or were not willing to make risky choices concerning life duration 
because of religious reasons. This left the data of 67 individuals for the analysis. 
The consistency tests we performed revealed satisfactory test-retest reliability. 
The correlations between the indifference values elicited in the experiment and 
their repetition were high: 0.75 for the CE method, 0.74 for the RF method and 
0.93 for the TO method. 
 
Utility curvature  
 
FIGURE 5.1. MEDIAN UTILITIES OF THE RF AND CE METHODS. 
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 Figure 5.1 shows the utility functions for the RF and the CE based on the 
median data. Both utility functions are clearly concave, with somewhat more 
concavity for the CE. The domain of the TO method was generally smaller and 
we, therefore, present the median data of the TO in a separate graph (Figure 5.2). 
Figure 5.2 shows more variability for the TO method. It should be kept in mind 
though that the smaller domain of the TO is likely to produce more linearity. 
When we fitted a power function to the median data, the power coefficients were 
0.48 for the CE, 0.62 for the RF and 0.74 for the TO. The results for the TO are 
comparable to those of previous studies that used the TO for measuring the utility 
for life duration (Bleichrodt and Pinto, 2000; Bleichrodt and Pinto, 2005). 
 
FIGURE 5.2. MEDIAN UTILITIES OF THE TO METHOD. 
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 Table 5.1 shows the classification of participants according to the shape of 
their utility function. Concave utility is clearly the modal shape in all three 
methods. The difference between the number of concave and convex participants 
is significant in all three methods (p < 0.001).  
 
TABLE 5.1. CLASSIFICATION OF PARTICIPANTS. 
 
 
 
 
 
 The medians of the individual power estimates were 0.44 for the CE, 0.62 for 
the RF, and 0.83 for the TO. All estimates are significantly smaller than 1, the 
case corresponding to linear utility (p < 0.001). The estimate for the CE is 
significantly smaller than for the RF (p = 0.037). Both the estimate for the CE and 
the estimate for the RF are significantly smaller than the estimate for the TO (p < 
0.001). The classification of the participants based on their estimated power 
coefficients was very close to the nonparametric classification given in Table 5.1. 
 The exponential power estimates show a similar picture. The median 
estimate is 1.74 for the RF, 3.11 for the CE, and 0.44 for the TO. All estimates 
differed significantly from each other and from 0 (p < 0.001). An interesting 
result was that, for the RF and CE methods, the exponential family fitted the data 
significantly better than the power family (Akaike information criterion, p < 
0.001). This fact points towards constant or even decreasing absolute risk 
aversion, instead of constant relative risk aversion, which corresponds with the 
 RF CE TO 
Concave 59 (88.1%) 57 (85.1%) 53 (79.1%) 
Convex 8 (11.9%) 10 (14.9%) 14 (20.9%) 
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power family. For the TO method, the power family gave a significantly better fit, 
but this may have been caused by the smaller domain for this method. Another 
interesting finding was the better fit of the RF method as compared to the CE 
method for both the power and the exponential family (p < 0.001). In addition, for 
the exponential family, the RF method fitted the data significantly better than the 
TO method (p < 0.001), whereas there was no significant difference for the power 
family (p = 0.148). 
 
Direct comparison between methods 
 Two proportional matches differed significantly between the RF and the CE 
(those for x0.75 and for x0.875). The other three did not differ significantly (p > 
0.10). We also compared the two methods over the whole domain by taking the 
differences between the proportional matches for each question and performing a 
Friedman test. This yielded a significant difference, indicating more concavity for 
the CE method than for the RF method (p = 0.041). 
 A problem with the TO method was that the value of x6
 
was in general rather 
low and consequently the common subdomain of the methods was small. We 
therefore could not compare these methods over the whole domain of fifty years 
considered in the CE and RF methods. On their common subdomain, the 
difference between the RF and the TO was not significant (p = 0.430), but the 
difference between CE and TO was significant (p < 0.001).  
 
Analysis in terms of prospect theory 
 Figure 5.3 shows the utility according to the CE when analyzed under 
prospect theory. The figure shows that the utility of the CE and the RF were now 
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close. The power coefficient based on the median data was now 0.60. Remember 
that it was 0.62 under the RF. 
 No significant differences remained when we compared the x-values for CE 
under prospect theory with the RF (p = 0.777) and with the TO (p = 0.061). When 
we compared the median of the individual power estimates, no difference was 
observed between CE (new estimate 0.57) and RF (p = 0.798), but the CE 
estimates were still significantly lower than the TO estimates (p < 0.02). The 
classification of the participants was not markedly affected when we evaluated the 
CE under prospect theory: 49 participants were concave and 18 convex by the 
nonparametric classification and 48 concave, 15 convex and 4 linear based on the 
power estimates. 
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FIGURE 5.3. MEDIAN UTILITIES OF THE RF AND CE METHODS UNDER PROSPECT 
THEORY (RP=0). 
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Convenience 
 The RF method was rated as the most convenient method (mean rating 4.76), 
followed by the TO method (mean = 4.31). The CE was rated the least convenient 
(mean = 3.88). The difference in rating between the RF and CE method was 
significant at the 1% level (p = 0.001), while the other differences were 
significant at the 5% level (RF-TO, p = 0.050; TO-CE, p = 0.039). 
Correspondence with the participants made clear that the main reason they found 
the RF method easier to answer was the difficulty they had with the possibility of 
immediate death in the other methods. The fact that the CE method contained 
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more questions with this possibility than the TO method probably caused the 
former method to be valued the least convenient. 
 
5.8 Discussion 
 
We observed significant differences between our new RF method, the CE and the 
TO. The differences between RF and CE could be due to risk aversion. The 
difference between CE and TO suggests that people violate expected utility and 
adds to the large literature on deviations from expected utility. When we 
evaluated the CE under prospect theory the differences between RF and CE and 
most of the differences between CE and TO disappeared. This suggests that 
differences between riskless and risky measures that have been observed in past 
studies were mainly due to violations of expected utility and that there is one 
concept of utility that can interchangeably be used in different decision contexts. 
This is an important finding for health economics and medical decision making 
where such transferability of utility is commonly used. Our finding is in line with 
Stalmeier and Bezembinder (1999) who previously observed that the difference 
between riskless and risky utility vanishes under prospect theory. 
 The TO produced more linearity than the other two methods. This may be 
due to the smaller domain of the TO method. It is well known that for small 
domains utility is close to linear. This caveat should be kept in mind when 
comparing the TO method with the other two methods.  
 Our analysis under prospect theory assumed that participants consider all life 
durations in the CE as gains. This assumption was based on previous findings by 
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Bleichrodt et al. (2001). The evidence of Bleichrodt et al. (2001) was obtained in 
a matching task. In a choice-based task van Osch et al. (2006) observed that a 
substantial proportion of their participants took the sure outcome as their 
reference point. Then the risky prospect in the CE is a mixed prospect and loss 
aversion affects preferences. Assuming that people take the sure outcome as their 
reference point, makes the utility of the CE much more linear. The median power 
estimate increases to 0.88 and significant differences are observed between the 
CE and the RF and the TO. These observations underline the need for more 
research into the formation of reference points in medical decision making. 
 Let us finally discuss the implications of our study. Our findings suggest that 
it is possible to measure the utility of life duration without using the problematic 
outcome death. This seems an important advantage as our respondents indicated 
that they considered our RF method simpler and more pleasant to answer than the 
TO and, particularly, the CE. The questions in the RF are easier to imagine for 
individuals, as confirmed by the participants’ ratings of the methods and their 
expressed thoughts about them. 
 A second advantage of our method is that it is not prone to the biases 
accruing from violations of expected utility. When we consider these biases 
normatively irrational, it seems natural to avoid these biases wherever possible in 
eliciting preferences for prescriptive purposes. One possibility to accomplish this 
is to use some kind of correction, as we did in the reanalysis of the CE method. It 
seems more efficient, however, to circumvent these biases entirely by employing 
a method that is not influenced by them, like the RF method. 
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Appendix 5A. Health state descriptions (translated from 
Dutch) 
 
Card 1 – Regular Back Pain 
 
You have regular back pain. This has the following consequences for your 
functioning in daily life: 
 You have no problems in walking about. 
 You have no problems to wash or dress yourself. 
 You have some problems with your usual activities. 
 You have moderate pain or other discomfort. 
    You are not anxious or depressed. 
 
Card 2 – Full Health 
 
You have no complaints and are in perfect health. This has the following 
consequences for your functioning in daily life: 
 You have no problems in walking about. 
 You have no problems to wash or dress yourself. 
 You have no problems with your usual activities. 
 You have no pain or other discomfort. 
    You are not anxious or depressed. 
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Appendix 5B. Display screen 
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Appendix 5C. Explanation midpoint technique 
 
The midpoint technique is illustrated in Table 5A. There we use the stimuli of the 
first iteration process of the RF method, i.e. the elicitation of x0.5 and show the 
answers of an imaginary participant. The option he chooses is indicated in italics. 
We always started with a value that was in the middle of the two extreme values 
and then adjusted this starting value upwards or downwards depending on the 
option chosen. The size of the change was always half the size of the change in 
the previous question, with the restriction that the numbers were rounded to 
integers. The method resulted in an interval within which the indifference values 
should lie. The midpoint of this interval was taken as the indifference value. For 
the CE and the TO method, this technique was applied in a similar way. 
 
TABLE 5A. ILLUSTRATION OF THE MIDPOINT TECHNIQUE. 
Iteration Offered choices in the elicitation of x0.5 
1 0 to 25 or 25 to 50 
2 0 to 13 or 13 to 50 
3 0 to 19 or 19 to 50 
4 0 to 16 or 16 to 50 
5 0 to 18 or 18 to 50 
Indifference value 18.5 
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Appendix 5D. Convenience questions (version RF-TO CE, 
translated from Dutch) 
 
Indicate, on a scale from 1 up to and including 7, to what degree you agree to 
each of the beneath propositions. The number 1 means that you fully DISAGREE 
and the number 7 means that you fully AGREE. 
 
1. The first part of the experiment, where you had to choose between treatments 
that relieve your back pain during different periods, was easy to answer. 
 
2. The second part of the experiment, where you had to choose between two risky 
options, 1 with a smaller difference between the two possible outcomes, and 1 
with a larger difference between the two outcomes, was easy to answer. 
 
3. The third part of the experiment, where you had to choose between a sure 
period that you live and a treatment with a chance for a longer period to live and a 
chance for a smaller period to live, was easy to answer. 
6 The correction of TTO scores for utility 
curvature using a risk-free utility elicitation 
method1 
 
 
Summary 
 
The TTO method has become the most frequently used method to measure health 
state utilities. However, it is still influenced by some important biases. One of 
these is the role of nonlinear utility of life duration, commonly believed to be 
caused by the discounting of future health and diminishing marginal utility of 
additional life years. Ignoring utility curvature in the process of valuing health 
states can result in a downward bias in health valuations. Moreover, if 
respondents already discount future life years in health state valuations, applying 
a standard discount rate to TTO estimates in economic evaluations, will result in 
double discounting. This chapter describes and employs a new method to correct 
TTO estimates for utility curvature. Unlike most previous attempts, the method we 
use is risk-free. It is robust to several biases that occur under methods that 
                                                 
1
 This chapter is based on Attema and Brouwer (2007a). 
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incorporate risk. Our results show a significant degree of utility curvature in TTO 
estimates. The risk-free method seems to be useful to correct TTO estimates for 
this influence and leads to significantly higher health state valuations. 
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
The time tradeoff (TTO) method is a popular way of eliciting preferences for 
health states (e.g. Dolan, 2000). As a consequence, several quality of life tariffs 
used in cost-effectiveness analyses are based on TTO measurements (e.g. Dolan, 
1997; Lamers et al., 2006). In a TTO individuals need to make a tradeoff between 
quality of life and duration of life. A typical TTO exercise will involve a tradeoff 
between living in some imperfect health state β for 10 years and living in perfect 
health for a period less than 10 years. The amount of time people are willing to 
sacrifice in order to restore perfect health then indicates the value of the health 
state β and can subsequently be used to calculate the quality adjusted life year 
(QALY) score of that health state.  
 Despite its popularity, the traditional TTO method has been shown to be 
prone to several potential biases. The method makes strong assumptions such as 
linear utility of life duration, no loss aversion and no scale compatibility, which 
are hard to maintain (e.g. Nord, 1992; Bleichrodt, 2002). Consequently, the 
QALY scores elicited by the conventional TTO procedure are biased. Loss 
aversion and scale compatibility cause an upward bias in QALY scores 
(Bleichrodt, 2002). Moreover, utility of life duration is often found to be 
Chapter 6: The correction of TTO scores for utility curvature 
 
 
153
nonlinear, which mainly relates to two aspects: (i) diminishing marginal utility of 
additional lifetime and (ii) discounting. Both are problematic in the context of a 
TTO, as this method does not take into account utility curvature, leading to a 
downward bias in QALY scores (Bleichrodt, 2002).  
 Diminishing marginal utility refers to the fact that the utility derived from an 
additional unit of some good declines with the quantity of that good that an 
individual already possesses. This implies that the utility increase from having the 
projected tenth year in the TTO is lower than that from the first year. Another 
important issue in the TTO method is that of discounting. A typical respondent 
having to trade off future life years in order to restore full health is likely to 
discount future life years (e.g. Stiggelbout et al., 1994; Stalmeier et al., 1996; 
Wakker and Deneffe, 1996; Martin et al, 2000; Bleichrodt and Pinto, 2005; van 
der Pol and Roux, 2005). Discounting implies, as Bohm-Bawerk already put it, 
that: ‘To goods that are destined to meet the wants of the future, we ascribe a 
value which is really less than the true intensity of their future marginal utility’ 
(as quoted in Olsen, 1993). Both mechanisms cause a lower value to be attached 
to the future life years that are traded off in a TTO exercise. This immediately 
indicates the problem that this chapter addresses. Simply using the number of 
future life years that individuals are willing to trade off in calculating QALY 
scores misrepresents the utility attached to a current imperfect health state. In 
order to have a better estimate of the true valuation of a health state, a correction 
for utility curvature is required, therefore. This is especially true for discounting 
given the way that resulting health state valuations are normally used in economic 
evaluations, i.e., they are discounted to calculate a net present value of QALYs 
(e.g. Gravelle et al., 2007). If uncorrected TTO values are used to calculate 
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QALYs and these are subsequently discounted using some discount rate for health 
effects, this would amount to double discounting and an underestimation of the 
utility derived from some health state (MacKeigan et al., 2003). 
 This chapter focuses on the role of nonlinear utility of life duration in TTO 
exercises and describes a new method to correct for utility curvature. This 
involves a recently proposed riskless method that does not need to make specific 
parametric assumptions about the utility function or discounting behavior (Attema 
et al., 2007). 
 The structure of the chapter is as follows. First, we introduce the theory 
underlying our study in Section 6.2. We also discuss related literature concerning 
adjusted TTO scores there. In Section 6.3 we explain the method used to elicit 
utility for life duration and the way to use this information to correct raw TTO 
scores. The experimental details are put forward in Section 6.4, followed by a 
presentation of the results in Section 6.5. Finally, Section 6.6 discusses the results 
and concludes. 
 
6.2 Theory and related literature 
 
A common way to describe preferences over lifetime utility is to represent them 
by the following multiplicative utility function over life duration and health 
quality: 
 
∑
=
=
T
jt
tt huV )(δ  (1) 
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with u(ht) a utility function that represents the individual’s preferences over health 
states at each time point t, δt denoting the corresponding weight attached to the 
utility at this point, j the starting period, and T the complete time frame. An 
axiomatic derivation for this model, which we will call the generalized QALY 
model, was given by Bleichrodt and Gafni (1996). 
 The conventional TTO method is embedded, however, in a special case of 
the generalized QALY model, which we will call the linear QALY model. In this 
linear QALY model, it is assumed that equal weight is attached to all utilities 
regardless of their timing, so that δt = 1 for each t in Equation (1). This is a 
restrictive assumption, however, since it implies no utility curvature for life 
duration. Given this assumption, the conventional TTO method measures the 
utility of a health state β by asking the respondent to give some period in full 
health, followed by death, which makes him indifferent to a stated period in 
health state β, also followed by death. As a result, the elicited indifference can be 
represented by the following equation: 
 
)(*)()(*)(* DunnFHunun FHFH −+= ββ β  (2) 
 
with FH representing full health and D death, nβ is the stated period in health state 
β, and nFH is the elicited period in full health. If the utility function over health is 
normalized so that 1)( =FHu  and 0)( =Du  we get the following simple 
expression for )(βu : 
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However, this expression only holds if the utility over life duration is indeed 
linear and there is no reallocation of lifetime consumption due to the smaller 
duration in full health. The latter concern will probably not cause a large bias 
(Dolan and Jones-Lee, 1997), but as indicated in the introduction, the assumption 
of linear utility over life duration does not seem realistic. If we take into account 
the existence of nonlinear utility of life duration, the estimate obtained by 
Equation (3) will clearly be biased and the resulting bias can be substantial (e.g. 
MacKeigan et al., 2003). Moreover, given the normal practice to discount health 
effects in economic evaluation, using these uncorrected TTO scores will result in 
double discounting of health effects. 
 It seems necessary, therefore, to avoid the restrictive assumptions of the 
linear QALY model. Simply starting from the generalized QALY model, and not 
imposing any restrictions on the weight respondents might attach to utilities over 
time, δt, the indifference implied by the TTO method (using the same notation as 
before) would give the following equation: 
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Measuring the value of u(β) therefore requires to have estimates of ∑
=
β
δ
n
t
t
0
and 
∑
=
FHn
t
t
0
δ first. The purpose of this chapter is to estimate corrected TTO values using 
the risk-free (RF) method proposed by Attema et al. (2007), which measures 
utility for life duration without making assumptions about δt. Therefore the 
method should elicit TTO values that are not distorted by utility curvature.  
 There have been some previous attempts to correct TTO scores for the utility 
of life duration (Pliskin et al., 1980; Stiggelbout et al., 1994; Stalmeier et al., 
1996; Martin et al., 2000; van Osch et al., 2004; van der Pol and Roux, 2005). 
However, most of these studies considered a risky situation in which they elicited 
certainty equivalents (CEs) to get a measure of the utility of life duration. That is, 
respondents were asked one or more questions where they had to indicate a sure 
amount of remaining life years that made them indifferent to a 50-50 gamble 
consisting of one higher and one lower amount of remaining life years. 
 Pliskin et al. (1980) asked one CE question where the gamble consisted of 5 
and 15 years in a constant mild health state. Their estimates were close to 
linearity. Pliskin et al. (1980) did not explicitly test for differences between 
unadjusted and adjusted TTO scores. Stiggelbout et al. (1994) elicited three CEs, 
with immediate death as the lowest possible outcome and 10 years as the highest 
possible outcome. A power function was used to fit these data and the estimated 
power was applied to correct the raw TTO scores. Their median power estimate 
was 0.73 and the adjusted TTO scores were significantly higher than the raw 
scores. In the study of Stalmeier et al. (1996), respondents performed seven life-
year gambles in good health, with death within a month as the lowest possible 
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outcome. They fitted the utility function with a power, logarithmic, exponential or 
logistic function and reported mainly concavity of the utility function for life 
duration and a substantial difference between unadjusted and adjusted TTO 
scores. Martin et al. (2000) asked three CE questions in a sample of 
cardiovascular disease patients, one gamble between 1 and 10 years, one between 
5 and 15 years, and one between 10 and 20 years. They therefore did not include 
immediate death. The results were fitted with a power and an exponential 
function. There was substantial concavity and the exponential function gave a 
better fit than the power function, which is evidence in favor of a constant 
absolute risk attitude instead of a constant relative risk attitude. The exponential 
function was subsequently used to correct the raw TTO scores upwards. A 
difference varying from 0.02 to 0.06 was found, depending on the durations used. 
Finally, the procedure used by van Osch et al. (2004) was the same as that of 
Stalmeier et al. (1996), except that death within a month was replaced by death 
within a week. They used the answers to estimate a power utility function. They 
found utility for life years to be nearly linear at the aggregate level. As a result, 
their corrected TTO scores were only slightly higher than the uncorrected ones. 
 These studies show that utility curvature can be important and that a 
correction of TTO scores for curvature can result in significantly higher health 
state valuations, although this is not confirmed in all studies. The latter will 
probably be related to differences in methods and populations between the 
studies. An important feature of all the above studies is that they use a method 
entailing risk to derive utility curvature. Such an approach, however, may be 
considered to be less compatible with the TTO method, which does not entail risk. 
Moreover, using risky situations in deriving utilities of life duration can lead to a 
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distortion of results due to probability weighting, which may bias the utilities 
obtained by the certainty equivalence method (Abdellaoui et al., 2007). Finally, 
several authors have pointed out that the inclusion of immediate death leads to 
extreme risk aversion and, hence, to strong concavity of utility (e.g. Tversky and 
Kahneman, 1986; Shin et al., 1997; Stiggelbout and de Haes, 2001; Bleichrodt et 
al., 2003). It therefore seems worthwhile to find risk-free methods to obtain 
estimates of utility curvature for life duration. Such methods seem more 
compatible with the risk-free nature of the TTO method, and in addition avoid 
probability weighting biases and the problematic inclusion of immediate death as 
an outcome. 
 One earlier attempt to derive corrected TTO values using a risk-free method 
has been reported to our knowledge. Van der Pol and Roux (2005) elicited time 
preference for an increase in body weight. However, in contrast to the present 
study, they asked only one question to measure time preference and therefore had 
to assume specific parametric discounting models to correct their TTO scores. 
They used an open-ended question to elicit time preference, where respondents 
had to specify the number of years with their weight being 20% higher starting in 
45 years time that was just as bad as their weight being 20% higher for 5 years 
starting in 15 years. This answer was used to estimate the parameter of the 
constant discounting model and of a specific hyperbolic discounting model. 
Subsequently, the raw TTO scores were adjusted upwards with these estimates. 
Van der Pol and Roux (2005) report a significant difference between raw and 
adjusted scores, with their mean estimated adjustment factor lying around 0.03 
(4.4%). 
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 In this paper we use a recently developed method to derive utility curvature 
(Attema et al., 2007). In comparison to the method used by van der Pol and Roux 
(2005) to derive utility curvature, which may be perceived to be cognitively 
demanding for lay respondents, our method is relatively easy to use. The 
comprehensiveness of the RF method was also confirmed in a questionnaire of 
Attema et al. (2007), which indicated that respondents found this method 
significantly easier to answer than the CE method. Moreover, the method relates 
well to TTO tradeoffs, since we make use of a choice-based procedure, requiring 
respondents to make tradeoffs between health profiles. Given these tradeoffs, the 
procedure is better embedded in economic theory than choiceless procedures 
(Dolan, 2000). Moreover, the method is developed in such a way that more 
measurements of the utility function can be obtained, allowing an accurate 
correction of the TTO results. Finally, our results are less susceptible to the 
validity of a particular parametric shape of the utility function for life duration, as 
will be further highlighted below.  
 
6.3 Method 
 
The full elicitation method consists of two distinct parts. First of all, we measure 
the degree of utility curvature. Then, in the second phase we perform a 
conventional time tradeoff. The results from the first phase are used to correct the 
responses in the second phase. Given that the conventional TTO method has 
already been discussed above, we focus here on the first phase and the correction 
of the answers in the second phase.   
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 The first phase uses the method of Attema et al. (2007). We briefly 
summarize their method here. The respondents’ task is to compare two different 
health profiles. The two health states are β and γ, with γ β. In the first health 
profile, A, the respondent gets an immediate improvement in health from β to γ, 
which lasts until time point m, after which the respondent returns to health state β 
until point T. In the second health profile, B, he will remain in this basic health 
state until time point m and then gets the health improvement, the latter lasting 
until point T. After point T the two options yield the same health state. Now we 
vary m until the respondent is indifferent between these two options. We then 
obtain the following equation:  
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As shown by Attema et al. (2007), this implies2: 
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 We assume that it does not matter whether the respondent is presented with an 
increasing health profile over time first or rather with a decreasing health profile first in 
this exercise. In other words, replacing the left-hand side of Equation (5) by the right-
hand side and vice versa will not lead to differences in the estimation of point m. Our 
results were tested for this and confirm this hypothesis. 
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We proceed by using this estimate of m at the place of T and posing a similar 
question in order to infer the respondents’ value of k such that
4
1
0
=∑
=
k
t
tδ . That is, 
in profile A, the immediate improvement in health from β to γ now lasts until time 
point k, after which the respondent returns to health state β until point m. In 
profile B he will remain in this basic health state until point k and then gets the 
health improvement, which now lasts until point m. In a similar way, when we 
replace the 0 of Equation 5 by m, we can infer the value of q such that 
4
3
0
=∑
=
q
t
tδ . 
Continuing in this manner, we can get more detailed information about the shape 
of δt. We can do this without making particular assumptions about the functional 
form of δt. Once we have elicited an estimate of δt using this method, we can use 
it to correct TTO estimates for utility of life duration.  
  To illustrate the correction of the TTO scores, consider the following 
situation. Let us assume that the purpose of the exercise is to estimate the utility 
of health state β. We may then ask the respondent, as this is normally done in 
TTO exercises, to specify the number of periods, nFH, in full health that makes 
him indifferent to m years in health state β. Making use of (6) this gives: 
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Suppose that the elicited value of nFH lies somewhere between the points k and m 
of the integral. By linear interpolation we can then estimate the value of ∑
=
FHn
t
t
0
δ  by 
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is easy to derive that 
6
5)( =βu . 
 This also makes clear that using uncorrected TTO scores results in an 
underestimation of the utility attached to health state β if utility of life duration is 
concave, since the conventional TTO method would have given a value of 8/10, 
which is smaller than the value of 5/6 we found above. Similarly, convex utility 
of life duration would result in an overestimation of the utility of β. 
 
6.4 Experiment 
 
In this section, we present an experiment, using the method described above. 
  
Participants 
 Seventy participants were recruited and were paid a fixed amount of €12.50 
to join the experiment. The participants were students from different faculties of 
the Erasmus University Rotterdam. Before the actual experiment, we tested the 
design in several pilot sessions using other students and university staff as 
participants. 
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Procedure 
 The experiment was administered in sessions of at most two persons each 
using a computer program. During each session there was an experimenter in the 
laboratory to give instructions and clarify possible opacities. The questions 
considered in this study were part of a larger experiment, which lasted no longer 
than 45 minutes. Further details about the utility elicitation part of the experiment 
can be found in Chapter 5. 
 
Stimuli of the RF method 
 Health state β in the RF method was specified as regular back pain. We 
selected this health state because it is a common illness and the participants were 
likely to know people suffering from it. We described the health state using the 
domains contained in the EuroQol 5D questionnaire. We therefore indicated what 
regular back pain meant for daily functioning in terms of five dimensions 
(mobility, self-care, usual activities, pain/discomfort, and anxiety/depression). 
The descriptions were printed on cards and handed to the participants (see 
Appendix 5A). Health state γ was specified as full health. It was made clear to the 
participants that this health state meant they were able to function perfectly on all 
five dimensions, irrespective of their age. 
 T was set equal to 50 years, because this was a plausible amount for our 
sample of students. In the first question we determined x0.5 such that 
2
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t δδ  by means of a choice-based procedure. We did this by 
eliciting the point where the participant was indifferent between a health profile 
starting with full health until time x0.5, followed by back pain for the remainder of 
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the 50 years and a health profile starting with back pain until time x0.5, followed 
by full health for the remainder of the 50 years. We told the participants that after 
this period the two options would be followed by the same health state without 
specifying it further. After having elicited the point x0.5, we subsequently used this 
point in the next question. In this way we elicited x0.125, x0.25, x0.75 and x0.875. 
 
Stimuli of the TTO method 
 The conventional TTO procedure to elicit the value of some health state β is 
to let the participants state the number of years nFH in full health that they 
consider equivalent to a specified duration nβ in health state β, i.e. such that nFH ~ 
nβ. The unadjusted TTO value is then given by nFH/nβ. Our experiment entailed 
two TTO questions of this kind. The health state (β) that we valued was specified 
as regular back pain again. We fixed the duration nβ at 14 (BP14) in one question 
and 27 years (BP27) in another one. The order of these questions was 
randomized. 
 
6.5 Results 
 
Fifty-six participants were included in the analyses (mean age 21.8 years, range 
18-37 years, 20 (35.7%) females). The other 14 participants were eliminated from 
the sample because they had at least one answer not corresponding to their 
reasoning. Two of these eliminated participants did not fully understand the utility 
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elicitation phase, whereas 12 participants were removed because they had 
difficulties completing the TTO phase.3 
 
Utility for life duration 
 The first phase of the experiment was aimed at deriving the utility for life 
duration. In Figure 6.1 we show the median data of the elicited utility for life 
duration functions. 
 
FIGURE 6.1. MEDIAN UTILITY OF LIFE DURATION ESTIMATES. 
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3
 For example, for one participant indifference between 10 years in full health and 5 years 
with back pain was elicited in the TTO part, although this participant clearly preferred the 
former alternative to the latter when she was asked to choose between them.  
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 The figure shows a clearly concave pattern, indicating that years farther in 
the future receive less weight compared to years nearer in time. This confirms that 
respondents indeed may discount future life years and may (expect to) experience 
diminishing marginal utility of additional life years. A convex utility function on 
the other hand would reflect more attention to utility in the future, or negative 
discounting. In order to give a more detailed description of the degree of 
concavity and convexity, we classified participants as concave or convex 
depending on their five answers to the utility elicitation questions. This was done 
by computing the differences between two successive elements of the elicited 
utility points and dividing these by their respective utility increase (this division 
was necessary since the utility difference between two successive elicited values 
could be either 0.125 or 0.25): 
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Then we computed: 
 
1−∆−∆=∂ jjj , j = 2,…,6 (9) 
 
i.e. how much successive outcome intervals increase or decrease per utility unit. 
For each participant we observed five values of ∂j. A positive value of ∂j 
corresponds to a concave part of the utility function. It means that an individual 
needs a larger increase in life duration to obtain a given increase in utility at 
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higher amounts than at lower amounts. Likewise, a negative value of ∂j 
corresponds to a convex part of the utility function and a value of 0 corresponds 
to linear utility. We classified a participant as having linear (concave, convex) 
utility if he had at least three out of five linear (concave, convex) parts. This 
criterion was used to account for response error. If none of the three parts (linear, 
concave or convex) occurred more than twice, the participant was not classified. 
Table 6.1 shows the results. It is clear that most participants showed positive 
discounting of future life years, which causes a downward bias in raw TTO 
scores, i.e. an underestimation of utility. 
 
TABLE 6.1. UTILITY CLASSIFICATION OF PARTICIPANTS. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 To give more insight into the degree of concavity, we estimated a power 
( rxu = , corresponding to a constant relative risk attitude over life years) and an 
exponential (
c
cx
e
e
u
−
−
−
−
=
1
1
, corresponding to a constant absolute risk attitude) 
utility function for the data of each participant. These parametric families were 
estimated by nonlinear least squares. The exponential family fitted the data 
 Number 
Concave 48 (85.7%) 
Convex 7 (12.5%) 
Linear 1 (1.8%) 
Unclassified 0 (0%) 
Total 56 
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significantly better than the power family (Akaike information criterion, p < 
0.001) and therefore we only report the results of the exponential function here. 
Actually, the data seemed to indicate an increasing absolute risk aversion instead 
of a constant absolute risk attitude for life duration, so that the exponential 
function may still not give the best fit. Note, however, that our correction 
procedure for TTO scores does not require the estimation of this function, as it 
depends only on the observed data points and the assumption of linearity in 
between two points.4 The median estimate of the exponential utility function is 
1.74, which is significantly higher than 1 (p < 0.001) and therefore indicates 
concavity.  
 What is clear, therefore, is that there was a clear degree of concavity in utility 
of life duration in this sample, which, without correction, on average leads to 
underestimation of the utility attached to the health state under study (abstracting 
from other biases).   
 
TTO scores 
 The data of a representative participant of the experiment may clarify the 
way we corrected TTO scores of each individual for their utility of life duration 
curvature. Let us take a look at Participant 2. This participant had the following 
utility points: x0.125 = 1.5, x0.25 = 4.5, x0.5 = 10, x0.75 = 20.5 and x0.875 = 32.5. As can 
be seen in Figure 6.2, this participant clearly had a concave utility function. The 
finding that x0.5 = 10, for example, means that this participant values the next 10 
                                                 
4
 We did not attempt to estimate functions that take into account increasing absolute risk 
aversion, since it is not pivotal for the present paper and rather laborious (e.g. Martin et 
al., 2000). 
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years equally as the 40 years thereafter, whereas 10 years is only one fourth of 40 
years. That is, the weight attached to years in the short term is higher than that 
attached to later years.  
 
FIGURE 6.2. EXAMPLE OF THE UTILITY CORRECTION OF TTO SCORES. 
TTO correction for Participant 2
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In the TTO part, Participant 2 gave the following answers: BP14 = 9 and BP27 = 
20. These numbers are also included in Figure 6.2. Obviously, the raw TTO 
scores for this participant are 9/14 = 0.6429 for BP14 and 20/27 = 0.7407 for 
BP27. 
 For the corrected TTO scores, the computation is somewhat less 
straightforward. There we have to compute the ratio of the weighted answers, 
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instead of computing the ratio of just the answers. In order to do so, for BP14 we 
first compute the participant’s utilities of 9 and 14 life years. The utility data show 
that the number 9 lies in between x0.25 and x0.5. This implies that in order to get an 
estimate of the utility of the coming 9 years, ∑
=
9
0t
tδ , we have to interpolate 
between these utility points: ∑
=
9
0t
tδ  = 0.25 + (9-4.5)/(10-4.5)*(0.5-0.25) = 0.4545. 
Similarly we obtain: ∑
=
14
0t
tδ = 0.5 + (14-10)/(20.5-10)*(0.75-0.5) = 0.5952.  
 Using these figures, we can now derive the corrected TTO score for 
Participant 2 for the BP14 case. This score is calculated as 0.4545/0.5952 = 
0.7636, which, as expected, is higher than his raw TTO score of 0.6429. In a 
similar fashion we obtain a corrected TTO score for BP27 for Participant 2 of 
0.9026, which again is higher than the raw score of 0.7407.  
 In Tables 6.2 and 6.3 we present summary statistics concerning the raw and 
corrected TTO scores for the full sample. In order to test for the sensitivity to the 
linear interpolation, we also report the corrected TTO scores using the estimated 
exponential utility functions as correctors. As expected, the corrected scores are 
higher than the raw scores (p < 0.01 for both questions), due to diminishing 
marginal utility. The difference between the raw and adjusted values is 0.04 
(5.8%) for BP14 and 0.05 (6.7%) for BP27. Besides, the nonparametriccaly and 
exponentially corrected scores are similar (p > 0.1763), so that our linear 
interpolation does not seem to cause many problems. 
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TABLE 6.2. RAW AND ADJUSTED TTO SCORES (BP14). 
BP14 Raw scores 
Corrected scores 
(nonparametric) 
Corrected scores 
(exponential) 
Mean 0.7092 0.7501 0.7471 
Standard error 0.0247 0.0249 0.0245 
Interquartile range 
0.6429-
0.8571 
0.6911-0.8797 0.7033-0.8767 
Range 0.0714-1 0.0935-1 0.0944-1 
Average number 
of life years traded 
4.07 - - 
Difference with 
raw scores 
- 0.0409 (5.8%) 0.0379 (5.3%) 
 
TABLE 6.3. RAW AND ADJUSTED TTO SCORES (BP27). 
BP27 Raw scores 
Corrected scores 
(nonparametric) 
Corrected scores 
(exponential) 
Mean 0.7509 0.8015 0.8092 
Standard error 0.0249 0.0254 0.0241 
Interquartile range 
0.7315-
0.8889 
0.6915-0.9353 0.7267-0.9403 
Range 0.0741-1 0.1321-1 0.1229-1 
Average number 
of life years traded 
6.73 - - 
Difference with 
raw scores 
- 0.0506 (6.7%) 0.0583 (7.8%) 
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6.6 Discussion 
 
This study has reported the use of a recently developed method to derive the 
degree of concavity in utility of life duration and applied it to correct TTO scores. 
Our results provide further evidence that respondents indeed do not have a linear 
utility function for life duration, causing the conventional TTO method to yield 
downward biased estimates. The risk-free method we employed to correct the raw 
TTO scores performs well in our sample. Its form and stimuli are similar to that 
of the TTO and, therefore, the method seems promising as a means of correcting 
TTO scores for utility curvature. Note that although a considerable fraction of 
respondents (20%) was removed from the analysis, this was mainly caused by 
difficulties in understanding the conventional TTO procedure and to a much 
smaller extent by problems with the utility of life duration elicitation procedure. 
Only 2.9% of the sample had to be removed because of difficulties with the RF 
method. 
 Some aspects of the method deserve mentioning. First, a potential drawback 
of this nonparametric risk-free method is that one has to assume linear utility 
between two measured utility points. However, if this is considered a problem, 
one can reduce the reliance on interpolation by obtaining more measurements and 
therefore reducing the space between observed points. This will of course require 
a more elaborate measurement procedure. Besides, by comparing the 
nonparametric estimates to parametric estimates, one can look at the potential 
consequences of the linearity assumptions. In our study, this did not cause large 
differences. A second point is that, in our study, we have applied one particular 
health state (back pain) in both the TTO exercise and the risk-free method 
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eliciting utility curvature. This was done deliberately, since we cannot exclude the 
possibility that different utility of life duration functions exist for different health 
states. In other words, the degree of utility curvature may depend on the health 
state used in the health profiles. It is, for instance, well known that losses and 
gains are discounted differently and that the size of gains and losses may be of 
importance as well (e.g. Thaler, 1981; Benzion et al., 1989; Abdellaoui et al., 
2006). This implies that there might not be a single utility function over life 
duration applicable to all health states. If it is confirmed that the degree of 
concavity depends on the health state presented, it seems worthwhile to combine 
the here described method and TTO exercises in such a way that for the health 
state under study the relevant utility of life duration function is elicited. On the 
other hand, there is considerable support for utility independence, so that this 
problem may not be too worrisome (e.g. Bleichrodt and Pinto, 2005). It would be 
worthwhile investigating this aspect further in future research. 
 In this study we found a significant and substantial difference between raw 
TTO scores and TTO scores that were corrected for utility curvature. The results 
are similar to those of Stiggelbout et al. (1994), Stalmeier et al. (1996), Martin et 
al. (2000) and van der Pol and Roux (2005), and therefore expand the evidence of 
the presence of a downward bias in the ordinary TTO method that might 
compensate the upward biases due to loss aversion and scale compatibility. In 
addition, in Chapter 5, for the participants of the present study the utility for life 
duration was also elicited by means of the CE method. This method yielded more 
concavity than the RF method, so a correction of the TTO scores using those 
utility estimates would probably cause an even higher upward adjustment. The 
only exception we could find concerns the results of van Osch et al. (2004), which 
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suggest that the effect of correcting TTO for utility curvature is only minor. A 
majority of the empirical evidence thus suggests that discounting raw TTO scores 
will lead to an underestimation of true preferences for health states.  
 Of course, the bias caused by utility curvature may be partly balanced or 
even offset by upward biases caused by loss aversion and scale compatibility. One 
could argue, therefore, that correcting for the bias of utility curvature is 
unnecessary or even undesirable. However, we would argue that a more precise 
elicitation of health state valuations requires avoiding biases or correcting for 
them rather than relying on these biases to somehow equal out. The method 
proposed here offers a clear way of correcting for an important bias in TTO. 
Moreover, as pointed out in Chapter 5, the RF method makes it possible to 
reliably measure the utility of life duration without needing the problematic 
outcome immediate death. That chapter also reported evidence that respondents 
find this method simpler and more pleasant to answer than alternative risky 
elicitation methods, like the certainty equivalence method. Further, the method 
avoids biases like probability weighting and does not make parametric 
assumptions. Finally, it seems more natural to use in a TTO context as the TTO 
method considers a riskless situation. 
 We believe, therefore, that the method presented here provides an interesting 
and tractable way of correcting TTO answers for the downward pressure of utility 
curvature. Although TTO may be prone to other biases as well, rather than relying 
on these biases to result in some kind of optimal balance, it seems worthwhile to 
attempt to find solutions. This chapter serves to contribute in that quest. 
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 7 Can we fix it? Yes we can! But what? A new 
test of procedural invariance in TTO measurement1 
 
 
Summary 
 
The TTO method has often been used to value health states, but it is susceptible to 
several biases and methodological difficulties. One of these is a violation of 
procedural invariance, which means that the way a TTO question is framed can 
have a substantial effect on the elicited value of a health state. There are four 
important sources of discrepancy of the two procedures: loss aversion, maximum 
endurable time, scale compatibility and utility curvature (mostly due to 
discounting). In this chapter we present the results of a new test of procedural 
invariance in which we avoided or corrected for two of these sources (discounting 
and maximum endurable time). Our results indicate that while correcting for 
discounting does diminish the difference between the two TTO procedures, a 
large and significant violation of procedural invariance remains. Loss aversion is 
probably the main determinant of the remainder of this difference. 
 
 
                                                 
1
 This chapter is based on Attema and Brouwer (2007b). 
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7.1 Introduction 
 
The time tradeoff (TTO) method is a popular method to value health states and 
many quality of life tariffs used in cost-effectiveness analyses are based on TTO 
valuations (e.g. Dolan, 1997; Dolan, 2000; Lamers et al., 2006). In spite of their 
popularity, however, TTO scores are influenced by several biases, like loss 
aversion and scale compatibility (e.g. Bleichrodt, 2002). Moreover, there are 
questions regarding respondents who are unwilling to trade off length of life to 
gain quality of life (e.g. McNeil et al., 1981; Stiggelbout et al., 1995) and 
regarding the influence of discounting on TTO scores (e.g. Dolan and Jones-Lee, 
1997; Bleichrodt, 2002; van der Pol and Roux, 2005; Attema and Brouwer, 
2007a). A fairly new research area in this context is that of procedural invariance 
of the TTO method (e.g. Spencer, 2003). The conventional TTO procedure fixes 
the number of years in some health state β and subsequently elicits the number of 
years in full health that would make a respondent indifferent between the two 
options. However, the value of health state β might as well be measured by an 
alternative TTO procedure in which the number of years in full health is fixed 
and subsequently the number of years in health state β that would make a 
respondent indifferent between the two options is elicited (Bleichrodt et al., 2003; 
Spencer, 2003). Although in theory both elicitation methods should yield similar 
results, evidence so far has been mixed (Bleichrodt et al., 2003; Clarke et al., 
20032; Spencer, 2003).  
                                                 
2
 This is an unpublished working paper, but was discussed in Bleichrodt et al. (2003). We 
here only use the information available in that publication. 
Chapter 7: Can we fix it? Yes we can! But what? 
 
 
179
 In this chapter, we report on a new empirical test, set out to address this topic 
of procedural invariance, in which, unlike previous studies, the TTO scores were 
also corrected for utility of life duration (discounting) using a new, risk-free 
method. We introduce the theory that underlies our study in Section 7.2. The 
experimental setup is described in Section 7.3 and Section 7.4 presents the results. 
Finally, Section 7.5 discusses the results. 
 
7.2 Background 
 
Preferences over lifetime utility have been represented by an additive utility 
function over life duration and health quality: 
 
∑
=
=
T
jt
tt huV )(δ  (1) 
 
with u(ht) denoting a utility function that represents the individual’s preferences 
over health states at each time point t, δt the corresponding weight attached to the 
utility at this point, j the starting period, and T the complete time frame (e.g. 
Bleichrodt and Gafni, 1996). The conventional TTO procedure makes use of a 
special case of Equation (1) where δt = 1 for each t. This special case is known as 
the linear QALY model, which assumes a linear utility function over life duration. 
The conventional procedure aims at eliciting the point of indifference between a 
certain period (nβ) in some health state β followed by death (D), and a shorter 
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period (nFH) in full health (FH), after which again death follows. The elicited 
indifference can then be represented by the following equation: 
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If the utility function over health is normalized so that 1)( =FHu  and 0)( =Du  
we get the following simple expression for u(β): 
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Looking at Equations (2) and (3) it is immediately clear that there are two ways of 
deriving this value of health state β. One can fix nβ, i.e. the time in health state β, 
as is common in conventional TTOs, leaving the respondent to specify the period 
in full health, nFH, making her indifferent between the two options. Alternatively, 
one might fix the period in full health (nFH) and elicit the number of years in 
health state β, nβ, again making the respondent indifferent between the two 
options. According to procedural invariance, both questions, abstracting from 
biases, should give the same result for u(β). Not until recently this feature of TTO 
gained attention and was used to test the robustness of the TTO method 
(Bleichrodt et al., 2003; Clarke et al., 2003; Spencer, 2003). The evidence so far is 
mixed. 
 Spencer (2003) applied four conventional (10 year period) TTO exercises 
valuing four different inferior health states. In addition, two alternative TTO 
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exercises were applied in which the period in some inferior health state was fixed 
and the duration in some worse health state was elicited that yielded indifference 
between the two scenarios. The results were mixed: only in one question the 
alternative procedure caused valuations to be significantly lower than those of the 
conventional procedure, but in the other no significant difference was found. 
Spencer (2003) moreover provides a useful overview of different biases that 
influence both procedures and provides qualitative feedback of respondents on the 
procedures. 
 Clarke et al. (2003) used a bid procedure to compare the conventional and 
alternative TTO procedures. Each participant got one bid and had the choice to 
accept the bid or reject it. They find no evidence of systematic inconsistencies 
between the procedures. 
 Finally, Bleichrodt et al. (2003) performed an experiment first performing 
five conventional TTO exercises all using back pain as the specified health state, 
but using different time frames  (i.e. nβ, ranging from 13 to 38 years). The 
participants had to return two weeks later, when the alternative TTO procedure 
was applied using their answers to the conventional TTO (i.e. the elicited nFH) to 
set the duration of full health. Procedural invariance would then require that the 
elicited durations with back pain be the same as the originally specified durations, 
that is, nβ. This way the problem of discounting was circumvented in establishing 
equivalence of the two procedures. The results indicated significantly lower TTO 
scores for the alternative procedure compared to the conventional procedure for 
three out of the five comparisons. For the longest durations no significantly 
different results were found. Bleichrodt et al. (2003) attribute the differences 
between the procedures mainly to loss aversion. 
Studies on intertemporal preferences with applications to health economics 
 182
 Testing for procedural invariance and determining the exact difference in 
derived health state valuations between the conventional and alternative 
procedure is not without problems, however, as several biases may lead to 
differences between the two procedures as highlighted below.   
 
Maximum endurable time  
 The phenomenon of maximum endurable time means that for severe health 
states there is a maximum duration people want to live in a health state, after 
which additional time is valued negatively. Its implication is a higher TTO score 
for the alternative procedure for higher gauge durations and a lower TTO score 
for the alternative procedure for lower gauge durations. 
 
Scale compatibility 
 Scale compatibility may also lead to bias. Scale compatibility refers to the 
phenomenon that respondents tend to give more weight to the attribute used as the 
response scale, which is time in the TTO method. This causes an upward bias on 
TTO scores for both procedures. The magnitude of this bias may differ between 
the two procedures, depending on the stimuli involved. It should be mentioned 
that the results of Bleichrodt et al. (2003) are not affected by scale compatibility. 
 
Loss aversion 
 Loss aversion refers to the fact that people are more sensitive to losses than 
to gains when viewed from a particular reference point (Tversky and Kahneman, 
1991). When we assume that the reference point is the initial health state 
considered in each question, this will cause a divergence between the two 
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procedures. In the conventional procedure, a loss in longevity occurs when a 
respondent trades off time, which may cause respondents to be overly reluctant to 
give up life years, leading to high TTO scores. In the alternative procedure there 
is a loss in health rather than longevity. In order to compensate for this loss, 
respondents may require a relatively large gain in life duration to compensate for 
this loss. As a result, the alternative procedure will generate lower TTO scores 
(Bleichrodt et al., 2003; Spencer 2003). 
 
Discounting 
 Finally, since the values of nβ and nFH need not be equal between the two 
TTO procedures, discounting future health is important as it influences the 
number of years traded or demanded. So, while discounting in itself does not 
induce a difference between the two procedures, i.e. theoretically both procedures 
should result in the same TTO score regardless of discounting, it can influence the 
magnitude of any difference that results from other biases. To what extent the 
magnitude of this difference is caused by discounting can only be assessed by 
correcting for it. 
 
We set out to perform a new test of procedural invariance in which we could 
avoid or correct for two of these biases, i.e. maximum endurable time and utility 
curvature due to discounting.  
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7.3 New test 
 
We performed an experimental study comparing the conventional and alternative 
TTO procedure in the context of a larger study (see Chapters 5 and 6 for more 
details). A novelty of this study in comparison to the earlier studies is that we 
correct the TTO scores in both procedures for the influence of discounting3. This 
provides a possibility of looking at the magnitude of the other biases in explaining 
the difference between the two TTO procedures, without the disturbing influence 
of discounting. Any difference between the two procedures that remains after 
correction can be interpreted as a ‘net effect’ of other biases, in particular loss 
aversion and scale compatibility.  
 The health state used in our study was specified as regular back pain.4 This is 
a common, easily understandable and non-severely impaired health state.5 The 
latter aspect minimizes the influence of the bias of maximum endurable time. We 
described the health state by the EuroQol 5D terminology. The descriptions were 
printed on cards and handed to the participants (see Appendix 5A). Further, we 
                                                 
3
 Although we use a recently introduced method (Attema et al., 2007), which makes no 
assumptions regarding the parametric shape of the discount function, correcting TTO 
scores for discounting is not new (e.g. van der Pol and Roux, 2005). However, this is the 
first study to do so in the context of examining procedural invariance. 
4
 Bleichrodt et al. (2003) successfully used the same health state (albeit using different 
stimuli) in their test of procedural invariance in a sample of Spanish students. They, 
however, did not correct TTO scores for discounting in investigating the magnitude of 
differences between both procedures. While their study could detect procedural 
invariance regardless of discounting due to its intelligent two-step design, the magnitude 
of the reported differences due to other biases was influenced by discounting.   
5
  The Dutch EQ-5D tariff for this health state (11221 in EQ-5D terms) is 0.811 (Lamers 
et al., 2005). 
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stressed to the participants that the health state ‘full health’ meant they were able 
to function perfectly on all the five EuroQoL dimensions, irrespective of their age 
(i.e. the value of the health state was equal to 1). Our experiment entailed two 
phases, both using regular back pain as the health state of interest. In the first 
phase of the experiment, we elicited the weighting function for future health (as 
described in Chapters 5 and 6), used to correct the answers to the TTO questions 
that were posed in the second phase. In the second phase we used two approaches 
to value the specified health state. First, we fixed the duration of the health state 
with back pain (nβ) at 14 (BP14) and 27 years (BP27), respectively, and asked for 
the number of years in full health (nFH) that they considered equivalent, using an 
open-ended procedure. Second, in the alternative procedure we fixed the duration 
in full health (nFH) at 10 (FH10) and 22 (FH22) years, respectively, and asked for 
the number of years with back pain (nβ) that they considered equivalent by means 
of an open-ended procedure again.  
 
7.4 Results 
 
Seventy participants, students recruited at the Erasmus University, took part in the 
experiment. Fourteen participants were eliminated from the study mainly because 
they did not understand the conventional TTO procedure. The average age of the 
56 included respondents was 21.8 years (sd=2.99) and 35.7% was female. Table 
7.1 presents the results. 
 As shown in Table 7.1, the alternative (FH10 and FH22) questions yield 
substantially lower scores than the conventional (BP14 and BP27) questions, both 
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before and after correction for discounting (p < 0.01 for both the raw and the 
adjusted scores). Correcting for discounting does diminish the difference between 
the scores of the two procedures considerably. The difference between the raw 
and adjusted scores is around 0.05 (6%) for the conventional procedure and 0.13 
(30%) for the alternative procedure, indicating a substantial difference between 
the impact of discounting for the two procedures. Longer durations for the 
alternative procedure explain this difference. It also needs noting that duration is 
much more influential for the alternative procedure than for the conventional one 
(i.e. the difference between FH10 and FH22 is much larger than between BP14 
and BP27).  
 The average corrected TTO score for BP14 was still almost 52% higher than 
for FH10. However, this difference between procedures was much smaller for 
larger durations, as the average corrected TTO score for BP27 was only about 
19% higher than for FH22. 
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TABLE 7.1. RESULTS. 
RAW TTO SCORES 
 BP14 BP27 FH10 FH22 
Mean 0.7092 0.7509 0.3711 0.5357 
Standard error 0.0247 0.0249 0.0285 0.0240 
IQR 0.6429-
0.8571 
0.7315-
0.8889 
0.2-0.5 0.3917-
0.6332 
Range 0.0714-1 0.0741-1 0.1-0.9434 0.22-0.9362 
Average value of n nFH=9.93 nFH=20.28 nβ=37.30 nβ=46.79 
Average number of 
life years 
traded/required 
4.07 6.73 27.30 24.79 
ADJUSTED TTO SCORES 
 BP14 BP27 FH10 FH22 
Mean 0.7501 0.8015 0.4935 0.6737 
Standard error 0.0249 0.0254 0.0289 0.0251 
IQR 0.6911-
0.8797 
0.6915-
0.9353 
0.3518-
0.6415 
0.5178-
0.8173 
Range 0.0935-1 0.1321-1 
0.0862-
0.9375 
0.2932-
0.9839 
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN RAW AND ADJUSTED TTO SCORES 
 BP14 BP27 FH10 FH22 
Difference 
0.0409 
(5.8%) 
0.0506 
(6.7%) 
0.1225 
(33.0%) 
0.1380 
(25.8%) 
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7.5 Discussion 
 
In this study we find significant and substantial differences between the 
conventional and the alternative procedure to elicit TTO scores, with the 
conventional procedure invoking considerably higher scores. The correction for 
discounting we applied indeed diminishes the differences between the procedures, 
but the differences remain substantial and significant. Compared to earlier studies, 
our results confirm the findings reported by Bleichrodt et al. (2003). Higher TTO 
scores for the conventional procedure than for the alternative procedure were also 
found by Spencer (2003) in one question format, although her estimates were 
confounded by discounting and maximum endurable time. We moreover confirm 
the finding of Bleichrodt et al. (2003) that the difference between the two 
procedures decreases when the specified duration increases. For longer durations 
than those used here, Bleichrodt et al. (2003) even found no difference between 
the two procedures. 
 Of the biases discussed in Section 7.2 only two appear relevant here. We 
corrected for discounting and avoided maximum endurable time bias by using a 
relatively mild health problem. As a result, the difference between the two 
formats relates to scale compatibility and loss aversion for life duration. Both 
work in the same direction (i.e. higher scores for the conventional TTO), and 
cannot be disentangled further here. Bleichrodt et al. (2003), however, suggest 
that loss aversion is the main driver of these differences, leading to an upward 
bias in the conventional TTO and a downward bias in the alternative TTO. The 
finding that the difference between the two procedures decreases when the 
specified duration increases then suggests that people are less loss averse for 
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longer durations. A possible reason for this is that the disutility of the experienced 
loss (indeed, this loss – moving from healthy to dead – occurs further away in 
time for conventional TTO procedures) may itself be discounted. Moreover, own 
expectations regarding duration and quality of life may play a role in such long 
term TTOs (van Nooten and Brouwer, 2004).6  
 We feel that another factor is relevant in explaining the difference between 
the two procedures, analogous to the well-known discrepancy between 
willingness to pay (WTP) and willingness to accept (WTA), the latter normally 
yielding higher results than the former (e.g. Horowitz and McConnell, 2002). In 
the WTP approach, respondents need to give up some amount from their own 
limited budget, which naturally limits their responses. Similarly, in the 
conventional TTO procedure individuals have a fixed budget of life duration in 
some non-perfect health state. In “buying” better health their ‘willingness to pay’ 
is limited by this budget. The alternative TTO procedure, on the other hand, can 
be compared to the WTA approach. Then, there is no restriction on the amount of 
money (in the context of the TTO time) one can ask in compensation for a decline 
in health. Such a situation without budget restraint can easily lead to higher 
answers than in case of a budget restraint, resulting in lower TTO scores. 
                                                 
6
 Subjective expectations regarding duration of life may have influenced our results as 
well, since our respondents were relatively young. This may have led them to consider 10 
years in full health (the fixed period in FH10) as rather short (in relation to their subjective 
reference point) and led them to demand relatively many ‘unhealthy’ life years (the 
average response in the FH10 question was quite high, i.e. 37.3) in order to regain some of 
their initial remaining subjective life expectancy. This may also partly explain the large 
difference between the scores for the FH10 and FH22 questions.  
 
Studies on intertemporal preferences with applications to health economics 
 190
 Note that the WTP-WTA gap is also caused by loss aversion (e.g. Knetsch, 
1989; Kahneman et al., 1990), but the presence of a possible ‘budget constraint’ 
may cause an additional explanation. The open-ended format of our TTO may 
have added to this discrepancy. Moreover, in case of imprecise preferences, in 
which some range of answers describes the preferences of the respondent better 
than one point, one might expect the conventional procedure to lead to an estimate 
on the low end of this range, while the alternative approaches the range from the 
other direction and results in a high estimate in that range. Payment scale 
techniques (e.g. Donaldson et al., 1998) make such relevant ranges explicit, which 
might be worthwhile investigating in the context of TTO also.    
 The implication of these findings is that the TTO does not appear consistent 
across operationalizations. Especially loss aversion appears to play an important 
role in explaining the difference between the two procedures. Framing TTO as 
health losses and time gains or vice versa therefore may matter in terms of results. 
Both framings appear prone to biases and it is difficult to judge which performs 
better. It is therefore unclear whether we should fix the period of full health or 
that of an imperfect health state in TTOs. The context of the intervention at stake 
(preventing health loss or restoring health) may be considered to be important in 
this respect as well. More fundamentally, we may need to consider whether we 
can fix the TTO to become less prone to these biases and a more consistent 
method in deriving health state valuations. For now, it seems unclear that we can. 
 8 On the (not so) constant proportional 
tradeoff in TTO1 
 
 
Summary 
 
The preference condition of constant proportional tradeoffs (CPTOs) is necessary 
for the QALY model to represent preferences over health profiles. The health 
tariffs used in this model are often estimated by means of the time tradeoff (TTO) 
method. TTO scores elicited using a particular duration are subsequently 
attached to health states irrespective of their duration. However, evidence on 
CPTO so far has been mixed. In this chapter we review this evidence. Further, we 
use a risk-free method to correct TTO scores for utility curvature and test whether 
decision makers trade off utility of duration and quality at the same rate 
irrespective of duration. We find CPTO to be violated for both raw values and 
utilities. Remarkably, we find higher values for longer durations, contrary to most 
of the previous studies. We propose a U-shaped relation between TTO scores and 
duration as a possible explanation for our findings. 
 
                                                 
1
 This chapter is based on Attema and Brouwer (2007c). 
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8.1 Introduction 
 
The QALY model has become an important model in valuing health benefits. To 
make the model practical, measurement methods are needed in order to elicit the 
quality of life weights used in this model. One such method is the TTO method, 
which is often used to derive (standard) quality of life weights for health states to 
be used in economic evaluations (e.g. Dolan, 1997; Lamers et al., 2006). The 
popularity of the TTO, however, is not explained from an absence of 
methodological problems surrounding it. On the contrary, the TTO has been 
shown to be prone to several biases and disturbing influences such as loss 
aversion, scale compatibility and discounting (Bleichrodt, 2002).  
 One important and necessary assumption for TTO measurements to be 
consistent with the QALY model is that of constant proportional tradeoffs 
(CPTOs). CPTO basically requires that the estimated TTO value should be the 
same for different durations. For example, if in valuing some imperfect health 
state β using a 10 year TTO people would indicate to be willing to trade off 2 
years (that is 20% of total time), then CPTO requires them to give up 2 months 
when using a 10 month TTO or 2 days when using a 10 day TTO. The proportion 
traded should always be equal (i.e. 20%), therefore. Besides a theoretical 
requirement, CPTO is also practically important when one considers the use of 
the valuation of health states in economic evaluations and medical decision 
making: they are attached to such health states regardless of the duration of the 
health problem, normally. If, therefore, the assumption of CPTO does not hold, 
health state valuations could be time dependent – that is, health states could be 
valued differently when their durations differ. 
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 The evidence on the validity of the CPTO assumption is mixed. Some 
empirical studies found support (e.g. Bleichrodt and Johannesson, 1997; Dolan 
and Stalmeier, 2003; van der Pol and Roux, 2005), while others rejected it (e.g. 
Sackett and Torrance, 1978; Stiggelbout et al., 1995), or found mixed results 
(Bleichrodt et al., 2003). Given the importance of the assumption and the mixed 
evidence for it, more research in this area seems warranted. 
 In this chapter we therefore discuss the current evidence regarding CPTO on 
the basis of a literature review and highlight the role of the utility for life duration 
in this debate. So far, most studies that found violations of CPTO assumed linear 
utility (i.e. no discounting or diminishing marginal utility), but it seems 
implausible that their participants would satisfy that assumption. Therefore, if one 
would have corrected for utility curvature, these respondents might have satisfied 
CPTO in terms of utilities after all. That is, TTO scores corrected for utility 
curvature may still be the same for different durations, despite the fact that ‘raw’ 
TTO scores vary with duration. It is important to investigate this possibility, 
because it might indicate that the QALY model does hold in a more general form, 
and that only the utility for life duration has to become less restrictive. We present 
the results of an experiment to test the CPTO assumption, in which we used both 
raw TTO scores and TTO scores that were corrected for utility curvature. For the 
utility correction of the TTO values, we use the risk-free utility for life duration 
elicitation method of Attema et al. (2007). Its advantages are that it does not need 
to make specific parametric assumptions about the utility function and that it is 
not influenced by biases due to probability weighting and the inclusion of the 
problematic outcome death. (See Chapter 5 for a discussion.) 
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 This chapter is organized as follows. We describe the theoretical background 
of CPTO in Section 8.2. Then, we review the existing literature that tested the 
CPTO assumption in Section 8.3. Our experimental test, followed by a 
presentation of the results, is described in Section 8.4. Finally, Section 8.5 
discusses the results and provides a possible explanation for our findings in the 
form of a generalized relationship between duration and tradeoffs. 
 
8.2 TTO and constant proportional tradeoffs 
 
As indicated, the TTO method is based on the QALY model. The QALY model is 
a common way to describe preferences over lifetime utility and represents these 
preferences by the following additive utility function over life duration and health 
quality (e.g. Miyamoto and Eraker, 1988): 
 
∑
=
=
T
jt
tt huV )(δ  (1) 
 
with u(ht) a utility function that represents the individual’s preferences over health 
states at each time point t, δt denoting the corresponding weight attached to the 
utility at this point, j the starting period, and T the complete time frame. 
 Often, TTOs assume linear utility, so that δt = 1 for each t in Equation (1). 
The model then simplifies to the linear QALY model, where equal weight is 
assumed to be attached to all utilities regardless of their timing. Then, the utility 
of a health state β can be elicited by asking the respondent to give some period in 
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full health, followed by death, which makes him indifferent to a stated period in 
health state β, also followed by death. As a result, the elicited indifference can be 
represented by the following equation: 
 
)(*)()(*)(* DunnFHunun FHFH −+= ββ β  (2) 
 
with FH representing full health and D death, nβ is the stated period in health state 
β, and nFH is the elicited period in full health. If the utility function over health is 
normalized so that 1)( =FHu  and 0)( =Du  we get the following simple 
expression for )(βu : 
 
β
β
n
n
u FH=)(  (3) 
 
Clearly, this expression only holds if the utility over life duration is indeed linear 
and there is no reallocation of lifetime consumption due to the smaller duration in 
perfect health.2 Pliskin et al. (1980) gave an axiomatic derivation of a particular 
version of the QALY model for constant health profiles, which includes the linear 
QALY model. They proved that preferences can be represented by this model if 
utility independence and CPTO hold. CPTO means that for each health state β 
there exists a number q≥0, such that nβ years in β is equivalent to qnβ (= nFH in 
Equation (3)) years in full health (FH), i.e. (β, nβ)~(FH, qnβ). In other words, 
                                                 
2
 The latter concern will probably not cause a large bias (Dolan and Jones-Lee, 1997). 
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individuals are willing to give up the same proportion (1-q) of lifetime 
irrespective of its duration (nβ). 
 Pliskin et al. (1980) also showed that if utility independence and CPTO hold, 
the utility function for life duration has to be linear or a power function. However, 
individuals may have a utility of life duration function that does not belong to the 
power family, but instead to some other parametric family. In that case, CPTO 
does not need to be confirmed, but it may very well be that such an individual 
does obey the assumption of CPTO in terms of utilities of life years instead of 
ordinary life years. That is, for each health state β there may exist a number q≥0, 
such that the utility of nβ years in β is equivalent to the utility of nβ years in full 
health multiplied by q. In other words, individuals may be willing to give up the 
same proportion (1-q) of utility of lifetime irrespective of its duration (nβ). 
Consequently, the QALY model of Pliskin et al. (1980) may still hold, albeit with 
less restrictions on the shape of the utility function for life duration. When the 
utility function for life duration is exponential instead of a power, for example, 
CPTO may hold in terms of utilities but not in terms of ordinary life years. 
Therefore, testing this form of CPTO requires the correction of TTO scores for 
utility curvature. Recently, Attema et al. (2007) have pointed out a new way of 
correcting for this curvature, using a risk-free elicitation method. Attema and 
Brouwer (2007a) used this method to adjust TTO scores. 
 CPTO can be violated due to other reasons as well (see e.g. Bleichrodt, 
2002), like loss aversion (i.e. the phenomenon that people are more sensitive to 
losses than to gains when viewed from a particular reference point—Tversky and 
Kahneman (1991)), and maximum endurable time (i.e. the fact that some bad 
health states can only be endured during some period of time after which its value 
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becomes negative). Depending on the magnitude and direction of these biases, 
CPTO may be violated in both directions or the biases may cancel out so that 
CPTO is not violated on the aggregate – or may mistakenly be perceived as not 
being violated if the violation itself is balanced by other biases. A better 
understanding of the validity of the assumption of CPTO therefore depends on a 
better understanding of the magnitudes of these biases and correcting for them as 
far as possible. 
 In the conventional TTO procedure, loss aversion may cause respondents to 
be overly reluctant to give up life years, leading to relatively high utility scores. 
Maximum endurable time will lead to higher values for bad health states for small 
durations, because for longer durations extra time in that health state will be 
valued negatively. While loss aversion is likely to be present in all TTO 
valuations, the presence of MET depends on the health state valued. Moreover, 
the influence of utility curvature, for instance caused by discounting, is also 
present in normal TTO valuations, but its influence will likely vary with the time 
horizon chosen and can be corrected for. In the next section, we will highlight the 
existing evidence regarding CPTO. In doing so, we will indicate whether the 
performed studies corrected for utility curvature or used health states that could 
lead to MET bias. 
 
8.3 Empirical evidence on CPTO 
 
As noted before, the evidence about the empirical validity of the CPTO 
assumption is mixed. This section highlights the existing evidence on the validity 
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of the CPTO assumption. Table 8.1 presents the empirical studies regarding 
CPTO, summarizes their main results (in terms of significance of the difference 
between small and long durations at the 5% level) and indicates whether or not 
they corrected for utility of life duration curvature and whether or not they used a 
health state that may be susceptible to maximum endurable time. The table 
emphasizes the amount of variation in results. Some studies confirm CPTO, but 
most studies reject it. These violations, however, are not easily interpretable since 
CPTO is violated in both directions, i.e. sometimes the proportion traded is 
relatively small for shorter durations and sometimes the proportion traded is 
larger for shorter durations, compared to longer durations. The finding that the 
TTO values of some health state are higher for short durations (i.e. less life years 
are being traded in that case) is somewhat more common. 
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TABLE 8.1. OVERVIEW OF CPTO STUDIES. 
Study Life years 
used 
MET 
health 
state 
Utility 
correction 
Results Sample 
Sackett and 
Torrance 
(1978) 
3 months 
8 years 
Life 
expectancy 
Mixed No TTO L < TTO S 
General 
population 
Patients 
Pliskin et al. 
(1980) 
5 years 
15 years No Yes 
TTO L = 
TTO S Pilot sample 
Miyamoto 
and Eraker 
(1988) 
1, 2, 15, 16, 
20, 24 No No 
TTO L < 
TTO S 
(p-values not 
reported) 
Patients 
Hall et al. 
(1992) 
10% of LE 
50% of LE 
Life 
expectancy 
Mixed No TTO L = TTO S 
Women 40-70 
50% patients 
Cook et al. 
(1994) 
1 year 
12 years No No 
TTO L = 
TTO S Patients 
Stiggelbout et 
al. (1995) 
3, 10, 15 
years 
3, 5, 10 years 
5, 20, LE 
No No TTO L < TTO S Patients 
Stalmeier et 
al. (1996) 5, 10, 25, 50 Yes Yes 
TTO L = 
TTO S 
Except for 
t=5 
Students 
Stalmeier et 
al. (1997) 5, 10, 25, 50 Yes No 
TTO L = 
TTO S 
TTO L > 
TTO S 
Students 
Bleichrodt 
and 
Johannesson 
(1997) 
10 and 30 
years No No 
TTO L = 
TTO S Students 
Unic et al. 
(1998) 
5, 10 and 
higher No No 
TTO L > 
TTO S 
Healthy 
women 
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Study Life years 
used 
MET 
health 
state 
Utility 
correction 
Results Sample 
Kirsch and 
McGuire 
(2000) 
2 and 10 
years Mixed No 
TTO L = 
TTO S 
TTO L < 
TTO S 
General 
population 
Martin et al. 
(2000) 
5, 10, 15 
years No Yes 
TTO L < 
TTO S 
Older 
cardiovascular 
disease 
patients (mean 
age 61) 
Stalmeier et 
al. (2001) 
10 and 20 
years Yes No 
TTO L < 
TTO S 
(p-values not 
reported) 
Students 
Patients 
Bleichrodt et 
al. (2003) 
13, 19, 24, 
31, 38 years No No 
TTO L = 
TTO S 
TTO L > 
TTO S 
Students 
Dolan and 
Stalmeier 
(2003) 
10 and 20 
years Yes No 
TTO L < 
TTO S Students 
Van der Pol 
and Roux 
(2005) 
20 and 50 
years No Yes 
TTO L = 
TTO S Students 
 
 Sackett and Torrance (1978) used a small, an intermediate and a long 
duration for a general population sample and a patient sample, and report higher 
TTO values for short durations. Miyamoto and Eraker (1988) reported evidence 
of no trade at all for durations smaller than 1 year for 25% of the respondents, 
whereas these people did trade off time for longer durations. Therefore, TTO 
values were higher for small durations than for long durations. Hall et al. (1992) 
compared three different durations, depending on life expectancy of the 
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respondents. No violations of CPTO were found. Cook et al. (1994) interviewed 
patients. Their TTO values were not significantly different between a duration of 
1 year and one of 12 years. Stiggelbout et al. (1995) used small and intermediate 
durations and found a violation of CPTO with TTO values for small durations 
being higher than those for long durations. Bleichrodt and Johannesson (1997) 
used an intermediate and a long duration. They found no violation of CPTO at the 
aggregate level. 
 Stalmeier et al. (1997) used bad health states to test for maximum endurable 
time. They cannot reject CPTO when comparing durations of 10 years and longer, 
but do find significantly lower TTO values for the 5 year horizon. Unic et al. 
(1998) estimated TTO values for several durations in a sample of healthy women 
and found lower values for shorter durations. Kirsch and McGuire (2000) 
compared a small and an intermediate duration and found mixed evidence. They 
reported higher TTO values for the short duration for bad health states, but no 
significant differences for moderate health states. They attribute this to 
respondents who value additional time in a bad health state as worse than death 
after some duration (i.e. maximum endurable time). Stalmeier et al. (2001) and 
Dolan and Stalmeier (2003) found smaller TTO values for higher durations when 
comparing two intermediate durations in a severe health state. This may again 
have been caused by maximum endurable time. Bleichrodt et al. (2003) used five 
different durations that were no multiples of 5 so that they were not very 
susceptible to a proportional heuristic. These durations were of an intermediate 
and long-term nature. They found higher TTO values for high durations than short 
durations for one procedure, indicating that people are willing to trade off 
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relatively less life years for higher amounts. For another procedure, they could, 
however, not reject CPTO. 
 We found four studies that corrected for utility of life duration curvature. 
Pliskin et al. (1980) used a certainty equivalence (CE) question to correct for 
utility of life duration and found no violation at the aggregate level. However, 
their sample was very small. Stalmeier et al. (1996) found no violation of CPTO. 
They also corrected for utility curvature by means of the CE method and 
estimated several parametric models. Martin et al. (2000) used three short and 
short-intermediate durations and corrected for utility curvature by means of CE 
questions. In a sample of cardiovascular patients, they found smaller TTO values 
for higher durations. Van der Pol and Roux (2005) compared TTO scores for a 
long-intermediate duration (20 years) and a very long duration (50 years). Further, 
they corrected for discounting by means of one discounting question. They found 
no violation of CPTO, neither for unadjusted nor for individually adjusted scores. 
 To summarize, sixteen empirical studies of CPTO were found. Six of these 
did not reject CPTO, six found lower TTO values for higher durations, one found 
the opposite result, and three found mixed results. There is no clear influence of 
correcting for discounting nor is there a clear influence of MET.3 It appears 
difficult therefore to derive any definite answers from the literature regarding 
CPTO. Most evidence points towards higher values for short durations, yet all but 
one of these studies do not correct for discounting, which can strongly influence 
results, given the time horizons chosen. It appears that more evidence is required 
                                                 
3
 It needs noting that TTO studies generally vary quite strongly in terms of designs 
(Arnesen and Trommald, 2005). Such variations obviously can also hamper direct 
comparisons of results of the studies listed in Table 8.1.  
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in order to better understand the relationship between health state duration and 
valuation.  
 
8.4 Testing CPTO while correcting for utility curvature and 
avoiding MET 
 
We performed an experimental study testing the CPTO assumption in the context 
of a larger study (see Chapters 5 and 6 for more details). Our experiment entailed 
two phases. In both phases we used regular back pain as the health state of 
interest. Back pain is a common, easily understandable and non-severe health 
state. The latter aspect minimizes the influence of the bias of maximum endurable 
time. We described the health state by the EuroQol 5D terminology. The 
descriptions were printed on cards and handed to the participants (see Appendix 
5A). Further, we stressed to the participants that the health state ‘full health’ 
meant they were able to function perfectly on all the five EuroQoL dimensions, 
irrespective of their age. In the first phase of the experiment, we elicited the 
weighting function for future health, used to correct the answers to the TTO 
questions that were posed in the second phase. 
 The first phase was based on the notion that if utility of life duration is 
nonlinear, the estimate obtained by Equation (3) will be biased. Rather, one would 
then need to use Equation (1). Without restrictions on δt (and using the notation 
introduced above) the indifference implied by the TTO under the QALY model 
would give the following equation: 
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Eliciting )(βu thus requires the elicitation of the weights δt. Attema et al. (2007) 
recently proposed a new risk-free elicitation method to do so. In short, the method 
presents a participant with two health scenarios. In the first scenario the 
participant first is in a good health state (g). After some time, t, she moves to a 
worse health state (h) for the remainder of the total time period P. In the second 
scenario, the participant first is in the worse health state (h) and at time t moves to 
the better health state (g) for the remainder of P. The value of t is elicited that 
makes the participant indifferent between these scenarios. This value indicates the 
point where the period before t yields as much utility as the period after t. When t 
is smaller than the midpoint of the period P, this indicates concavity of the utility 
function over life duration. Then, as a result, raw TTO values will be biased 
downwards and correcting for this concavity results in higher utility scores. More 
detailed information about the exact shape of the utility function can be obtained 
by repeating this procedure (using the first estimate of t as input in the next 
exercise, etc). (See Chapter 5 for details). 
 In the second phase of the experiment we used two approaches to value the 
specified health state. First, in a conventional procedure, we fixed the duration of 
the health state with back pain (nβ) at 14 (BP14) and 27 years (BP27), 
respectively, and asked for the number of years in full health (nFH) that they 
considered equivalent. Second, in an alternative procedure, we fixed the duration 
in full health (nFH) at 10 (FH10) and 22 (FH22) years, respectively, and asked for 
the number of years with back pain (nβ) that they considered equivalent. 
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Results 
 Seventy participants were recruited and were paid a fixed amount of €12.50 
to join the experiment. The participants were students from different faculties of 
the Erasmus University Rotterdam. Fifty-six participants were included in the 
analyses. The other 14 participants were eliminated from the sample because they 
had at least one inconsistent answer or had not understood the utility elicitation 
part. The average age of the 56 included respondents was 21.8 years (sd=2.99) 
and 35.7% was female. 
 In Table 8.2 we present some summary statistics concerning the raw and 
corrected TTO scores.4 The difference between the raw and adjusted values is 
around 0.05 (6%) for the BP questions and 0.13 (30%) for the FH questions (see 
last row of Table 8.2). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
4
 These results were used to test the procedural invariance of TTO in Attema and Brouwer 
(2007b). 
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TABLE 8.2. TTO SCORES. 
 
Raw scores BP14 BP27 FH10 FH22 
Mean  0.7092 0.7509 0.3711 0.5357 
Standard error 0.0247 0.0249 0.0285 0.0240 
Interquartile range 0.6429-0.8571 
0.7315-
0.8889 0.2-0.5 
0.3917-
0.6332 
Range 0.0714-1 0.0741-1 0.1-0.9434 0.22-0.9362 
Average number of 
years 
required/sacrificed 
4.07 6.73 27.30 24.79 
Adjusted scores 
Mean 0.7501 0.8015 0.4935 0.6737 
Standard error 0.0249 0.0254 0.0289 0.0251 
Interquartile range 0.6911-0.8797 
0.6915-
0.9353 
0.3518-
0.6415 
0.5178-
0.8173 
Range 0.0935-1 0.1321-1 0.0862-0.9375 
0.2932-
0.9839 
Difference between BP14 and BP27: 0.0417 (5.9%, p < 0.01) 
Difference between adjusted BP14 and adjusted BP27: 0.0514 (6.9%, p < 
0.01) 
Difference between FH10 and FH22: 0.1646 (44.4%. p < 0.01) 
Difference between adjusted FH10 and adjusted FH22: 0.1802 (36.5%, p < 
0.01) 
 
 In order to test the CPTO assumption, we compared the small and the long 
duration for both elicitation procedures. For both raw and adjusted TTO scores, 
CPTO was rejected, with the score being higher for longer than for smaller 
durations (p < 0.01). This finding is in contrast with most of the aforementioned 
studies. 
 In the FH questions, our results seem to be caused partly by the large fraction 
of respondents (23.2%) that gave the same answer to FH10 and FH22. In the BP 
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questions, many respondents (33.9%) answered as if using a proportional 
heuristic, i.e. their answer to the second question was twice the amount of their 
answer to the first question. Because the input of the second question was 
somewhat lower than twice the amount of the first question (27<2*14), this 
resulted in a higher raw TTO score for a longer duration for these respondents. 
We therefore repeated the analysis excluding these respondents, which still 
yielded a significant difference between the different durations. For BP14 and 
BP27, CPTO is still rejected in the same direction (p < 0.02). For the FH 
questions, FH22 also still yields higher TTO scores than FH10, both when 
excluding proportional heuristic respondents and when excluding respondents 
who gave the same answer to both questions (p < 0.01. For the BP questions there 
were no respondents giving the same answers to both questions). As a result, for 
the alternative procedure, there is again a violation of CPTO in the opposite 
direction of most of the earlier found violations. 
 Summarizing, our results indicate that correcting for utility curvature and 
avoiding MET does not seem to be sufficient to restore the validity of the 
assumption of CPTO.    
 
8.5 Discussion 
 
What can we infer from this overview and study other than that we succeed in 
adding to the confusion regarding constant proportional tradeoff? We believe 
some important observations need to be made. 
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 First, the review of the literature shows that violations of CPTO are common. 
Though often the violation causes shorter duration to result in a decreased 
willingness to trade and therefore higher health state valuations, the opposite has 
also been shown. The reviewed studies differ in many respects, including the time 
horizon chosen and whether a correction for utility curvature has been applied. 
Not many studies do the latter. Of the four that did, three find no violation of 
CPTO, while one finds that shorter durations result in higher valuations (Martin et 
al., 2000). The fact that the latter study used relatively old patients (average age of 
61) in their study may have influenced results, not only because of the way they 
view health problems, but also because of the fact that their subjective life-
expectancy may have been less than the projected ones. (See van Nooten and 
Brouwer (2004) on how this could bias results.) Such differences between the 
studies make it difficult to derive general conclusions from the existing evidence. 
 The present study was clearly small and the sample consisted of students, 
hampering generalization. Still, we found a robust violation of CPTO for both raw 
and corrected TTO scores in our sample. Remarkably, this violation is in the 
opposite direction of most of the previously found violations of CPTO and the 
only study correcting for utility curvature to find such a violation of CPTO. We 
also found that the magnitude of the violation was much smaller for the 
conventional TTO procedure (fixing time in an imperfect health state) than for the 
alternative one (fixing the period in full health). The latter was also found by 
Bleichrodt et al. (2003) and stresses the importance of other biases and influences 
in deriving the violation of CPTO. 
 Our results concerning the utility of life duration (see Chapters 5 and 6) are 
in agreement with the violation of CPTO for raw scores. We find evidence against 
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a constant relative risk attitude for remaining lifetime, which is the property 
characterizing power utility functions. Instead the data seem to be more in line 
with a constant absolute risk attitude, corresponding to exponential utility 
functions. However, after correcting for utility curvature, CPTO is still rejected, 
which indicates a more fundamental rejection of the QALY model. It seems that 
individuals do not trade off utility of life duration for health status at a constant 
rate, but instead at a rate that depends on the duration involved. For relatively 
long durations, like the ones used in our study, the amount of years traded is 
relatively low also after correction for utility curvature. Given this finding, the 
plausibility of relatively high TTO values for very short durations (who would 
trade off two days to avoid low back pain when having only ten days left to live?) 
and the diverse violations of CPTO reported in the literature (which indeed must 
be related to the fact that TTO results vary strongly between studies as reported 
by Arnesen and Trommald (2005)), it is interesting to hypothesize on the shape of 
this relationship between duration and tradeoffs. 
 Given the importance of loss aversion in the TTO (e.g. Bleichrodt, 2002; 
Bleichrodt et al., 2003), we hypothesize that a possible explanation for the 
variation in findings and therefore for a general relationship between health state 
duration and health state valuation in TTO is driven by this bias. In a conventional 
TTO with a ‘small’ duration, loss aversion and scale compatibility may relate 
especially to the amount of time left to live and may be stronger for smaller time 
horizons (durations). Loss aversion then causes respondents to be overly reluctant 
to give up life years, leading to relatively high utility scores. For ‘long’ durations, 
on the other hand, the absolute amount of years sacrificed may become dominant 
in the tradeoff, i.e. the reference point of the respondents changes, with people 
Studies on intertemporal preferences with applications to health economics 
 210
being reluctant to trade off more than some absolute amount of time. Thus, the 
absolute amount of time remaining is leading when the TTO uses short durations 
and the absolute amount of time sacrificed is leading for longer durations. The 
result will be that individuals give up fewer years for short and long durations, 
and less driven by these considerations in between these two points, causing TTO 
values to be a U-shaped function of duration. Future research testing multiple 
durations using a within-subject design could formally test this hypothesis. 
 It is important to stress that the use of the word ‘bias’ can be misleading. Not 
all deviations from CPTO need to be ‘biases’ in the sense that the TTO method 
causes some systematic misrepresentation of real preferences. The biases 
discussed here may simply reflect genuine and even plausible preferences, which 
are simply not adequately captured in the current QALY model. For instance, 
desiring some minimal remaining length of life seems a common and plausible 
preference, which can affect health state valuations elicited through TTO. Of 
course, such time dependency in valuations has important implications for 
deriving health state valuations and for the practice of economic evaluations, if 
we would want to reflect such preferences. 
 For now, it seems that the QALY model may be too simple, that there is 
indeed no constant proportional tradeoff of life years for health quality and, 
therefore, that health state valuations may depend on the duration of these health 
states. 
 
 
 9 Conclusion 
 
This chapter discusses the main conclusions drawn in this thesis. The conclusions 
will be made along the lines of the research questions defined in the introduction. 
 
9.1 Time preference 
 
Chapter 2 reviewed the existing literature on time preference and showed that the 
violations of the constant discounting model are extensive. It also discussed their 
implications for medical decision making and presented several examples of 
applications to health-related behavior. It made clear that incorporating the 
observed violations of the standard model into new models is able to explain 
anomalous health-related behavior and can be exploited to improve policy 
recommendations. 
 Chapters 3 and 4 contributed to the empirical literature on time preference by 
introducing new measurement methods and performing experimental 
measurements of discounted utility with these methods. In Chapter 3 a new 
method to measure intertemporal preferences was proposed, where first utility of 
money is elicited in a nonparametric way. Moreover, the method elicits utility in 
an intertemporal domain, so that a uniform setting is used throughout the entire 
measurement process. Thereafter, time preference can be elicited, correcting for 
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utility curvature as determined in the first stage. The method was subsequently 
tested in an experiment. It turned out that intertemporal utility was concave for 
gains and convex for losses, consistent with a hypothesis of Loewenstein and 
Prelec (1992). However, utility curvature had not much influence on time 
preferences. It did lower the gain-loss asymmetry somewhat, but the difference in 
discount factors between gains and losses remained significant. Another 
interesting result is that I found this asymmetry even though I used a neutral 
frame. Therefore, I rejected Shelley’s (1993) conjecture that the gain-loss 
asymmetry can be explained by a framing effect. Further, I found the generalized 
hyperbolic discounting model of Loewenstein and Prelec (1992) to describe the 
data significantly better than the constant discounting model, whereas other 
hyperbolic discounting models gave a similar fit as the constant discounting 
model. An implication thereof is that impatience is decreasing monotonically over 
time, and, hence, hyperbolic discounting is not merely caused by an immediacy 
effect as in quasi-hyperbolic discounting. 
 A way to measure the degree of time inconsistency, i.e. the deviation from 
stationarity, without needing information about the utility function for money, 
was proposed in Chapter 4. This measure was subsequently used in an 
experiment. Violations of both constant and hyperbolic discounting were found 
and, instead, discounting was increasing over time, contrary to most of the 
previous evidence. These results make clear that observed time preferences 
depend heavily on the elicitation procedure. The experiment of Chapter 3 used a 
choice procedure and expressed delay in terms of months and years, whereas 
Chapter 4 made use of a matching procedure and expressed delay in terms of 
months only. Another important difference concerns the response scale. Chapter 3 
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had money as response scale, whereas Chapter 4 had time as response scale. More 
research on the influence of the procedure is therefore warranted. 
 Chapter 5 investigated time preference for future lifetime. It proposed a risk-
free method for measuring the utility of life duration. The advantages of this 
method over existing methods are that it is not distorted by probability weighting 
and that is does not need the inclusion of the problematic outcome death. The 
results of a questionnaire confirmed that respondents find this method easier to 
answer than both the certainty equivalence method and the tradeoff method, 
which both measure utility under risk. Utility of life duration was measured in an 
experiment and compared regarding the three methods. The certainty equivalence 
method yielded more concave utility than the risk-free method, but this difference 
was no longer significant after correction for probability weighting. The results of 
the tradeoff method, which is not distorted by probability weighting, did not differ 
significantly from those of the risk-free method. It therefore seems that the risk-
free method is able to provide a reliable measure of utility and is easy to apply for 
practical purposes. 
 Another remarkable finding was that utility could be described better by an 
exponential function than by the popular power function. These results lend 
support to a constant absolute risk posture over life years instead of a constant 
relative risk posture. This is in contrast to other studies that did not find this result 
(e.g. Abellan-Perpinan et al., 2006), and is some evidence against the QALY 
model proposed in the seminal study of Pliskin et al. (1980), because that model 
requires a linear or power utility for life duration function. An exponential utility 
for life duration function, on the other hand, has the interesting property that it 
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corresponds with constant discounting of future life years, which is common 
practice in health economics. 
 
9.2 Universality of utility 
 
In addition to measuring time preference, the methods developed in this thesis 
gave the possibility to compare utility in different domains. Chapter 3 compared 
utility of money elicited in an intertemporal domain to previous findings on utility 
elicited in risk and uncertainty domains. The findings were rather similar, 
indicating a universal concept of utility. 
 Chapter 5 tested whether utility of life duration in a certainty domain differed 
from utility of life duration in a risky domain. No significant differences were 
found when correcting for probability weighting. Keeping in mind that probability 
weighting is a bias that is distinct from utility curvature, this finding is again 
evidence in favor of universality of utility. These results have important 
implications. For instance, they support the transferability of utility through 
different domains and as such support the common practice among health 
scientists to apply TTO scores (time domain) and standard gamble utilities (risk 
domain) in economic evaluations (welfare economic domain). Moreover, these 
results reject the common view in economics that utility is context dependent. 
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9.3 Time tradeoff method 
 
This thesis has applied the risk-free method of Chapter 5 to TTO valuations in 
order to investigate the role of the utility of life duration in the TTO method. First, 
in Chapter 6, I explained how to correct TTO scores for utility of life duration 
curvature with the risk-free method and estimated the size of this correction. Due 
to the concave shape of the utility functions, the corrected TTO scores were 
significantly higher than the uncorrected ones. The magnitude of this difference 
was approximately 0.05 (6%). 
 Chapter 7 dealt with procedural invariance of the TTO method. There I 
considered the influence of utility for life duration on the disparity between two 
TTO procedures. It was found that correcting for utility of life duration 
diminishes this disparity, although a large and significant gap remains. This is 
probably caused by loss aversion. 
 Finally, Chapter 8 considered the constant proportional tradeoffs property. 
The existing evidence on this property was reviewed and a new test was 
performed that investigated whether utilities of life years were traded off in a 
constantly proportional way. CPTO turned out to hold neither for ordinary life 
years nor for utilities. This result implies that the QALY model for decision 
making in health needs reconsideration as a descriptive model for individual 
preferences over health outcomes. 
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 Samenvatting 
 
Economische baten worden vaak op verschillende momenten in de tijd ontvangen. 
Er zijn talrijke voorbeelden van economische toepassingen waarin de uitkomsten 
op verschillende momenten optreden. Dit zijn onder meer spaarbeslissingen van 
huishoudens, het milieubeleid van landen, investeringsbeslissingen van bedrijven, 
gezondheidsgerelateerde beslissingen van individuen, en scholingsactiviteiten van 
leerlingen. 
 In het merendeel van deze gevallen worden toekomstige uitkomsten minder 
gewaardeerd dan soortgelijke huidige uitkomsten, dat wil zeggen er is positieve 
tijdsvoorkeur. Hier zijn verschillende redenen voor. Een eerste reden is dat de 
toekomst bijna altijd wordt omgeven door onzekerheid, terwijl uitkomsten die 
onmiddellijk of in de meer nabije toekomst worden ontvangen, zekerder zijn. Dit 
leidt tot het disconteren van toekomstige uitkomsten. 
 Ten tweede is nut vaak concaaf in uitkomsten (afnemend marginaal nut). Dit 
betekent dat extra eenheden van een bepaalde uitkomst minder extra nut 
opleveren naarmate je al meer van die uitkomst hebt. Een tweede kopje koffie 
geeft bijvoorbeeld doorgaans minder nut dan het eerste kopje. Aangezien welvaart 
over de tijd stijgt door bijvoorbeeld economische groei, hebben mensen in de 
toekomst meer mogelijkheden om te consumeren. Het nut van deze extra 
consumptie stijgt vanwege het afnemende marginale nut echter niet evenredig met 
de consumptiestijging, zodat toekomstige uitkomsten minder nut geven dan 
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dezelfde uitkomsten die nu verkregen worden, met als gevolg dat die toekomstige 
uitkomsten gedisconteerd worden. 
 Ten derde zijn mensen vaak kortzichtig en beschouwen zij niet altijd alle 
beschikbare informatie over de toekomst, hetgeen gelijkwaardig is aan het geven 
van een lager (of zelfs helemaal geen) gewicht aan toekomstige uitkomsten. 
 
Het meten van tijdsvoorkeur 
 
Tijdsvoorkeur heeft grote invloed op vele economische activiteiten. Het is daarom 
noodzakelijk om goede metingen van tijdsvoorkeur te verkrijgen. In verschillende 
wetenschappelijke disciplines, waaronder economie, psychologie en 
gezondheidswetenschappen, is er een debat gaande over de juiste manier om 
toekomstige baten te disconteren (bijv. Frederick e.a., 2002). Een aanzienlijk deel 
van de literatuur veronderstelt additiviteit van nut op verschillende tijdstippen. Dit 
betekent dat het totale gedisconteerde nut van alle baten kan worden verkregen 
door het vermenigvuldigen van de hoeveelheid nut in elke periode met een 
discontofactor, en het vervolgens optellen van deze gedisconteerde hoeveelheden 
nut. Dit impliceert dat het nut van een hoeveelheid baten op een bepaald punt in 
de tijd onafhankelijk is van de hoeveelheid baten op een ander punt in de tijd. Het 
meest gebruikte gedisconteerde nutsmodel is het constante disconteermodel, 
waarin de disconteerfunctie bepaald wordt door een constante jaarlijkse 
discontovoet. De praktijk van het disconteren van toekomstige nutsstromen door 
middel van een constante voet wordt echter betwist vanwege empirisch 
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waargenomen schendingen van het constante disconteermodel (bijv. Ainslie, 
1975; Thaler, 1981; Benzion e.a., 1989). 
 Hyperbolische disconteermodellen (bijv. Harvey, 1986; Loewenstein en 
Prelec, 1992) zijn populaire alternatieven. In deze modellen is de discontovoet 
niet constant maar is per periode verschillend. Baten die na een korte tijd 
optreden, krijgen een hoger discontopercentage per periode dan baten die na een 
langere tijd optreden. Met andere woorden, hyperbolisch disconterende mensen 
handelen alsof ze geduldiger worden naarmate uitbetalingen verder in de 
toekomst optreden. Er is daarnaast een aantal andere schendingen van het 
constante disconteermodel geobserveerd, zoals het op een verschillende manier 
disconteren van winsten en verliezen (Thaler, 1981; Loewenstein, 1988). 
 Een bezwaar tegen de meeste van de bestaande empirische studies over 
tijdsvoorkeur is dat deze studies lineair nut van geld veronderstelden, of dat zij 
veronderstelden dat de nutsfunctie een bepaalde parametrische vorm had. De 
daaruit voortvloeiende tijdsvoorkeurschattingen zijn derhalve onzuiver als deze 
veronderstelling niet geldig is. Een belangrijk doel van dit proefschrift was om dit 
probleem te verhelpen door middel van het aandragen en toetsen van nieuwe 
methodes om tijdsvoorkeur te meten die deze veronderstellingen niet hoeven te 
maken. 
 Daartoe heeft Hoofdstuk 2 eerst een overzicht van de bestaande literatuur 
over tijdsvoorkeur gegeven en laten zien dat de schendingen van constante 
discontering talrijk en systematisch zijn. In dat hoofdstuk zijn eveneens de 
implicaties van deze schendingen voor medische besluitvorming bediscussieerd 
en zijn diverse voorbeelden van toepassingen op gezondheidsgerelateerd gedrag 
gepresenteerd. Hierin is duidelijk gemaakt dat de schendingen van constante 
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discontering te verklaren zijn met behulp van nieuwe modellen. Die nieuwe 
modellen kan men benutten om beleidsaanbevelingen te verbeteren. 
 Daarna is er, in Hoofdstuk 3, een methode geïntroduceerd die nut kan meten 
zonder een bepaalde parametrische vorm te veronderstellen en die vervolgens kan 
worden gebruikt om gemeten tijdsvoorkeur te corrigeren voor nutskromming. 
Bovendien meet de methode nut in een intertemporele context, zodat er gedurende 
het gehele meetproces een uniforme context gebruikt wordt. De methode is 
getoetst door middel van een experiment. De resultaten stelden mij in staat om de 
rol van nutskromming in het meten van tijdsvoorkeur te analyseren, om 
verschillende disconteermodellen met elkaar te vergelijken en om aan te geven 
welk model de data het beste beschreef. Het vergelijken van de fit van 
verschillende disconteermodellen was namelijk nog nauwelijks gedaan in eerdere 
studies. Ook heb ik getoetst of de asymmetrie tussen het disconteren van winsten 
en verliezen verklaard kon worden met behulp van verschillende nutsfuncties 
voor winsten en verliezen. Geconcludeerd werd dat intertemporeel nut concaaf 
was voor winsten en convex voor verliezen, consistent met een hypothese van 
Loewenstein en Prelec (1992). Nutskromming had echter weinig invloed op 
tijdsvoorkeur. Wel verminderde het de winstverliesasymmetrie enigszins, maar 
het verschil in discontovoeten tussen winsten en verliezen bleef significant. Een 
ander interessant resultaat was dat deze asymmetrie gevonden werd ondanks het 
gebruik van een neutraal kader. Daarom verwierpen de resultaten van dit 
hoofdstuk de stelling van Shelley (1993) dat de winstverliesasymmetrie kan 
worden verklaard door een kadereffect. 
 Voorts vond ik dat het hyperbolische disconteermodel van Loewenstein en 
Prelec (1992) de data significant beter beschreef dan het constante 
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disconteermodel en andere hyperbolische disconteermodellen, zoals het quasi-
hyperbolische disconteermodel. Dit laatste model is zeer populair in economische 
toepassingen en veronderstelt dat er sprake is van een immediacy effect. Dit 
betekent dat mensen een sterk onderscheid maken tussen baten die onmiddellijk 
verkregen worden en baten die in de toekomst verkregen worden, maar minder 
onderscheid maken tussen baten in de nabije toekomst en baten in de verdere 
toekomst. De discontovoet is met andere woorden hoog als onmiddellijke baten 
vergeleken worden met baten in de toekomst, maar is lager en constant als baten 
op verschillende punten in de toekomst vergeleken worden. Een implicatie van de 
resultaten van Hoofdstuk 3 is echter dat discontovoeten op een monotone wijze 
over de tijd dalen en, derhalve, dat hyperbolisch disconteren niet slechts door een 
immediacy effect wordt veroorzaakt zoals bij quasi-hyperbolisch disconteren. 
 In Hoofdstuk 4 is een andere methode geïntroduceerd die het mogelijk maakt 
om te toetsen of individuen afwijken van het constante disconteermodel en om 
hun afwijking van dit model te kwantificeren zonder de nutsfunctie te hoeven 
meten. De methode kan alternatieve tijdsvoorkeurmodellen toetsen. Zij maakt het 
door middel van een paar eenvoudige vragen mogelijk om te toetsen of individuen 
vatbaar zijn voor intertemporele arbitrage. Met behulp van een experiment is deze 
methode in de praktijk getoetst. In dit experiment zijn zowel schendingen van het 
constante disconteermodel als van het hyperbolische disconteermodel gevonden, 
terwijl de discontovoeten stegen bij grotere vertragingen, in tegenstelling tot de 
meeste bestaande gegevens en de resultaten van Hoofdstuk 3. De resultaten van 
Hoofdstukken 3 en 4 maken duidelijk dat geobserveerde tijdsvoorkeuren in sterke 
mate afhangen van de meetmethode. Het experiment van Hoofdstuk 3 gebruikte 
een keuzeprocedure, terwijl het experiment van Hoofdstuk 4 een matching 
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procedure gebruikte. Bij een keuzeprocedure dient de respondent te kiezen tussen 
twee alternatieven en wordt er aan de hand van zijn antwoorden naar een 
indifferentiewaarde gezocht. Bij een matching procedure, daarentegen, wordt de 
respondent gevraagd om bij één alternatief een bepaalde waarde te geven die hem 
indifferent maakt tussen twee alternatieven. Daarnaast drukte Hoofdstuk 3 
vertraging uit in maanden en jaren, terwijl Hoofdstuk 4 vertraging alleen in 
maanden uitdrukte. Een ander belangrijk verschil betreft de responsschaal. In 
Hoofdstuk 3 was dit geld, terwijl dit in Hoofdstuk 4 tijd was. Meer onderzoek 
naar de invloed van de procedure op de resultaten is daarom gerechtvaardigd. 
 In Hoofdstuk 5 is een nieuwe methode voorgesteld om tijdsvoorkeur voor 
toekomstige levensjaren te meten, ook wel bekend als het nut van levensduur. Het 
is belangrijk om kennis van deze nutsfunctie te hebben, omdat deze cruciaal is bij 
het doen van medische behandelingsaanbevelingen die het beste de belangen van 
de patiënt weergeven. De gebruikelijke manier om informatie over deze functie te 
verkrijgen is met behulp van de CE-methode, welke nut onder risico meet. Deze 
methode vereist dat de verwachte nutstheorie, de normatieve theorie voor 
beslissen onder risico, geldig is. Helaas is de verwachte nutstheorie niet zo goed 
in staat om de praktijk te verklaren (Starmer, 2000), zodat het via de CE-methode 
gemeten nut onzuiver kan zijn. Mensen hebben bijvoorbeeld vaak moeite om met 
kansen om te gaan, welke zij vaak een gewicht geven dat lager of hoger is dan de 
betreffende kans. Hier houdt de verwachte nutstheorie geen rekening mee. 
Bovendien heeft de CE-methode de uitkomst dood als stimulus. Dit leidt tot 
sterke risicoaversie en, daardoor, sterke concaafheid van nut (bijv. Tversky en 
Kahneman, 1986; Stiggelbout en De Haes, 2001; Bleichrodt e.a., 2003). 
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 Het is daarom de moeite waard om nieuwe technieken te vinden om 
schattingen van de nutskromming van levensduur te verkrijgen die een risicovrije 
context gebruiken en het opnemen van de uitkomst dood vermijden. In dit 
proefschrift heb ik een dergelijke techniek voorgesteld, te weten de risicovrije 
methode. Deze methode is wederom in een experiment getoetst en vergeleken met 
twee bestaande methoden die het nut van levensduur onder risico meten (de CE-
methode en de TO-methode). Daarnaast is er met behulp van een enquête 
onderzocht wat de respondenten van deze methoden vonden. De resultaten 
hiervan bevestigden dat zij de risicovrije methode gemakkelijker te beantwoorden 
vonden dan de andere twee methoden. Wat betreft de nutsfunctie voor levensduur 
leverde de CE-methode meer concaaf nut op dan de risicovrije methode. Dit 
verschil was echter niet langer significant na correctie voor kansweging. De 
resultaten van de TO-methode, die niet verstoord wordt door kansweging, 
verschilden niet significant van die van de risicovrije methode. Het lijkt er daarom 
op dat de risicovrije methode in staat is om een betrouwbare meting van nut te 
verschaffen en gemakkelijk toe te passen is voor praktische doeleinden. 
 Een andere opmerkelijke bevinding was dat nut beter door een exponentiële 
functie dan door de populaire machtsfunctie beschreven kon worden. Deze 
resultaten ondersteunen een constante absolute risicohouding met betrekking tot 
levensjaren in plaats van een constante relatieve risicohouding. Dit staat in 
tegenstelling tot andere studies die wel een constante relatieve risicohouding 
vonden. De precieze risicohouding van mensen heeft interessante gevolgen voor 
het QALY-model, een populair model om voorkeuren voor gezondheidsprofielen 
te beschrijven. Een constante absolute risicohouding, en de daarmee gepaard 
gaande exponentiële nutsfunctie voor levensduur, is consistent met constante 
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discontering van toekomstige levensjaren. Een constante relatieve risicohouding, 
en de daarmee gepaard gaande machtsfunctie voor levensduur, is juist consistent 
met een hyperbolische discontering van toekomstige levensjaren. 
 
Eén nutsbegrip 
 
Dit proefschrift heeft ook bekeken of er één nutsbegrip bestaat dat geldig is in 
verschillende situaties of dat nut contextafhankelijk is en per domein verschilt. 
Economen betogen traditiegetrouw dat nut per domein verschilt en dat de 
nutsfunctie die relevant is voor besluitvorming onder risico daardoor niet kan 
worden toegepast in andere contexten, zoals besluitvorming onder zekerheid en 
intertemporele besluitvorming (zie Wakker, 1994, voor een overzicht). Op het 
gebied van de gezondheidseconomie is er echter een tendens om 
overdraagbaarheid van nut te veronderstellen. De TTO-methode, bijvoorbeeld, 
meet nut in een intertemporele context, maar de resulterende TTO-waarderingen 
worden dikwijls in economische evaluaties van de gezondheidszorg gebruikt, dat 
wil zeggen in welvaartseconomie. Hetzelfde geldt voor nut dat is gemeten met 
behulp van de standard gamble methode die beslissingen onder risico beschouwt. 
 Dit proefschrift heeft nutsfuncties voor geld en gezondheid in verschillende 
beslissingscontexten op een experimentele wijze gemeten. Een noviteit in dit 
proefschrift is dat nut voor geld is gemeten in een intertemporele situatie 
(Hoofdstuk 3). De resultaten zijn vergeleken met voorgaande nutsmetingen in een 
onzekere of risicovolle situatie. De bevindingen stemden in grote mate overeen, 
hetgeen een universeel nutsconcept ondersteunt. Daarnaast heeft Hoofdstuk 5 de 
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risicovrije methode om het nut van levensduur in een risicovrije situatie te meten 
voorgesteld. De experimentele resultaten die met deze methoden werden 
verkregen, werden voor dezelfde respondenten vergeleken met de experimentele 
resultaten van twee andere bekende meetmethoden die een risicovolle situatie 
gebruiken. Er werden geen significante verschillen gevonden na correctie voor 
kansweging. Als we beseffen dat kansweging een afwijking is die niets met 
nutskromming te maken heeft, dan is deze bevinding opnieuw bewijs ten gunste 
van één nutsbegrip. 
 Deze resultaten hebben belangrijke implicaties. Zij steunen bijvoorbeeld de 
overdraagbaarheid van nut naar verschillende domeinen en daardoor de 
gebruikelijke praktijk in de gezondheidseconomie om TTO-nut (tijdsdomein) en 
standard gamble nut (risicodomein) te gebruiken in economische evaluaties 
(welvaartseconomiedomein). Bovendien verwerpen deze resultaten de gangbare 
opvatting in de economische wetenschap dat nut contextafhankelijk is.  
 
De TTO-methode 
 
Hoofdstukken 6, 7 en 8 pasten de resultaten toe op TTO, een belangrijke methode 
om het nut van gezondheid te meten. De meting van het nut van levensduur is 
gebruikt om de TTO-methode te corrigeren voor nutskromming. In een TTO 
dienen individuen een afweging te maken tussen kwaliteit van leven en duur van 
leven. Een probleem van de TTO-methode is echter de veronderstelling van 
lineair nut van levensduur, terwijl die vaak concaaf blijkt te zijn doordat veel 
mensen toekomstige levenstijd disconteren. Dit resulteert in een te laag nut voor 
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gezondheidstoestanden (Bleichrodt, 2002). Het is wenselijk om dit verschil te 
kwantificeren en hiervoor te corrigeren. 
 Er zijn enkele eerdere pogingen ondernomen om TTO-scores te corrigeren 
voor het nut van levensduur (bijv. Stiggelbout e.a., 1994; Stalmeier e.a., 1996; 
Van Osch e.a., 2004; Van der Pol en Roux, 2005), maar de meeste van deze 
studies gebruikten de CE methode, wat vereist dat de verwachte nutstheorie 
geldig is. Als dit niet het geval is, zal de correctie van TTO-scores onjuist zijn. In 
dit proefschrift is de risicovrije methode aangewend om TTO-scores voor de 
nutskromming van levensduur te corrigeren, zodat men niet afhankelijk is van de 
geldigheid van de verwachte nutstheorie en de invloed van de uitkomst dood. De 
verschillen met ongecorrigeerde TTO-scores zijn onderzocht en de rol van 
nutscorrectie in diverse schendingen van de TTO-methode is verkend. 
 In Hoofdstuk 6 heb ik uitgelegd hoe de risicovrije methode gebruikt kan 
worden om TTO-scores voor nutskromming van levensduur te corrigeren en heb 
ik geschat hoe groot deze correctie is. Vanwege de concave vorm van de 
nutsfuncties waren de gecorrigeerde TTO-scores significant hoger dan de 
ongecorrigeerde TTO-scores. De grootte van dit verschil was ongeveer 0.05 
(ongeveer 6%). 
 Hoofdstuk 7 toetste of TTO-scores afhankelijk zijn van de gebruikte 
meetprocedure. Als twee verschillende procedures om TTO te meten 
verschillende uitkomsten geven, kunnen de conclusies van economische 
evaluaties sterk afhangen van de gebruikte procedure. Het is daarom belangrijk te 
weten hoe deze verschillen veroorzaakt worden en welke procedure het beste 
gehanteerd kan worden. In Hoofdstuk 7 beschouwde ik de invloed van het nut van 
levensduur op de ongelijkheid tussen twee verschillende TTO-procedures. Mijn 
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bevindingen waren dat corrigeren voor het nut van levensduur deze ongelijkheid 
vermindert, hoewel een groot en significant verschil overblijft. Dit wordt 
waarschijnlijk veroorzaakt door afkeer van verliezen, wat betekent dat mensen 
geneigd zijn om negatieve uitkomsten, bezien vanaf een bepaald referentiepunt, 
meer gewicht te geven dan soortgelijke positieve uitkomsten bezien vanaf dit 
referentiepunt (Tversky en Kahneman, 1991). 
 Ten slotte heeft Hoofdstuk 8 de CPTO-eigenschap van de TTO-methode 
behandeld. Deze eigenschap houdt in dat de gemeten TTO-score hetzelfde moet 
zijn voor verschillende duren. Als iemand bijvoorbeeld acht jaar in volledige 
gezondheid equivalent vindt aan tien jaar met rugklachten, dan zou hij acht 
maanden in volledige gezondheid equivalent moeten vinden aan tien maanden 
met rugklachten. Het bestaande bewijs over deze eigenschap is besproken en er is 
een nieuwe toets uitgevoerd om te onderzoeken of het nut van levensjaren op een 
constante proportionele manier werd afgeruild. Het bleek dat noch gewone 
levensjaren, noch het nut van levensjaren in een constante proportionele manier 
werden afgeruild. Dit resultaat is evidentie tegen de beschrijvende geldigheid van 
het QALY-model voor besluitvorming in de gezondheidszorg. 
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